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Abstract
False polarization is an overestimation ofa gap between the views of two sides
that OCcurs because social perceivers expect their peers to be more susceptible
\0 group norms than themselves, Shared reality is a generic term denoting social
verification of information by individuals and groups. This thesis explores the
relation between shared social reality and false polarization in situations where
twa groups take the perspectives of each other. A special emphasis in the-thesis
is put on intergroup attributions. In Study I, [\\'0 ex peri rnentsexarni ned the
differences between evaluative and descriptive aspects of intergroup perception.
In Experiment 1. Latvian and Russian students agreed on the descriptive scores
of mutual ratings, but they disagreed on the evaluative ones. In Experiment 2,
male and female psychology Sll;lden'l<: did n01 show any dis~greement either for
evaluative or descriptive scores, but theyexpected their peers to be in-group
biased in e aluation of both groups. In Study 2, supporters and opponents f
Latvia's. E membership exhibited a false polarizaticn effect when rating
various causal explanations of attitudinal behavior of both groups. Stud. 3
replicated this result with free response causal explanations. Content analysis of
the data showed that simulated explanations of a target behavior given from the
opposite group perspectives differed more lin tenus of perceiving the actors'
awareness of causes of behavior and in terms of using mental slate markers)
than those given from the partisans' own perspective. In Study 4, (\"0
experiments dernonstrated that ED supporters and opponents could not
differerniate between explanations given by in-group members and out-group
members who imagined the same perspective and responded more favorably to
explanations given from the explainers' own perspective than from the imagined
perspectives. In general, the results demonstrate the robustness of the false
polarization effect across various contexts. The findings also illustrate the
complexity of the term "shared social reality." Furthermore, in the coruext of
intergroup perception. these findings suggest that the most appropriate
opera! iona Iizat ion 0 r th is concept shoul d be shared stereotypes between grou ps.
f<.:t'}. words Shared reality. social reality , false polarization effect, social
percept ion, percept ion a r bias, soda l categorizatlcn, in-group favorit ism.
intergroup attribution .. intergroup perception, eausalexplanaticn,
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ITRODUCTIO
"In a Grove" a short story by the early 20lhcentury Japanese writer
Ryunosuke Akutagawa, develops like. a conventional detective story. A samurai
has been killed and his wife raped in a cedar grove nearby a country road, The
readers learn the details of the crime from first-person reports of a number of
witnessesra woodcutter who found the body; a monk who was the last 10 see
the man alive; the mother of the woman; and the policeman who arrested the
suspect. Despite the unusual form of narrative" every detail fits together neatly
as the reader and the police commissioner simultaneously solve the crime. That
is. everything fits unti I the reader hears the stories of the three main characters.
The suspected murderer boastfully confesses how he killed the man in the
hardest swordfight of his life. The tearful woman reveals how she killed her
husband out of shame of what happened to her, failing to commit suicide.
Finally, speaking through a medium, the dead man reveals that he killed himself
because of his wife's infidelity. What happened in the grove was very real; the
man died. However, what the police commissioner has in front of him are three
separate realities, realities with the same physical proof. Until at least two
accounts agree, the commissioner has little if any hope of finding the "real
truth".
What will not escape the reader's notice is that each character's story is
very much in line with that character's social role. The thief, the samurai, and
his wife all behave exactly like representatives of these social groups would be
expected LO act in traditional Japanese society. Every narrative serves perfectly
to save the narrator's face: everybody did the right thing onder the
circumstances. The commissioner may find it hard to accept but perhaps none
of the characters are lying, There are as many truths as many faces need to be
saved. To rephrase this tenet using the terms of social science, there are as many
psychological realities as there are social perceivers reflecting on the same
phys ica I reality. Eac h psycho Iogi c al reali ty is determined by the percei ver ' s
unique perspective, shaped by his or herinterests, individual traits, and soda I
category memberships. Unless these realities are compared and verified against
each other, each one is perfectly valid on its own. Akutagawa never lets the
reader know what really happened in the grove.
Divergent accounts of the same event shaped by the perceivers' interests
are by no means limited to eccentric literary characters as the classic case study
by Hastorf and Cantril (1954) shows. The reports of the same controversial
football game in the campus papers of Princeton and Dartmouth sound as
different as the stories told by Akutagawa's characters. When the researchers
asked undergraduates of born universities to judge the game, both groups
differed in the number of infractions they saw each team to commit and in their
interpretation ofthe seriousness of these infractions. These resu Its lead Hastorf
and Cantril to conclude that "there is no such 'thing' as a 'game' existing 'out
there' in its own right which people merely 'observe', The 'game' 'exists' for a
person and is experienced by him only in so far as certain happenings have
signi flcances in terms of his purpose .... The sharing of signi ficances provi des
the links except for which a 'social' event would not be experienced and would
not exist for anyone" (p. 133).
This "sharing of significances" that turns subjective experiences into
objective "reality" constitutes the focus of the present thesis. More specifically,
this thesis looks at how the interaction between cognitive factors, such as
asymmetric perception of bias in self and others. and social factors, such as
group norms and social stereotypes, shape the perception and interpretation of a
shared social reality between two groups. Two concepts are central to the
research reported below. One is "shared reality",a generic term denoting social
verification of information by individuals and groups. The other is "false
polarizatlon", an overestimation of a gap between the views of two sides
involved ina conflict or controversy. Four empirical studies focus on the
relation between both concepts. The thesis Introduction provides a theoretical
background. to these studies and discusses their contribution to social
psycho logy.
The thesis introduction consists of three parts. The first part, divided into
seven sections gives an overview of the previous research in the field of
intergroup perception that forms a basis for the empirical studies of this thesis.
The first section is devoted to the concept of shared social real ity, with a special
focus Oil the problem of defining and operationalizing this concept in social
psychological research. The second section gives a short overview of the topic
of perspective raking. The third section reviews the empirical evidence of
asymmetric perception of cognitive biases in self and others and discusses the
"naive realism" theory of social perception. The fourth section gives an
overview of the previous studies of the false polarization effect. The fifth
section is devoted to the effects of soeialcategorization on the social perception
and inference. The sixth section discusses stereotyping as one of the
consequences of social categorization. The seventh section provides information
about previous empirical research of intergroup anributionsand various
possible class! flcations 0 f causal explanations that can be used in attribution
studies. The second part of the introduction provides an overview of the four
empirical studies upon which this thesis Is based. The third part discusses the
major findings and contributions of this thesi s, the Iimitations of the reported
empirical studies, and possible directions for further research.
Shared Social Realil:y
Festinger (\950) concluded, "where the dependence upon physical reality
is low the dependence upon social reality is correspondingly high. An opinion, a
belief, an altitude is 'correct', 'valid', and 'proper' to the extent that it is anchored
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in a group ofpeople with similar beliefs, opinions, and altitudes" (pp. 272-273).
For Festinger 0950, 1954), there exists a duality between physical and social
realities; physical reality is given precedence when the conditions allow for easy
testing of assumptions about this reality. The social reality forms the basis of
opinions, attitudes, and beliefs for which the physical evidence is ambiguous, or
impossible, Hardin and Higgins (1996) cite plenty of evidence to Festinger's
predictions about social verification of opinions, beliefs and jirtitudes.
However, they assume no distinction between physical and social realities,
arguing that any experience, including individual sensations,can be considered
reliable and valid only to the extent that it. is socially verified. In the absence of
such verification, any experience is random and transitory .. Indeed the very
criteria of what is considered "objectively" real or "physically" measurable are
also determined through social consensus.
An early demonstration of the role of shared social reality in verifying
individual experience is offered by Sherif's (1936, chapter 6) autokinetic
experiments .. In these experiments, participants where asked to judge the
magnitude and direction of movement of a point of light in a darkened room. In
reality, the point of light is fixed but appears to move erratically, When the
participants performed the task alone, they tended to create a subjective point of
reference and subjective norm to estimate the "rnovernent''; there was a strong
tendency to preserve this nann throughout subsequent trials. When no
externally given reference points were available, the first estimation became a
standard for further comparisons. As one might have expected, these standards
differed betx een the participants ..When the participants first performed the task
by themselves and subsequently in groups of two and three, their judgments
quickly converged to form a group norm. When the participants started the task
in groups, a group nann was established even faster and was maintained by the
individuals when they subsequently performed the task alone. The subjective
experiences of group members became objective through social verification,
Hardin and Higgins (1996) argue that when an experience is recognized
and shared with others in the process of social interaction, it achieves reliability,
validity, generality, and predictability. The reliability of a shared experience is
demonstrated by its repealed recognition by others, Through this recognition an
individual learns that the experience is reproducible in others and thus is not
random or incidental. Social verification also validates an experience, showing
that it is hot only a subjective perception but corresponds 10 some objective
reality. It is important to stress, however, that the validity of an experience is
achieved within a specific social group, andthe same socially validated "facts"
can be interpreted differently by another group from a different perspective ..The
human need for social verification of one's experience is demonstrated by
Asch's (1958) experiments on conformity, Experimental manipuletions showed
that the presence of a "true partner" considerably reduced thetendency to
conform (0 the majority's. opinion. Even {he slightest evidence of social
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verification significantly boosted people's confidence in the validity and
reliability of their own experience and encouraged them to speak up against the
majority. More recently, Luus and Wells (1994) demonstrated that individuals'
confidence in their own judgements varied signiflcaurly depending on social
verification of these judgements, Eyewirnesses' confidence in accuracy of
identifying a suspect in a photo-lineup largely depended on whether they
believed another witness had identified the same suspect.
Hard in and Higgins (1996) define shared reality as an ongoi ng, dynamic
process of social verification through which an experience achieves the
phenornenologicel status of objective reality. This verification can take place
through communication when an individual does not have any direct experience
with the subject of knowledge. In this case, people simply learn and compare
the altitudes, beliefs, and opinions of others. The verification can also happen
through active social interaction where individuals have joint experiences and,
on the: basis of these experiences, form knowledge. Like Festinger, Hardin and
Higgins are interested primarily in functions of shared reality for the individual
and the consequences of shared reality on interpersonal interaction and
communication. Shared reality has important consequences for creating and
maintaining the experience of self: the more a given aspect of self has been
recognized in the social verification process, the more "real" it becomes, and the
more likely it is to be maintained and defended. Shared reality regulates social
interaction by allowing individuals to predict expectations and behaviors of
others; it regulates communication by allowing individuals to tailor their
messages to a particular audience and to evaluate audienc e feedback as well as
to provide appropriate feedback to other individuals.
For the individual social perceiver, any direct or indirect interaction with
others provides some information about existence or absence of shared reality.
In addition, it allows people 10 estimate the extent of overlap in opinions,
attitudes, and beliefs of self and others. For a. social scientist, however, the
definition and measurement of shared reality constitutes a methodological
challenge .. One can think of several ways how the construct of shared reality can
be operationalized, As far as the researchers are interested in the consequences
of shared reality for an individual-s self-perception, choice of communicative or
behavioral strategies or general beliefs about the world-vshared reality can be
defined as an individual's subjective experience of sharing his beliefs. opinions,
or attitudes with others. For example, Hardin and Higgins (1996 pp. 58-59)
defined [he se If~attributes of part iei pan ts in their experiments as "shared" if
subjects believed at least one other person thought the attribute characteristic of
them. From this point of view, either the definition or measurement of shared
reality does not pose a real problem.
The situation is different when shared reality has to be defined and
measured. on an interpersonal level. Those are situations, for example, when
presence or absence of shared reality has consequences for [he efficiency of
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communication (e.g, Nickerson. 1999) or group performance (e.g., Moreland,
Argote, & Krishnan, 1996). For a communication or cooperation to succeed. it
is important that two or more people really share information, beliefs, opinions.
attitudes, or common understanding of objects or events; it is not enough that
these people subjectively believe in sharing social reality with the relevant
otherts) .. In such a situation, one possibility to measure shared reality is simply
by reference to the outcome of the respective social activity for which the
necessity of shared reality is assumed. If communication is successful or if a
group succeeds on a task that requires shared understanding and knowledge, one
mayctairn that such an outcome confirms the existence of shared reality
between or among the group members. Such an approach, however, would be
formal and without any exploratory and predictive qualities. Another way to
operationalize shared reality is to measure to what extent group members agree
in their views of each other and/or in [heir evaluations of other people or
objects. Any "objective" criteria of accuracy, like physical measurements or
expert judgements, are 0f litile practi cal use. A member 0 f a worki ng group may
consider oneself hardworking, but all the other group members may consider
the same person as having a habit to ingratiate herself with the boss. The same
objective rneasurement-vthe long hours the person spends at work--may serve to
justify both opinions.
What is considered "accurate" depends on the perspective of each social
perceiver. The agreement between/among group members can be studied in two
ways (Kenny & Albright, 1987). First, one may ask if the other(s) view the
person as self does, Second, one may ask if people know how the otherts) see
them and/or other people, objects, events. In this sense, one can say that a
shared reality exists in a group if at least two individuals agree on their
evaluations of each otherand/or their evaluations of another person, event. or
object. Alternatively, in groups of more than two individuals the mean rating of
the same target by all judges can be taken as the measurement of shared reality.
and individual ratings can be compared to that mean to estimate shared reality
between separate individuals and the group as .3 whole .. Of course, the
researcher has to decide whatconstitutes a high or low agreement especially in
cases where only two individuals judge each other.
The social-regulatory functions of shared reality include creation and
maintenance of group norms. On the one hand, group members as individuals
actively participate in the creal ion of group standards and norms, which
constitute the shared reality ina group. On the other hand, the group as a whole
imposes this shared reality on each member. The group norms largely determine
what attitudes, beliefs, and opinions each member is supposed to have. In other
words, shared reality in a group is created by shared group identity. Research
has shown that people's susceptibility 10 social. influence depends on their self-
categorization as members of a particular group and their acceptance of the
norms of that group (Turner & Oakes, 1989). Thus, informarion coming from an
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in-group source and seen as prototypical of in-group norms is more readily
accepted as true than information coming from other sources (Hogg & Turner,
1987; Van Knippenberg & Wilke, 1992).
This pervasive influence ofgroup norms on individual attitudes, beliefs,
and behaviors leads to several questions. What happens when two individuals
belonging to two different groups (thus representing different shared realities)
interact? To what extent do these individuals share a social reality between
them? This question can be answered from two perspectives-vby Iooking for
shared reality either at a different level of social categorization, or alternatively,
at the same level of categorization (i.e., the dimension of comparison that makes
individuals' group memberships salient),
Individuals belong to multiple social categories at the same time (Turner, Hogg,
Oakes, Reicher, & Wetherell, 1987), and different categories (i.e., group
memberships) can become salient depending on the situational context. No
matter how antagonistic the group identities of two individuals may be, there is
likely to be another and more inclusive social category that would allow these
individuals to see themselves as belonging to the same category (e.g., members
of the same society, culture, or, most inclusively, humankind). Societal beliefs
shared by the same society ensure that any two members of that society are
likely 10 share some social identiry, and through that, also some social reality
(Bar-Tal, 2000). A militant atheist and an ardently religious person may not
share a single common belief regarding meaning or origin of human life. Still,
they are likely to share social norms that require handling their controversy
either through civilized discussion or by politely ignoring each other without
resolving to rudeness or physical violence. Thus, even with their incompatible
social identities (atheist or religious) salient, they still share the common social
reality of their society or culture. It is a higher-order shared reality in the sense
that itis imposed on these individuals (and on the groups that they represent) by
a larger, more inclusive social group. This higher-order shared reality is a
necessary pre-cond ilion for proper functioning of the soc iety,
Of course, conflicts and controversies between groups are not the only
contexts where the higher-order shared reality is displayed, Different groups can
share many beliefs as members of the same society. Societal beliefs may
include my ths, collective memories, symbols, ideologies, seif-irnages, images of
other societies, goals, values, or social aspirations (Bar-Tal, ZOOO). Moreover,
two groups can agree on mutual stereotypes as long as these stereotypes are
accepted as true on a higher societal level of social verification (Oakes &
Reynolds. 1997). However. although competing groups may agree on the
descripri ve nature of mutual stereotypes they are likely to see the same traits as
positive when those traits refer to the in-group and as negative when the same
traits refer to Ihe out-group (Hilton & Von Hippel, 1996; Peabody, 1968).
An interesting question is whether the representatives of opposing groups
share some social reality as members of botb social categories at the level of
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their ideological controversy. Is there a shared reality between two groups in
conflict regarding the subject, nature, and contents of this conflict? Tajfel
(1981 ajemphasizee that social categorization divides the social world. It is
impossible to have an in-group without contrasting it to some out-group.
Beliefs, attitudes, opinions, and practices that define- groups have their special
value for the group members because they are seen as superior to those held by
other groups. Billig (2003) notes that hum an thinking isinherent Iy rhetorical in
itself, rhetorical in the sense that internal thinking is a form of self-deliberation
and self-persuasion. Thus, one's attitude, belief, or opinion is largely a stance
directed against possible counter-stances. Onan intergroup level, in-group is
defined not only by what it is, but also by what it is not, or by what relevant out-
groups are in contrast to the in-group. Reicher and Hopkins (i 996) found that
the sel f-categori es, wh ic h representat iyes 0 f po Iirica t facti oris u sed. to depi cl
themselves and their parties, were not fixed but were rhetoricallyconstructed to
use against the position and arguments of the other side. To use the stance of the
out-group for strengthening one's own arguments, people should have fairly
good knowledge of beliefs and atti rudesconsti tuti ng this sta nee. Moreover, to
construct a successful attack on the opponents' position, group members should
to some extent understand the reasoning behind out-groups arguments, so their
response can be predicted. The same is true about defending one's own stance
against a possible attack. McGuire's (1964) classic experiments on inducing
resistance to persuasion serve to illustrate this point: previous exposure
("inoculation") to moderate amounts of propaganda that provoked the
participants to look for counter-ergurnents made these participants more
resistant to subsequent attempts of persuasion than unprepared participants. TI1e
stance of one side is formulated with the stance of the other side in mind; thus
both groups can be said to share a common social reality .. In a way, on an
intergroup level, the function of creating a shared reality is still social
verification, but these are not individual experiences that are verified. They are
shared beliefs and attitudes of the groups. The method of verification is not
through confirmation (i.e., testing if others share the group's belief), but through
argumentation (i.e., testing if the group's belief can stand its ground in a contest
with an opposing belief).
The definition and measurement of shared reality between groups is
similar to that used for individuals. Shared reality can be operationalized as
agreement between groups about how these groups see each other and each
other's beliefs and attitudes about other groups or topics. One can do this by
asking all group members (or representative samples of group members) to
provide their own opinions and to predict the responses of another group to the
same questions. Similarity between the actual and predicted group means
indicates agreement, and thus, existence of a shared reality.
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Perspective Taking
As Hardin and Higgins (1996) point out, shared knowledge is constructed
in part through a process of reciprocal perspective taking. Mead (I 934)
distinguished between I, the jrnpulsive, non-reflective self, and me, the
reflective, socially guided self, that is developed throughinternalizing social
norms. Through me the individual achieves self-consciousness as a social being,
becomes able to communicate with others, and positions and orients oneself in
any given social context and. in society as a whole. To develop this reflective
aspect of self, an individual must Jearn to see oneself through the eyes of others,
or, in other words, to take the perspective of others. The ability of perspective
laking is acquired early in life by interacting with other people, which forces
children 10 start seeing themselves from the viewpoint of others, Approximately
at the age of 7 children learn to shift from the egocentric perspective of the
world to a more self-conscious perspective, becoming aware of the need for
verification of their ideasthrough discursi ve argumentation (Piaget, 1928/1999).
Developmentally. this shift in human thinking coincides with the learning of
geometrical representation of perspectives-vlearning to mentally represent an
object from a perspective from which it is not physically perceived (Piaget &
Inhelder, 1956/L997). Taking into account other people's perspectives has been
shown 10 be an important factor for efficiency of social communication and
regulation of soei al interacti on (Krauss & Fussell, 1996).
Montgomery (1994) points tethe similarities between perspectives in
perception and thinking. Similar to the way a certain visual perspective results
in an observer seeing an object in a certain way (some features in the
foreground, some in the background, and some altogether out of the picture),
adopting a certain cognitive perspective influences people's judgements and
decisions about different objects. It is assumed that the qualities of an object of
perception or judgement are independent of the perspective from which the
object is viewed. However, depending on the perspective adcpted by the
perceiver, certain attributes of the object become more salient. (In perceptional
terms, they are brought to the foreground). Any object or event can be seen in a
positive or negative light depending on the perspective. The same person can be
seen as stingy or economical, or the same act can be interpreted as brave or
stupidly reckless. According to Montgomery (1994), an object can be seen from
an inside or an outside perspective. When an inside perspective is adopted, the
object is seen as affiliated with the subject (perceiver), and the subject focuses
on the advantages of the object In contrast, when an outside perspective is
adapted, the disadvantages of the object come into the foreground. It is also
possible: 10 distinguish between three subject-based perspectives, depending on
the identification of the perceiver. The perceiver can identify with the
Following: (a) the self only (the object evaluation is guided by personal interests
of the self); (b) the self and some other entities, for example, an in-group (the
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object evaluation depends on the group interests); or (c) some other entity or
entities such as an out-group (the object of evaluation depends on the perceiver's
interpretation of that out-group's interests), It is assumed that the perceiver is
able to switch among the different combinations of subject-based and object-
based (l.e., inside and outside) perspectives. This assumption has important
irnplications for studies of intergroup perception: by taking the perspective of an
out-group, the perceiver should be able to see one's in-group from an outside
perspective. That is; the perceiver can see as the out-group members themselves
see the perceiver's in-group, Ofcourse, this is only possible if both groups share
some social reality; that is, the perceiver must have at least some knowledge
about the norms, beliefs, and opinions of the oth.er group.
There is mixed support regarding the effectiveness of perspective taking
in interpersonal and intergroup contexts. Some experiments on interpersonal
attrlbution have found that literally changing the physical perspective ill an
interaction can reverse the actor -observer effect (Regan & Totten, 1975; Storm s,
1973). Anderson and Picherr (l97a.) report that part icipants recalled different
in fa rrn arion Irorn a Iic ti t ious scenario dependi ng on the imagined perspect ive
from which the recall was made. Frank and Gilovich (19&9) asked their
participants to recall an earlier conversation from either their own or an
observer perspective. The participants made more dispositional attributions to
their own behavior when they recalled the conversation from an observer
perspective. Some studies have found that when taking an out-group's
perspective, group members indeed- seem to identify with thai group and start
seeing their own group from an outside perspective, exhibiting biases in favor
of the group whose perspective they are faking (Austers, 2002a- Austers &
Montgomery, 2001). Moreover, groups can be fairly accurate in predicting an
out-group's opinion from that group's perspective; it is similar to the actual
opinion of the group (Kemdal & Montgomery, 200 I). However, other research
has documented systematic biases in perspective taking such as imputing one's
knOWledge to others (Fussel & Krauss, 199\;. Nickerson, Baddeley, & Freeman,
1987). Mikula, Athenstaedt, Heschgl, and Heimgartner U998) found systematic
dIfferences in the way actors and recipients interpreted negative incidents in
interpersonal relationships when taking each other's perspectives. This means
[hal accuracy in perspective taking is by no means granted and may depend on a
number of factors. One such factor can be an assumption thai other people are
biased and thus not able or willing to see things the same way as the social
perceiver does.
Perception of Bias in Self and Others
Pronin, Puccio, and Ross (2002) note that "people readily recognize
biases in others that they do not recognize in themselves, and as a result, they
make overly negative attributions about others whose views and self-interested
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motives seem 'conveniently' congruent" (p. 638). Pronin, Gllovich, and Ross (in
press) review a Dumber of studies that support this assertion. According to these
authors, the evidence showing the asymmetry of perception of cognitive biases
in self versus others comes from three types of studies. First, there are studies
that demonstrate people's failure to recognize cognitive biases in themselves.
For example, research has shown thar people are unaware of how their general
evaluation of targets influence their ratings of specific target attributes (Nisbett
& Wilson, 1977b) even when informed about the "halo effect" and asked to
become conscious of the causes of their ratings (Wetzel, Wilson. & Kort 198]);
they 'are unaware of theeffect that outcome know ledge has on their perceptions
(Fischhoff, 1975); they display overconfidence in their predictions despite
systematic underestimation of time for task completion (Buehler, Griffin, &
Ross, 1994); and they underest imate their capac it)' to generate satisfaction wi lh
future outcomes and mistakenly attribute such satisfaction to external agents
(Gilbert, Brown, Pinel, & Wilson, 2000).
Results from the second category of studies suggest that people recognize
and expect cognitive biases in others. For example, research shows that actors
correctly expect observers 10 make correspondent inferences (Miller, Baer, &
Schonberg, 1979; Von Boven, Kamada, & Gilovich, .1999), but may
overestimate the extent of observers' correspondence bias (Van Boven er al.,
1999); people have intuitive understanding of the false consensus effectand
predict it in others (Krueger & Zeiger, 1993); people expect the actor-observer
effect to appear ill attributions made by others (Austers & Montgomery, 200 I;
Kemdal & Montgomery, 2001). These findings demonstrate that although the
social observers may not notice the presence of cognitive biases in their own
judgements, they often have intuitive knowledge of such biases in the general
population and are able to use this knowledge in making predictions about the
opinions and behaviors of other people.
Finally, the third group includes studies that have compared the
perception of cognitive bias in self versus other people. For example, Kruger
and Gilovieh (1999) report that marriedcouples, debaters, and video game and
dart players expected their peers, but not themselves, to be motivationally
biased in allocating responsibility for desirable and undesirable joint outcomes,
Van Boven, White, Kamada, and Gilovich (2003) found that people expected
their peers to make more extreme dispositional inferences than they did
themselves for a situationally constrained actor's behavior. Miller and Ratner
(1998) found that individuals overestimate the role of self-Interest as a
motivator of other people's actions. Heath (1999) reports, similar results-vpeople
expect others to be more rnotivared than themselves by extrinsic incentives (like
job security or pay) and less motivated by intrinsic incentives (like learning new
things or skill development). In four studies examining the mechanisms behind
the better- than average effect, Epley and Dunning (2000) found that the
participants overestimated the likelihood that they would act in generous or
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selfless ways. but were quite accurate in predicting selfishly motivated actions
in others. Other studies have shown tha: people see themselves as less likely to
display self-serving bias than the average person (Friedrich, 1996); participants
in anchoring studies report they have been less influenced by the experimental
manipulation than others but fail. to recognize the impact of the anchor on their
own estimates (Wilson, Houston, Etling, & Brekke, i996);. and people expect
out-group members to be biased in their evaluations whereas seeing their own
evaluations as similar to impartial third-party judgements (Vivian & Berkowitz,
1992).
Pronin, Lin, and Ross (2002) report on what appears to be so far the most
extensive and systematic study of bias perception in self and others. They asked
the participants La rate their own and others' susceptibility to a num ber of biases.
In two surveys, Stanford students judged themselves less susceptible than and
average American or an average fellow classmate to eight different biases (self-
serving attributions for success versus failure, dissonance reduction after free
choice. the positi ve ha I0 effect, biasedassirni (at;on of new informat ion, reactive
devaluation of proposals from one's negotiation counterparts, perceptions of
hostile media bias toward one's group or cause, the fundamental attribution
error in '<blaming the victim" and judgments about the "greater good"
influenced by self-interest), In the third survey, these results were replicated
with travelers at San Francisco international airport comparing themselves with
fellow travelers, and with another seven biases added to the design (friend
enhancement, trust of strangers, trust of borrowers, generous attribution,
down-ward and upward comparison biases, and the gambler's fallacy). In
addition, participants of this survey rated themselves as less susceptible than
their peers to low availability biases (but not high availabiliry biases) and
"socially undesirable" biases (but not "socially desirable' biases). Interestingly.
however, neither student nor traveler participants rated themselves as less prone
than their peers to such personal limitations as procrastination, fear of public
speaking, and the planning fallacy. Pronin et al. also found that most
participants failed to acknowledge the influence of better-than-average effect on
their ratings after being made aware of this bias (Study 2) and that the
participants were more inclined \0 detect self-enhancement bias in their dyad
partners than in themselves (Study 3). The authors conclude that "knowledge of
particular biases in human judgement and inference, and the ability to recognize
the impact of those biases on others, neither prevents one from succumbing nor
makes one aware of having done so" (p. 378).
It is tempting to explain the asymmetric pattern of bias perception as a
manifestation of human need for positive self-evaluation (Tesser, 1(88) through
social comparison. Given the evidence of the impact of motivation on human
judgements (Kunda, 1990) and given the negativeeonnotations associated with
the concept of bias, it does not seem unlikely that people overlook biases in
themselves and seek them out in others in order to look better In comparison.
II
Pronin et al, (in press) admit that motivational factors probably playa role in
people's claims of less-than-average susceptibility to bias, but they argue that
these factors are likely to operate alongside with purely cognitive, non-
rnori vari ana I mechanisms of the human mind to produce the asymmetry effect.
Building on the classic work of Ichheiser (1949), Ross and Ward (1996)
have offered an explanation for this asymmetry to people's ability to recognize
cognitive bias.es In themselves and others. They argue. that although some
aspects of the human egocentrism disappear in the course of experience and
maturation, the process is never completed. Despite their ability to recognize
that other individuals see the world from different perspectives than themselves,
people fail to acknowledge the extent to which the other perspectives can differ
from their own point of view, In other words, people make insufficient
allowance for the construal differences between themselves and others. Ross
and Ward term this worldview "naive realism". Lay epistemology of natve
realism is based on three tenets:
1. People believe that they see entities and events "as they are in objective
reality", and that their attitudes, beliefs, and preferences follow from a direct
and unbiased apprehension of this reality.
2. Other social perceivers, who have access to the same information and who
have processed this information in a rational manner, should share the naive
realist's reactions, behaviors, and opinions. This belief, for example, results
in the false consensus effect (Marks & Miller, 1987; Ross, Green, & House,
\977).
3. The failure of other social perceivers to do so arises from one of three
possible sources: (a) the individual or group in question might have been
exposed to a different source of information than the naive realist; (b) the
individual or group in question rna)' be unable or unwilling to process the
information in a rational and nonnative way; and [c) the individual or group
in question may be biased (either in interpreting the evidence or proceeding
[rom evidence to concfusions) by ideology, self interest, or some other
distorting personal influence.
Two mechanisms seem 10 account for the line of reasoning behind the
tenets of naive realism. First, research has shown that people are not very good
at introspection and tend 10 rely on a priori causal theories rather than true
introspection when reporting on their cognitive processes (Nisbett & Wilson,
19'17a; Nisbett & Ross, 1980, Chapter 9). This tendency may largely account
for the first tenet or the starting point of nalve realism. People simply lack the
necessary cognitive ability to detect biases in their thinking. Moreover. people
not only fail 1:0 find evidence of cognitive bias in their reasoning, but they also
do tind evidence of their efforts to avoid such a bias. Pronin et al. (in press)
refer to this phenomenon as "introspection illusion" because it leads people to
mistakenly perceive the results of their own introspection as complete and valid.
12
When others fail to meet the predictions of the second tenet, the social
perceiver is forced to seek explanation for their behavior. The third tenet offers
three possible explanations: the first deals with the situational constraints of the
person or group in question. (i.e., lack of information), and the ather two explain
the behavior in the terms ofthat person's or group's dispositional qualities. This
is where the second mechanism-ccorrespondence bias (Gilbert & Malone, (995)
or the fundamental attribution error (Ross, 1977)~-playsits role in converting
the nalve realist into a "nerve cynic". Social perceivers are more inclined to
infer stable traits and dispositions from an actor's behavior while overlooking
the in fluence of situat ional factors (Jones, 1979; Jones & Davis, 1965; Jones &
Nisbett 1972), Repeated observation of behavior may lead the naive realist to
make dispositional inferences about particular people or groups, to make
generalizations, and with the rime-to develop lay theories about people's
tendency to commit various types ofcognitive biases and to be self-serving in
their inferences. At the same time, as research reported by Pronin et al. (in
press) demonstratesveven equipped with such theories of general human
behavior people continue to apply them 10 others, but continue 10 rely on
introspection when analyzing their own cognitive processes.
Naive realism bas a number of consequences in social behavior. For
example it leads people to assume that others are less susceptible to mass media
appeals and propaganda-a much-researched phenomenon also known asthe
"third person effect" (Cohen, Mutz, Price, & Gunther, 1988; Davison, 1983;
Duck & Mullin, 1995). Another media-related phenomenon stemming from the
najve realism is the 'hostile media effect" (Vallone, Ross, & Lepper,
J 985)-partis8ns' tendency to see media reports as biased in favor of the
opposite side in depictions of controversial issues. Vel another consequence is
the "illusion of asymmetric insight" (Pronin, Kruger, Savitsky, & Ross,
2002)-people's tendency to assume that they know their peers better than their
peers know them, However, from me point of view of social imeracrlon the
most important consequence is the so-called "false polarization effect",
The' False Polarization Erfed
Pronin, Puccio, and Ross (2002) deflne the false polarization effect as an
overestimation of the construal gap between the modal views of two sides in a
controversy or conflict and an underestimation of the amount of common
ground thai could serve as a basis for reconciliation and constructive action.
Robinson, Keltner, Ward, and Ross (1995), and Keltner and Robinson {19971
have carried out systematic studies of the false polarization effect. Robinson et
al. ( 1995) asked pro~c ho ice and pro-li fe partisans in the abortion rights debate 10
respond to a number of questions and to indicate the responses that they
believed the average in-group and out-group member would give to the same
questions. In another study, the same authors asked political liberals and
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conservatives a series of questions about a controversial criminal case and the
outcomes of the following trial, and they asked them to predict the responses of
their political allies and opponents. Both studies showed that although the
opposing groups indeed differed in their opinions about the issues in question,
the assumed differences were much larger than the actual. differences between.
the groups. Both groups overestimated the extremity of opinions of both their
in-group and out-group members. Similarly to other studies reporting
asymmetric perception of bias the participants indicated that their own views
and assumptions were generally less shaped by political ideology than by
objective or rational pragmatic concerns compared with the views of their peer'S.
Keltner and Robinson (1997) asked "traditionalist" and "revisionist"
university professors toexpress [heir opinions related to the so-called Western
canon dispute (and to estimate the responses of their peers representing the
same and the opposite side in the dispute). They also asked the participants to
select a list of books that they woulduse in teaching an undergraduate course of
English literature, and another Iisr of books that wou ld represent the average
preferences of the other side. Both groups overestimated the extremity of both
sides' opinions (but especially the traditionalist attitudes of the traditional ists),
Both groups (but especially traditionalists) also underestimated the overlap of
both sides' book selections.
The false polarization effect has been found in several other studies
across a number of contexts. Dawes, Singer, and Lemons (1972) asked
supporters and opponents of the Vietnam War to write statements that would be
endorsed by members of one or the other group. When these statements where
presented [0 the corresponding groups, both supporters and opponents rejected
more statements written by their out-group members than by in-group members.
The most often given reason for rejection was that these statements were too
extreme. Diekman, Eagly, and Kulesa (2002) found that male and female
participants overestimated male opposition to pro-female attitude statements.
Morrin and Norton (2003) found that college student "bathers" and "non-
bathers" during a shower ban overestimated the gap between both groups in
their concern for the community. Ln a study by Robinson and Friedman (1995),
union and management negotiators overestimated theextremity of the other
sides' posi tion in al abor dis pute situation. In a study of "adversary's extre miry
bias" by Rouhana, O'Dwyer, and Morrison Vasa (1997), Israeli and Arab
students exaggerated the political views of the other party.
While there is little doubt that the false polarization effect is a
consequence of naive realism and asymmetric bias perception, Pronin, Puccio,
and Ross. (2002) and Puccio (2003) point at another, more social source of the
phenomenon. During contentious discussions, many individuals remain silent.
Those who do express their opinions are often. the ones with the strongest
conviction. Even if the speakers do have some doubts, they hesitate to reveal
them. The same is generally true about wider-scale political debates in mass
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media. As a result. the social perceivers (partisans involved in the debate and
neutral observers alike) are exposed to biased samples of information
representing the parties' opinions. The error committed by the social perceivers
in such situation can be twofold. First, it is erroneous to assume that the
information expressed by the partisans always represent their true opinions. As
the classic study of Jones and Harris (196n demonstrated, even when the
situational constraints are highly salient, people lend to make dispositional
attributions, assuming that the observable behavior corresponds to the true
attitudes (see also Jones, Worchel, Goethals, & Grumet, 1971)..PeopJeare even
more likely to commit such correspondence bias where the situational
constraints are not obvious, or where such constraints (e.g., an actor's position
as a figurehead for a political faction) can be interpreted as motivational factors
contri but ing to the ext rem ity 0f (he actor's position, or to the Iac k of am bigu ity
in an actor's beliefs. Second, it is erroneous to assume that the biased sample of
opinions represents an accurate reflection of the average opinion of the larger
population of partisans in question. The most extreme opinions in social
controversles are often also the most salient, and sometimes, the only ones
available. Thus, when the social situation calls for an estimation of the average
opinion of a partisan group, people tend to rely on the availability heuristic
(Taylor, 1982' Tversky & Kahneman, 1973) in their predictions, Although these
errors committed by the social perceiver result directly from biases in social
perception, they are preceded or at least facilitated by biases in social
preseruarion.
Puccio (2003) tested the social presentation hypothesis in five studies
designed to reduce the false polarization effect. She asked the participants in
different experimental settings to estimate the position of partisans who had
expressed the arguments supporting their own side, the best arguments for the
other side, or arguments for both sides. The results showed that the position of
part isans who bad expressed argurn ents favori ng the other side (Studies 1 and 3)
or both sides (Studies 2, 3.4, and 5) were judged as significantly less extreme
than the position of partisans providing arguments only favoring their own side.
Expressing arguments for the other side reduced the false polarization effect and
led the participants 10 perceive the other side as more open-minded and
increased the participant's optimism about reaching agreement in a situation of
negotiations. The results demonstrate that the presentation of social information
indeed influences the false polarization effect The findings also lead Puccio to
conclude that ironically the same correspondent inference bias may increase
(when only parties' own positions are communicated) or reduce (when the
parties are encouraged to express the opponent's position) the false polarization.
In the tarter case, the observers lend 1'0 overlook the situational constraints put
on the actors (experimenter's dernandcor, presumably, in real-life situations-«
mediator's instructions) and tend to perceive the opponents as more open-
minded and less extreme.
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Social Categorization and Soeial Idenrity
Besides the cognitive biases discussed above, social categorization is
perhaps the strongest factor influencing how social perceivers see reality.
Kel tner and Robinson (1993) found that negotiators unaware of thel r ideological
differences reached agreement faster and rated their partner as more
constructive and cooperative than negotiators aware of the differences or
negotiators sharing the same tdeologicalvlews who had been led TO believe that
their views were different. In three studies of "reactive devaluation", Maoz,
Ward, Katz, and Ross (2002) found that Israeli Arabs and Jews derogated
proposalsattributed to the other side of the conflict even when those proposals
were developed by representatives of their own side.
Social category membership adds a strong evaluativeelement to social
judgements. Taj fel (1978) demonstrated that out of their need for self-
enhancement, people have a. strong. motivation to identify with social groups
they belong to (in-groups), and to compare these groups favorably to other
groups (out-groups). The social identity theory (SID is a motivational theory in
its basic assumptions. Tajfel and Turner (1.979) start from the assertion that
individuals strive to maintain or enhance their self-esteem to achieve a positive
self-concept. Social groups or categories in any society are associated with
posi tlve or negat ive value eonnotati ons. Consequently, social identity (defined
as "those aspects of an Individual's self-image that derive from the social
categories to which he perceives himself as belonging" [po 40]) can be positive
or negative according to the evaluations of those groups, which tend to be
socially consensual within or across groups. The evaluation of one's in-group is
determined with reference to specific our-groups through social comparisons in
terms of value- laden attributes.
The SIT in its condensed form rests on three principles (Tajfel & Turner,
1979). First, individuals strive to achieve and maintain positive social identity.
Second positive social identity is largely based on favorable comparisons
between in-group and relevant out-groups. Third, when social identity is
unsatisfactory, individuals will strive either to leave their group' and join some
more positively distinct group, or to make their existing group more positively
distinct. The fanner solution is an individual strategy, designed to change the
self-concept of individual, leaving the (low) group status intact. The latter
solution can take the form of social creativity (finding a new dimension for
intergroup comparison, changing the values associated with comparison
dimensions. or finding other, lower status groups for comparison) or direct
competition with the out-group. Over two decades or research within the
traditions of social identity theory and self-categorization theory have provided
plenty of evidence to these principles (Brewer & Brown 1998; Brown, 2000'
Hogg & Abrams, 1999).
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This motivation for favorable between-group comparison results in a
generallendency to evaluate one's membership group (in-group) more
positively than any non-membership group (out-groupj-In-group favoritism or
in-group bias (Hewstone, Rubin, & Willis, 2002). Of course, because people
belong to numerous social categoriesat the same time, it depends on the
particular situational context which social category memberships become most
salient and are activated, thus affecting people's judgementsabout the members
of other social categories, (Turner et al., 1987), According to Turneret aJ.
e (987), the sal ien ceof social categories is deterrn ined by the rneta-contras l
ratio: the ratio of the perceived differences between categories 1'0 the perceived
differences within categories. The higher the ratio (that is, categories are seen as
homogeneous and different from each other), the more salient the social self-
ca tegori zat ions.
Research has identified a number of factors that facilitate in-group
favoritism. Such factors include the following: level ofidentificationwith (or
commitment to) in-group (Branscombe & Wann, 1994; Verkuyten & Nekuee,
1999); the context in which the comparison is made (Kinkel & Verkuyten,
1999); group size and status differences (Mullen, Brown, & Smith, 1992;
Sachdev & Bourhis, 1987); the perceived threat to the in-group's interests
(Ellerners, Spears, & Doosje, 2002; Esses, Jackson, & Armstrong, (998); the
social self-esteem of the group members (Rubin & Hewstone, 1998); and
individual difference variables like authoritarianism (Altemeyer, 1998),
religious beliefs (Batson & Burris, 1994), and system of values (Biernat,
Vescio, & Theno, 1996), An Important factor influencing in-group favoritism is
the way it is expressed (or the dimension on which il is measured), Studies have
shown thai in-group favoritism is usually not found when it is framed as out-
group derogation rather than in-group enhancement (Brewer, 1999, 2001;
Mumrnendey, 1995; Otten & Mummendey, 2000) ..However, some studies of
trait evaluations have found in-group favoritism on both positive and negative
dimensions (Reynolds, Turner, & Haslam 2000; Rusternli, Mertan, & Cifcl,
2000). Reynolds et al. (2000) suggest that when the comparative dimensions are
irnponanr and relevant to in-group-out-group categorization, in-group
favornism can be expressed to the same extent on both positive and negative
dimensions. The relationships between the mentioned factors are complex and
result in numerous interactions between them. However. theexisting research
points to the robustness of the general tendency to see one's own group in a
more favorable light than other groups.
tereot)'pfs
Social categorization is helpful for social interaction because it tells
people what to expect from others. It helps one infer motives, predict the
reasoning and behavior of others and thus helps them to reduce the uncertainty
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of the social environment. The simplified social knowledge about categories is
available in the form of stereotypes (Fiske, 1998; Tajfel, 1981 b), Hilton and
Von Hippel (.1996) de fine stereotypes as "be liefs about tbe characteri sties,
attributes, and behaviors of members of certain groups" (p, 240). These beliefs
can have [WQ functions and two Sources.
First, stereotypes operate like social schemas, allowing to process
information about others more quickly and efficiently by simplifying the
demands the siruat ion makes on the perceiver (Fiske & Taylor, J 991). As social
schernas, stereotypes contain highly abstract and generalized information about
members of various social groups, Largely based on and maintained by
individual experience, social schemas can reflect (with acceptable accuracy)
real characteristics of groups and actual intergroup differences. Schematic
processing is necessarily simplistic and may cause the social perceivers to make
occasional mistakes. In the long run, however, such schemes have some
adaptive value for the social perceiver because most of the time they lead to
adequate, if not optimal, inferences about members of a stereotyped group. The
need for speed and 'efficiency, however, does not mean that people use
schematic processing automatically and unoonditionally (Brewer & Feinstein,
1999; Fiske, Lin & Neuberg, 1999; Fiske and Neuberg, 1990). Instead, people
are "motivated tacticians" who have multiplecognitive strategies available and
are able to choose between them based on their goals. motives, and needs
(Fiske, 1992; Fiske & Taylor, 1991) ..This view of the social perceiver suggests
that people choose between schematic (or theory-driven, top-down) information
processing and data-driven (or bottom-up) information processing depending on
their motivation. This means [hat where the expected costs of making a mistake
is low, it can be rational 10 rely on stereotypes in making social inferences,
The other function (and source) of stereotyping is more social than
cognitive in nature. Hilton and Von Hippel (1996) state that stereotypes are
more than just. beliefs about groups; they are also theories about why certain
attributes go together. In this sense, stereotypes can be independent of the real-
life group di fferences. Tajfel (1981 b) identified two social functions of
stereotypes: (I) creation and maintenance of group ideologies that help (0
explain or justify a variety of social actions; (2) helping to preserve or cerate
positively valued differentiations between one's owo and other social groups.
This interpretation of stereotypes is similar to Allport's interpretation (1958): "a
stereotype is an exaggerated belief associated with a category. Its function is to
jllstify (rationalize) our conduct in relation to that category" (p. 187, italics in
original). ..By "our conduct", Allport meant primarily individuaJ social perceivers
holding stereotypes of various categories, whereas Tajfet was interested more In
the "group ideologies" affecting intergroup behavior and intergroup perception.
Tajfel was Interested primarily in social stereotypes-beliefs that are shared by
large numbers ofpeople within social groups or entities. An important function
of social stereotypes is providing explanations of social issues and intergroup
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differences. These explanations, in turn, form a basis for a value-laden
di fferentiation between social groups and justification of intergroup behavior. In
other words, stereotypes reflect the existing social structure of a given society
and the existing rules for social mobility and change. Stereotypes as social
schernas are more or less descriptive in nature; stereotypes as shared beliefs are
largely prescriptive and normative. Stanger and Schwier (1996) express the
same idea; they argue that stereotypes are maintained as norms in a given
society, transmitted by language and. mass media.
The social nature of shared stereotypes has prompted some researchers to
interpret and study them as social representations (Hewstone, Jaspars, &
l.alljee, 1982). Mescovici (198111984,1988) brought the concept of soda I
representations into social psychology in 1970s. Moscovici (1981) defines
social representations as "a set of concepts, Statements and explanations
originating in. daily life in the course of inter-individual communications. They
are equivalent, In our society, of the myths and belief systems in traditional
societies; they might even be said to be the contemporary version of common
sense" (p, 181), and elsewhere (19'84) as "social reality sui generis" (p. 13,
italics in original). Social representations range from generalized structures
shared by all society members and entire nations to highly specific knowledge
structures shared by separate subgroups of society (Moscovici, I 988). All
important function of social representations is to conventionalize objects,
persons, and events by locating them within a context of familiar, established
categories, It is dear from Moscovici's (1981) definition given above that
representations not only reflect the way society thinks, but representations are
also prescriptive in nature, imposing themselves on the cognitive activity of
individuals. According to Moseovici (1984),. "representations are prescriptive,
that is they impose themselves upon us with an irresistible force" (p. 9).
Indivi dual s are 0 ften unaware 0f thi sin fluence and rem a in una ware of the social
determinauon of their thought, preferring to view their reasoningas "common
sense". According to Augoustinos and Walker (1995) stereotypes are social
representations because they do not simply exist in individuals heads, but they
are socially and discursively constructed in the course of everyday
communication. Moreover, once established (or "objectified" to use a term from
social representation theory) they assume an independent and often prescriptive
reality.
Gardne r ( 1994) rev lews anum ber 0f stud ies dem 0nstrati ng the power of
shared stereotypes in communication. The cited evidence demonstrates that
groups are veryefficiern in guessing the stereotyped larger group from a given
small number (as few as two) of stereotypical traits, provided that these
stereotypes are shared within the group .. Gardner concludes that when the
stereotypes are consensual, individuals can understand them regardless of
wnelher or not they subscribe to them. and they are able to communicate
through the stereotypes alone. These findings also demonstrate rhal regardless
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of whether social stereotypes reflect real group differences or not, they indeed
represent a social reality of its own, shared and communicated by members of
the same group. Experimental evidence also shows that stereotypes that are
learned from others tend to be more extreme, contain less variability
information, and have higher social consensus than stereotypes learned directly
from a contact with the stereotyped group (Thomson, Judd, & Park, 1999).
Social categorization also tells the person how to act in specific
situations, Group norms largely determine what attitudes a group member is
supposed to hold regarding different phenomena, and how the group member is
supposed to react to various social stimuli (Abrams, Wetherell, Cochrane,
Hogg, & Turner, 2001; Turner, 1991; Turner & Oakes, 1989). Group members
endorse shared stereotypes through mutual influence because they reflect shared
in-group norms. Self-caregorizarion theory asserts that an important
consequence of individuals perceiving themselves in terms of social identity is
that they agree with others belonging to the same social category, and they
expect these others to agree with them. In-group members are perceived as
sources that can consensually validate individual's beliefs. When a person's
social. identity is salient, in-group opinions perform a regulatory function as a
source of normative information against which individual observations are
evaluated and validated. As a result, group members tend to adopt the beliefs
shared by other group members to form a shared reality. According to Haslam
(1997), if there is a. disagreement between an individual and other in-group
members (a particular belief appears not to be shared), individuals will (a)
modify their belief so that i.tbecomes consistent with other group members, (b)
attribute the disagreement (0 differences in the stimulus perception, or (c) re-
categorize the former in-group members as an out-group in order to reduce
subjective uncertainty that arises from disagreement with people With whom
they expect to agree.
The prescriptive nature of social stereotypes has important consequences
for the social interaction and intergroup relations. Stereotypes provide an
abstract picture of the stereotyped group and instruct the social perceiver how to
behave towards the members of that group. In this way, social stereotypes can
become self-fulfilling prophecies, both on interpersonal and intergroup level.
Self-fulfilling prophecies emerge wben people's stereotypes make them
(consciously or unconsciously) alter their behavior in such ways that they
provoke the expected, stereotype-consistent behavior from the people who are
targets of the stereoty pical expectancies. Experi menta lev idence has
demonstrated the power of self-fulfilling prophecies in interpersonal
communication (Snyder, Tanke. & Berscheid, 1977; Word,. Zanna, & Cooper
1974). One may speculate that the same effect happens on intergroup level with
wider societal consequences.
The shared and pervasive nature of social stereotypes has for many
decades urged psychologists 10 discuss the question of stereotype accuracy,
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Judd and Park (1993) admit that defining a Criterion against which stereotypes
could be evaluated as accurate or inaccurate is a "thorny issue" because of the
difficulty of objective measurement of a group's location on the relevant
attributes. The most frequently used criterion involves self-report evaluations by
individuals sampled from the stereotyped group. However, such a method is
affected by sample selection biases (in cases of larger populations) and self-
report biases (such. as social desirability or different interpretations of the
attributes in question). Another method might involve collection of objective or
behavioral measurements of the stereotyped group. With this method, the
problem is finding valid ways to objectively operationalize (he attributes in
question; for many variables, such operationalization can be virtually
impossible. Yet another possible criterion is using judgements of experts who
have all extensive knowledge of the stereotyped group. However, such
judgements are subject to stereotypes held by the experts themselves. Judd and
Park (1993) conclude that stereotype accuracy can be defined only by using a
number of criteria and by controlling for the possible biasing factors influencing
each criterion. They also stress that the accuracy quest-ion Concerns the
correspondence between individuals' personal beliefs and the true attributes of
the group as opposed to the correspondence between knowledge of (shared)
ell Itural stereotypes of a group and the true attri butes of the group.
Oakes and Reynolds (1997) emphasize the difficulty of distinguishing the
latter twoconcepts in practice. They argue that social values, which serve as
premises for the perceived accuracy of stereotypes, cannot be deemed
objectively true or untrue, but rather can be either validated or challenged
through processes of social influence and political action. Aggregation of
individual~level data does not represent at "true" group-level score because on
the group level stereotypes have a different sort of validity that reflects and
explains the existing intergroup relationships of the moment. Stereotypes are
held about groups as social categories and not groups as aggregations of
individua Is. Therefore, the "true score" esta b lis hed on one ( indi vidual
measurement) level cannot serve as criterion for evaluating accuracy on the
other level (group perception). Rather, the validity of stereotypes is established
at a higher level of social categorization (individual beliefs are validated at the
level of group and group beliefs at the level of society). Agreement between two
groups OD the stereotype of one of them does not necessarily reflect a "kernel of
truth" in the stereotype-it may simply reflect the fact thai the stereotyped group
has accepted the image held by the stereotyping group.
In real life, the cognitive and social aspects of stereotyping are hard 10
distingUish. Although social stereotypes constitute a reality of their awn they
are maintained by individuals, and they manifest themselves through the
behavior of individuals, Stereotypes of other groups are not activated and
applied unconditionally. First, depending on the situational context, the
siereotyped group can be categorized either as out-group, or as a part of a larger,
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more inel us ivein-group that wi II influence which stereotypes will be activated
(Haslam, Turner, Oakes, McGarty, & Hayes, 1992). Second, individual
cognitive processes influence activation of stereotypes. One interesting line of
research concerns the automaticity of stereotype activation. Devine (19S9) has
argued that automaticity develops in social stereotype activation at a young age.
However, as people grow older and start to reflect on their own beliefs, they
learn to suppress the automatically-activated stereotypes and consciously
activate more favorable or politically correct beliefs associated with the
stereotyped category. This altering of the stereotypic cognitions depends on
individual's altitude (prejudice) towards the stereotyped group. Only those low
on prejudice (without a negative attitude towards the out-group in question)
exert the necessary effort to negate tile stereotypes. According to Devine (1989)
and Devine and Monteith (1999)~ stereotypes and persona! beliefs are
conceptually distinct cognitive structures, each representing a part of
individual's entire knowledge base about a particular group. Both concepts may
overlap, but they are not identical ..All persons belonging to a particular culture
should be equally aware of certain cultural stereotypes, but they may differ in
their level of prejudice and thus the endorsement of the stereotypes. Hilton and
Von Hippe! (J996) cite a number of studies confirming Devine's theory.
Augoustinos, Ahrens, and Innes (1994) found that participants high in prejudice
and low in prejudice could equally 115t the elements of social stereotypes.
However, high-prejudice participants tended 10 give unqualified pejorative
responses, and low-prejudice partie ipants qualified their responses and tended to
distance themselves from these responses.
10rergrou p Attti bu tions
One area where social categorization and ster-eotypes have a particularly
strong influence is intergroup attributiOfL Hewstone (1989) defines intergroup
attribution as "the, ways members of different social groups explain th:e behavior
(as well as the outcomes and consequences of behavior) of members of their
own and other social groups" (p. 166). The reason that stereotypes play such a
significant role in intergroup attributions is that the social perceiver attributes
the behavior of another person not simply 10 individual characteristics of this
person or the situational context but to characteristics associated with the group
to which the other person belongs. Moreover, the social perceiver is also a
member ofa social group, and the norms of thar group largely prescribe how the
behavior of particular out-groups should be explained. The salience of social
caleguri es thus makes intergroup attribu [ion di fferent frern Jnterpersonal
attribut jon.
Although the first attempts to apply classical attribution theories to
intergroup context appeared in the 1970s, social psychologists interested in
intergroup relations had discussed some aspects of group attribution already in
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the 1960s. Sherif (1966, pp. 109-110) noted that the assignment of blame in
conflict situations is conducted almost entirely from the in-group's point of
view. Cam pbell (1967, p. 825) saw" erroneous causal perception" as one 0f the
undesirable aspects of stereotypes" noting the tendency of white perceivers to
attribute racial group differences in education to race rather than environmental
background. Tajfel (1969) hypothesized that intergroup attributions would be
simpler and more predictable than interpersonal attributions. Following Jones
and Davis (1965), Tajfel predicted that the social perceiver's preference for
person attributions rather than situation attributions would be extrapolated to
group perception. That is, social groups would be personalized, and the
explanations would focus on inherent group characteristics rather than transient
situational factors.
The earlie-st demonstration of intergroup attribution was a paper by
Taylor and Jaggi (1974) who examined explanations of positive and negative
behaviors by in-group and out-group members among Hindu office workers in
India. The participants- read a short description of a behavior and chose an
explanation from a list 0 f possible internal or external causes for the behavior.
Taylor and Jaggi found that for socially desirable behaviors the participants
made more internal attributions for in-group than out-group actors; for
undesirable behaviors, there were fewer internal attributions for in-group than
for out-group actors. The results were largely replicated in the United States by
Wang and McKillip (reviewed in Petti grew , 2001). An interesting additional
finding in their study was that the more ethnocentric American adult and
Chinese college student samples in their study displayed [he group serving
attrihutlonat bias (in opposite directions, as expected), but the less ethnocentric
American college students sample did not display such a bias. A decade later,
Hewstone and Ward (1985) replicated and extended the results with Malay and
Chinese samples in Malaysia and Singapore, They found a dear evidence of
erhnoeentric attribution, but the effect of in-group favoritism was far stronger
than thai of out-group derogation. The results of one study also showed that the
minority group (Chinese) in. fact made out-group favoring attributions, leading
the researchers to conclude that ethnocentric attribution is not a universal
tendency and can be reversed For low status groups, reflecting the political and
cultural background. -
or the intergroup attribution studies published in 1970s, Duncan (1976)
offers perhaps the most illustrative evidence of bow actor's group membership
affects attributions of behavior. Duncan showed white participants a short film
where one person shoved the other following ansrgument. The race of Ihe two
actors was varied in a way that a white actor pushed either a white actor or a
black actor, or a blackactor pushed either a white actor or a black actor. The
pa.rtic1pants then were asked to categorize the behavior and to rate the extent to
which the behavior had internalor external causes, There was a very clear
tendency in the results that when the actor delivering the shove was black, his
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behavior was categorized as more aggressive than when the actor was white;
this tendency was especially strong when the actor receiving the shove was
white, There was a strong pattern ro attribute the shove to dispositional factors
when theactor was black and to situational factors when the actor was white.
Duncan assumed. that the presenceof the black actor automatically activated the
stereotype that associates black people with violence; once activated, the
stereotype biased the observers' Inrerpretation of the events by providing
automatic and simple stereotype-consistent explanation.
The evidence of social stereotypes biasing intergroup attribution is not
limited to studies of racial or ethnic groups. Deau.x and Emswi lIer (1974) found
that on a stereorypically masculine task a male actor's success was more likely
to be attributed to ability than a female actor's success on the same task. On a
stereotyplcally female task, no differences were found In attributions for male
and female success.
1n the .Iight 0 f these fi nd ings, in 1979 Pettigrew (200 I) suggested a mode 1
that. allowed making systematic predictions for out-group derogating
attributions in intergroup context. Build ing On Ross's (1977) "fundamental
attri buti 011 error". Pettigrew tried to expia in how intergroup m isartribut ions can
help individuals to maintain their negative stereotypes about prejudiced groups,
Pettigrew reasoned that if an oUI-group member were seen performing a
negative act consistent with the negative stereotype of that group, the tendency
to make internal attributions would be enhanced. When an out-group member
was seen performing a single positive act, the perceiver would be motivated to
"explain it away", so that the original stereotype needs not to be changed ..
Depending on the perceiver's interpretation of the situation, the positive
behavior can be explained as (a) an exceptional case, {b) actor's special
advantage or luck, (c) actor's high motivation and effort, or (d) manipulated
si ttl a (ional context Petti grew pred icted th at the "u Irima te attri but i0nerror"
would be sharper for prejudiced individuals, more likely to occur when the
group memberships are salient, and it would be stronger when the groups in
question have histories of intense conflict and possess negative stereotypes of
each other. Furthermore, the ultimate attribution error would be more likely to
occur when racial and ethnic differences covary with national and
soc joeconern ic differences.
In his review of 19 studies of intergroup artributionconducted over two
decades, Hewstone (1990) reports limited support to Pettigrew's predictions.
Hewstone differentiates between categorization effects and outcome effects in
intergroup attribution, Categorization effects compare the ettributions made for
in-group and out-group members separately for each type ofbehavior, Outcome
effects compare the attributions made for different types of behavior (e.g.
positive/negative; success/failure) separately for in-group and out-group actors,
Hewstone concludes that there is a tendency to attribute negative out-group
behavior 10 personal causes: however. he notes that this tendency more often
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lakes the formo fa categorizat ion effect (m ore internal attri buti on for a negative
act by out-group than an in-group member) rather than an outcome effect for
out-group actors (e.g., more internal attributions for negative than for positive
acts). There is also a tendency for out-group failure to be attributed more to lack
of ability than is for in-group failure. Regarding explanation of positive out-
group behavior, the predictions have not been systematically tested because
none of the reviewed studies examined all four possible explanations suggested
by Pettigrew. There is some evidence that out-group success is explained away
in terms of luck, high effort. or ease of task. Sometimes less internal attributions
have been found for positive out-group behavior than positive in-group
behavior. The research evidence supports the prediction thai group-serving
attributions may be stronger when perceivers are aware of [heir own and the
actor's group memberships, Group serving attributions indeed vary across
situations and may be stronger when the groups have histories of conflict and
possess negative stereotypes of each other; however, the bias can disappear or
even be reversed for members oflow-status groups. Although the tendency for
group-serving attributions may be stronger for prejudiced individuals, the effect
has not always been bound, More recent studies have provided further support
for the. general tendency for group-serving attributions (Austers, 2002a; Hunter,
Stringer, & Watson 1991; Jackson, Sullivan, & Hodge, 1993), but also
demonstrated thecontext-dependence of these effects (Islam & Hewstone,
1993).
Despite the long tradition of intergroup attribution research and the clear
evidence of how social categorization and stereotyping affects group
attributions, mere nave been relatively few studiesexamining the effects of
group perspective taking on intergroup attributions. Consequently, not much
evidence is accumulated about the false polarization effect in intergroup
attributions, although the otherwise robust nature of the false polarization
suggests that it is likely to appear in causal explanationsas well. Kemdal and
Montgomery (200 I) found th.at animal experimenters and animal rights activists
could take each other's perspectives, resulting in a reversed actor-observer
effect. Only the animal rights supporters showed some false polarization when
guessing the ratings of internal causes for activists' behavior from the
researchers' perspective. Austers (2002a) asked ethnic Latvian and Russian
schoolteachers to rate positive and negative behaviors from their own and out-
group perspective on a number of attributlonal dimensions. The results
indicated some false polarization effect in predicting out-group's responses but
not consistently. Using a free response format, Austersand Montgomery (2001)
asked their participants to explain an out-group behavior from their own and
three imagined perspectives: an OlJl-group,a neutral. observer, and a "reflected
O'ut-group perspective". That is they were asked to explain how an out-group
member would explain a behavior from the participant's in-group perspecti ve,
From a reflected out-group perspective, participants used more personality-
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related explanations than from a self perspective, and the tendency was reversed
for situational explanations indicating that the participants had expected an
ideological bias to influence the explanations by an out-group member,
However, this only indicates an expected false polarization on behalf of an out-
group rather than all actual bias. It should be noted, however, that in none of
these studies direct statistical tests were performed to check for the false
polarization effect, and the observations reported above 'are based on general
patterns of means. Inaddition, in all of the reported studies, the participants
were asked to take an out-group perspective but not an in-group perspective.
Robinson et al, (1995) tested some aspects of intergroup attributionwhen they
asked their participants to rate tile basis of their own political judgments and
that of their in-group and out-group members. The respondents indicated that
they personally had been less influenced by ideology or political orientation
than either their peers or opponents .. These findings suggest a presence of the
false polarization effect in the context of intergroup attributions.
The results of interpersonal or intergroup attribution studies largely
depend on the methodology used for categorizing the attributions. The oldest
and most widely used classification of attributions, based on Heider's (1958)
model of interpersonal attributions, distinguishes between internal
(dispositional) and external (situational) attributions. This classification has
been criticized On both theoretical and practical methodological grounds
(Miller, Smith, & Ulernan, 1981; Ross, 1977). Islam and Hewstone (1993)
proposed an alternative four-dimensional model, measuring attributions along
the eontinuums of causal locus, stability, controllability (from Weiner, 1986).,.
and globaliry (from Abramson, Seligman, & Teasdale, 1978). Kruglanski
(1975) has stressed the necessity to differentiate between endogenous and
exogenous artributions, where anendogenously attributed action is an end in
itself and an exogenously attributed action is one that mediates a further goal.
Kruglanski (1979) also distinguishes between causal explanations (accounting
rOT what causedan act) and teleological explanations (accounting for why the
act was accomplished), and between actions (actor's intentional behavior) and
occurrences (behavior independent of the actor's will). Similarly, Buss (1979)
suggested categorizing attributions into causes and reasons. Locke and
Pennington (1982) further elaborated this division, interpreting reasons as one
type of internal causes of behavior, which can further be divided into situational
reasons and psychological reasons.
More recently, Malle and colleagues (Malle, 1999, 200 I; Malle & Knabe,
1997; Malle, Knobe, O'Laughlin, Pearce, & Nelson 2000) have attempted to
integrate the previous efforts at categorizingattributions into a new framework.
The rna-in idea behind their model of folkexplanarions of behavior (FEB) is that
rather than concentrating on the explicit contents of causal arrriburions, people's
behavior explanations must instead be considered in terms of their conceptual
structure, the network of concepts and assumptions on which these explanations
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are based. Central to this structure is the folk concept of intentionality (Malle,
2001; Malle & Knabe, 1997). According to the classification suggested by
Malle (1999), explanations that interpret an agent's behavior as unintentional are
considered cause explanations. Explanations that interpret the behavior as
intentional are divided into three major groups: (a) causal history of reasons
(factors from agent's personal history that cause the intentional behavior without
the agent being aware of them); (b) reasons (factors that theagent considered
when forming the intention toact); and (c) enabling factors (factors that clarify
how it was possible that the agent completed the intended action). Reasons are
further divided into three types: desires, beliefs, and valuings .. A distinction Is
made between reasons marked with a mental Slate description and those
unmarked. In addition, the coding scheme developed by Malle (2000) uses a
number of secondary codes to reflect the contents of each explanation, The FEB
coding scheme has been used roexamine tJ16 differences between how
individuals explain individual and group behavior (O'Laughlin & Malle, 2002),
but it does not seem to have been applied in studies of intergroup attributions.
Aims of ehe Thesis
The general aim of the thesis is to explore how the false polarization
effect influences perception and interpretation of the shared social reality when
two groups take the perspective of eac h other. Til is thesis exam ineswhat can or
should be understood with respect (,0 shared social reality in intergroup
perception. All four Studies address this issue in various ways to find common
patterns of agreement and disagreement in intergroup perception. Study I and
Study 4 are designed to test the effects of shared reality more directly. In
addition, this thesis tests 'the robustness of the false polarization effect in various
prevlously unexplored contexts, focusing on intergroup attributions ...Study]
looks at (he false polarization effect in intergroup ratings of personality traits.
Study 2 examines the false polarization in intergroup ratings on a number of
attn butional dimensions. Study 3 explores the influence of the false polarizarlon
effect on causal explanations given in a free response formal. Finally, Study 4
checks the possible influences of the false polarization effect on perception of
causal explanations previously provided from own perspective and imagined
group perspect ives,
The false polarizationeffect is a complex phenomenon because it is
hypOlhesiz,ed to bea result of three interacting factors: asymmetric perception
of bias, social categorization. and biased presentation of information. Of the
three mentioned factors, the effects of social categorization are examined more
deeply. Social categorization through stereotypes associated with each social
category tells the social perceiver when to expect group-serving effects in
groups' opinions. and in which direction these effects are supposed to occur. One
question addressed in this thesis is 10 what. extent the false polarization effect
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coincides with social categorization effects. That is, does the false polarization
effect happen only when the group norms clearly state which responses are
group serving and which are not? This question is addressed most directly in
Study 1, which looks separately at categorization. effect and false polarization
effect in descriptive and evaluative aspects of intergroup ratings. Study 2
provides some additional information on this topic by using a number of
attributional dimensions where categorization effects cannot be predicted in
advance. In all the reported studies, to elicit the categorization effects
influencing group judgements more efficiently, groups were asked to evaluate
two targets (in-group target and out-group target).
In addition, this thesis tests a promising method for coding intergroup
attributions-the Folk Explanations of Behavior coding scheme that has been
developed and mostly used in interpersonal contexts. The folk Explanations of
Behavior coding scheme is applied in Study 3. Study 2 provides some
additional information about how some of the concepts underlying the coding
categories are perceived in intergroup settings.
OVERVIEW OF THE EMPIRICAL STUDIES
Study]. Differentiating In-group Favoritism ,from Shared Reality ill
Intergroup Perception
This study explores the effects of two factors influencing mutual ratings
ofsocial groups: in-group favoritism and shared reality. In-group favoritism is a
consequence of salient social ca tegorizati on. In line with the social identity
theory (Tajfel & Turner, 1979) and self-categorization theory (Turner et al.,
1987), in-group favoritism should influence intergroup ratings in a way that
allows each group to see itself more favorably than the other group. In other
words, in-group favoritism should influence the evaluative aspects of intergroup
ratings. Shared reality, on the other hand, can be defined as the shared
stereotypes of both groups; that is, the characteristics of both groups that they
agree about and that presumably have been verified on a higher (i.e. societal)
level of social categorization (Oakes & Reynolds. 1997).. Because of in-group
favoritism, the shared stereotypes are likely to be expressed differently by both
groups. The same descriptive attribute (e.g.,. tendency to save money) can be
seen either as a positive trait (thrifty) or a negative one (stingy), depending on
whether seen from a group's inside perspective (i.e., by the group members
themselves) or an outside perspective (i.e., by members of the out-group)
(Montgomery, 1994). Peabody (1968, 1985) separates both aspects of
intergroup ratings, This study applied Peabody's method in two intergroup
settings. We predicted that each grnup would show in-group favoritism on the
evaluative aspects of ratings, but both groups would agree on the descriptive
ratings of each other. We also predicted that the groups would show false
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polarization 00 the evaluative dimension, but they would not overestimate the
group differences on the descriptive dimension.
Method
In Experiment I, 86 Latvian and 77 Russian university students rated two
targets-a Latvian living in Latvia and a Russian living in Latvia-on 13 pairs of
scales designed to di fferentiate between the eval uati ve and deseripti ve aspects
of each rating. For each scale pair, we calculated an evaluative score. as the
mean of ratings on both scales and a descriptive score as the difference of
ratings on both scales divided by two. We then conducted a 2 (judge ethnlcity:
Latvian \IS. Russian) by 2 (target ethnicity: Latvian vs, Russian) by 13 (scale
pair) mixed ANOYA with repealed measures on the last two factors separately
for the evaluative and descriptive scores.
In Experiment 2, 44 female and 33 male psychology students- rated two
targets-a male psychology student at Stockholm University and a female
psychology student at Stockholm Uni versity-on 8 pairs of scales. Each
participant rated both targets from his or her own perspective as well as from
{he perspectives of a male psychology student and a female psychology student.
Similar to Experiment I, we calculated evaluative and descriptive scores, which
were then separately entered into a 2 (gender of judge) by 2 (gender of target)
by 3 (perspective: own vs. male vs, female) by 8 (scale pair) mixed ANOYA
with repeated measures on the last two factors.
Major Fir/clings
The analysis of evaluative scores in Experiment 1 revealed a tendency
that each target was evaluated more positively by in-group judges than by out-
group judges. Russian judges showed clear in-group favoritism, evaluating the
Russian target significantly higher than the Latvian target. Latvian judges did
not see both targets as significantly different in evaluative terms, The analysis
of descriptive scores showed that both groups of judges tended 10 agree on the
descriptive attributes of each target. Furthermore, the judges saw both targets as
differem from each other.
In Experiment 2, the analysis of evaluative scores showed that neither of
the two groups of judges displayed significant in-group favoritism in evaluation
of both targets. However, when taking the group perspectives, the participants
gave the highest evaluation to each target from the target's In-group perspective ..
expecting the ratings by their peers 10 be positively biased towards in-group,
SimiJarto the results in Experiment 1, both groups of judges tended to agree on
the descriptive attributes of each target. Although there were some differences
in ratings from own and the imagined group perspectives, these differences
were not systematical and did nOI reflect any false polarization.
DisC' IISS ion
The results demonstrated that intergroup ratings reflect agreement on the
contents of shared group stereotypes despite the bias introduced by in-group
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favoritism (Experiment I). This agreement is largely independent of whether
these ratings are made from one's own perspective or imagined group
perspectives (Experiment 2). The results of Experiment 2 produced a moderate
false polarization effect for the evaluative scores, although the participants
themselves did nOI show any in-group favoritism, The results support the
hypothesis that the false polarization effect is more likely to occur on evaluative
dimensions where the knowledge of group norms provide guidelines about how
group members are supposed to judge different targets. However, it would be
interesting to replicate the results of Experiment 2 in a more competitive
intergroup context where the social categorization is more salient.
Study 2. The False Polarization Effect in Explanations of Attitudinal
Behavior.
This study tests whether the false polarization effect is present in
explanations of causes of attitudinal behavior when these explanations ate given
from in-group and out-group perspectives. The false polarization effect has been
previously found in studies of political beliefs and attitudes (Pronin, Puccio, &
Ross, 2002). However, apart from some aspects of studies conducted by
Robinson et al. (1995), this phenomenon has not been systematically researched
in the area of intergroup attributions. Our study used a number of different
ettriburional dimensions reported in literature on previous research. Given the
robust nature of the false polarization effect, we predicted that it should appear
in intergroup attributions as well. That is, when imagining bow specific causes
for a given target behavior are rated from the target's in-group and out-group
perspecti ves, partie ipants wou Id gi ve signi fican tl y higher (or lower) rat ings than
the respective in-group and out-group members themselves. Theoretically, the
mean differences should occur in the group-serving direction. However, from
the previous reports of Intergroup attribution studies, il was not possible to
formulate precise hypotheses about what should be seen as the group serving
direction for all variables employed. Therefore our general prediction was that
the mean differences from opposing group perspectives should be in opposite
directions for the same target behavior; that is. what is seen as favorable by a
target's in-group would be seen as less favorable by the out-group and vice
versa.
Method
Ninety-two supporters and 49 opponents of Latvia's EU membership
rated two opposite attitudinal behaviors (actively supporting EU membership
vs, actively protesting against EU membership) on 17 rating scales constructed
to cover various aspects of intergroup attributions. Attitudinal behavior is
genera I,. non-speci fie behavior that expresses the actors' attitude towards a
certain issue. In other words, actors behaving in line with lheir attitudes. Each
participant rated each target behavior from three perspectives: one's own
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perspective and the imagined group perspectives of EU supporters and EU
opponents. Of the 17 rating scales, 2 scales measured participants' evaluation of
the target behavior, and t 5 scales represented various attributional dimensions.
Besides the variables of causal locus, controllability, stability, and globality
(Islam & Hewstone, 1993), we included a number of explanatory dimensions
taken from the FEB model (Malle, 1999, 2001). In addition, the participants
also indicated their agreement/disagreement with seven items measuring.their
support to EU membership. The participants rated the same items also fram
both group perspectives.
Major Findings
For two attributional dimensions-causal locus (actor vs .. situation) and
global it)' 0f ca uses-there were no significant mean differences between judges
or target behaviors and no false polarization effect. The false polarization effect
appeared in estimations of stability of causes of behavior and in ratings of the
actors' control over the causes of their behavior. From the target's imagined in-
group perspective, the participants rated the causes as more stable, and the
actors more in control 0 f the causes a f their beha vior, th an the ta rgei' s .in-grou p
did from their own perspective. Interestingly most of the time the ratings from
the judges; own perspective did not differ significantly between both groups.
TIle false polarization effect was not equally strong for all target behaviors and
from all imagined group perspectives, but it always occurred in the expected
direction.
After a principal component analysis, two lndexes-rationality index and
subjectivity index-were constructed from the items derived from the FEB
scheme. The pattern of means for the rationality index showed that the
participants saw rationality as a favorable cause of behavior and showed the
false polarization effect when rating the rationality of causes of both target
behaviors. The participants generally saw subjectivity as an unfavorable factor
in determining causes of behavior. Regarding the means of subjectivity index,
the participants showed false polarization when rating both target behaviors
from the targets' in-group perspectives but not from our-group perspectives,
False polarization of smaller magnitude was also found in the ratings of actors'
acceptanc.e of other people's opinions, which was generally seen as an
unfavorable cause of behavior,
Discllssion
The study confirmed that the false polarization effect is a robust
phenomenon, which can affect not only predicrionof group attitudes but also
causal explanations of attitudinal behavior. Interestingly, we did not find any
group-serving effects In ratings of globaliry of causes and the person-situation
attributions, nor did we find any false polarization effects on these scores. One
e.xpJanalion for this finding is that the study did Clot compare positive and
neg.ulive behaviors by both groups. Although all four dimensions have been
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shown to yield group-serving biases for comparisons of positive and negative
in-group and out-group behaviors (cf., Islam & Hewstone, 1993), the same
effects rna)' be less pronounced when explaining non-specific attitudinal
behavior. Another possible explanation is that globaHty of causes and the
jierson-situation distinction per se have neither positive nor negative
connotations (whereas for example stability, control, and rationality as concepts
have positive conno etions), It is likely that the evaluative connotation ofa
rating dimension triggers the false polarization effect In estimating in-group and
out-group ratings along with the general social categorization effects (i.e., in-
group favoritism).
Study 3. "False Polarization when Imagining Others' Explanations of
Attitudinal Behavior
This study had two aims. First. we wanted to examine whether the false
polarization effect would appear in free-response explanations of attitudinal
behavior. Second, we wanted to explore [he possibilities of using the BEB
coding scheme in studies of intergroup attributions, We made two predictions
regarding the false polarization effect. We hypothesized that one dimension that
could elicit group-serving biases and false polarization could be the ratio
between the number of reason explanations and causal history of mason (CHR)
explanations used by the participants. Reason explanations imply actors'
awareness of the causes of their behavior; CHR explanations imply alack of
such awareness, Awareness,according to Locke & Pennington (t 982), in the
context of attributions largely equals rationality, which, in tum, is seen as a
favorable causal factor (Kenworthy & Miller, 2002). Our prediction was that
participants should provide more reason (relative to CHR) explanations when
taking the (imagined) in-group perspective of the target than the target's in-
group members nave provided from their own perspective. And vice versa,
SImulated explanations given. from a target's out-group perspective should
contain more CHR (relative to reason)expJana.tions compared to the
explanations given by that target's out-group members. Another prediction
concerned the use of marked and unmarked reason explanations. In line with
Malle's (1999) reason Ing that mental state m arkers are Iikely to be used b
observers 10 distance themselves from the agent's subjective reasons we
hypothesized that one should expect more marked (relative [0 unmarked) reason
explanations when a target's out-group members explain the target's behavior
than if the same behavior is explained by the target's in-group members.
Consequently, our prediction for the false polarization effect was [hal
part leipants shou Id use more mental state markers when tak ing the (imagined)
out-group perspective of the target than the target's out-group have used from
their own perspective; the opposite should be true regarding the target's in-
group perspective.
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iethod
Sixty-one supporters and 23 opponents of Latvia's EU membership
provided free-response explanations to two attitudinal behaviors-people
actively supporting and people actively opposing EU membership. Each
participant explained each behavior from one's own perspective and from the
imagined perspective of either EU supporters or EU opponents (the gTOUp
perspective was varied between participants). The participants also rated their
support to EU membership on seven items, and they answered the same items
rrom the same imagined group perspective from which they hadexplained the
behavior.
Two independent judges then carried out a content analysis of the
responses, using the F.EX Coding Scheme for Folk Explanations of Behavior
(Malle, 2000). Explanation types (cause explanations, causal history of reason
fCHR] explanations reason explanations [marked and unmarked], and enabling
factor explanations) were used as the primary codes. The contents of each
explanation were coded using a number of secondary codes. There was a high
agreement between the judges on the primarycodes (88.3% of the units), but
unsatisfactory agreement on the secondary codes (65.7%). Thus, only the
primary codes were used in the data analysis .. As predicted. the numbers of
reason and CHR explanations and the numbers of marked and unmarked reason
explanations were negatively correlated for each target behavior. This allowed
us to construct a reason-Clfk index [or each participant by subtracting the
number of CHR explanations from the number of reason explanations and
dividing the difference by the total number of explanations given. A marked-
unmarked index was constructed in an identical manner.
Major Findings
The predicted pattern of false polarization appeared in the means of
reason-CHR index. Generally, each target's in-group members showed the
Strongest false po Iarization (in terms of using more CHR exp lanai ions re lati ve
to reason explanations) when explaining the target behavior from its out-group
perspective. For the marked-unmarked index, there was some evidence of false
polarization bUI not all mean differences were significant and in the expected
direction.
Discussion
The results of Study 3 are interesting from IWO aspects. First, it was
shown that the explainers tended to use more reason explanations for attitude-
congruent (in-group) behavior and more causal history of reason explanations
for attitude-incongruent (out-group) behavior. The ratio between bothtypes of
explanations indeed reflectsgroup-servlng biases in causal attribution. In
addition, the use of mental state markers is related to the explainers' attitude
towards the target behavior (with more markers used to distance oneself from
the actors' motives .. which are unacceptable to the explainer), These results
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show that the FEB coding scheme can be successfully applied to the context of
intergroup attributions and its categories used for calculating indexes that reflect
in-group favoritism in attributions, Second, the results demonstrate that the false
polarization effect occurs both in numerical ratings and in choice of expressions
when predicting a group's position, The explanations given from group
perspectives were more simplistic than explanations provided from the
explainers' own perspective ...The study demonstrated the robust nature of tbe
false polarization effect, although it could not answer if this effect happens
because of asymmetric perception of bias or biased presentation of social
information (ora combination of both factors).
Study 4. Di:rrerentiating Explanations of Attitude-consistent Behavior: The
Role of Perspectives and Mode of Perspective Taking.
This study was designed to test whether participants could differentiate
between causal explanations previously provided by their in-groupand out-
group members from their own perspective and the imagined perspectives of
both groups ..The study had two aims. First, we wanted to test ifthe participants
would be able to see a difference between explanations provided from the same
perspective when this perspective is taken as an in-group perspective and when
It is taken as an out-group perspective .. If the shared reality hypothesis is true,
and the groups formulate theirarguments with the opposite arguments in mind,
they should be able [0 "emulate" out-group opinion effectively when giving
explanations from an out-group perspective. Consequently, the' explanatiens
provided from the same perspective by members of both groups should be of
similar qua Iiry, and perce ivers unaware of the origin of the explanati ons shou Id
see no di fferences between them, Second, we wanted to test whether the
participants would be able to see any differences between explanations given
when a given group perspective istaken as explainer's own perspective and an
imagined in-group or out-group perspective. If the "naive realism" hypothesis is
true, and the participants formulate the group opinions with an assumption that
their peers are more biased than they are, the explanations provided from the
imagined group perspectives should be more simplified and exaggerated.
Consequently, perceivers unaware of the origin of explanations should see some
di fference in qual ity between both types of explanations regardless of the group
perspecti ••..e
Method
In Experiment I, 78 supporters and 57 opponents of Latvia's EU
membership expressed their agreement or disagreement with a number of causal
explanations selected from the data. of Study 3. ] n Experiment 2, 60 supporters
and 28 opponents of EU membership expressed their agreement with the same
explanations, rated each explanation on a number of scales, and attempted to
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guess whether the explanation had been initially provided by a supporter or
opponent anne EU membership.
We selected 72 explanations from Study 3, 36 for each target behavior
(actively supporting vs, actively protesting Latvia's EU membership). Half of
(he explanationswere provided by EU supporters, and the other half by the
opponents from the three possible perspectives: one's own perspective,
imagined supporter perspective, and imagined opponent perspective. In
Experiment 1, the explanations were randomly assigned to three different
versions of the questionnaire. The participants rated their agreement or
disagreement with 12 explanations for each target behavior. In Experiment 2,
six different versions of the questionnaire were ·t:reated, and participants rated
six explanations for each target behavior. In both experiments, the explanations
came from the six possible combinations of perspective (supporter vs.
opponent) and mode of perspective taking (i.e., how that perspective had been
taken: as own perspective as an imagined in-group perspective, or as an
imagined out-group perspective). In Experiment 2, in addition to rating their
agreement with each explanation, the participants a Iso rated how
positive/nega.tive the explanation was towards the target group, to what extent
the explanation depicted the target behavior as rational or irrational, how typical
the explanation was for the Latvian society, and how substantiated the
explanation was. After that, the participants were informed that the explanations
they had just rated had been provided by supporters and opponents of ED
membership from their own perspective and imagined group perspectives. The
participants were then asked to guess if the explanation had been initially
provided by an EU supporter or an opponent
ll.Jajor Fi'1dings
In line with the predictions, in both experiments participants agreed more
with explanations provided from their in-group perspective than from an QUI-
group perspective. The agreement was independent of Whether their in-group
members or out-group members had taken that perspective. In addition, the
participants tended (0 agree more with the explanations provided by explainers
expressing own opinion rather than the explanations given. from the imagined
group perspectives ..Furthermore, in Experiment 2 own explanations were rated
as more positive towards the target group, better substantiated, and depicting the
larget behavior as more rational than the simulated in-group orout-group
explanations. Interestingly, own explanations were rated also as more typical
than the group explanations. although for this variable the mean differences
were smaller. In line with the initial predictions .. the participants were able to
"guess" only the perspective from which the explanation had been provided, bur
(hey could not "guess" Iheexplainer attitude when this altitude was not
congruent with the perspective,
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Discussion
In general, group members can recognize the perspective from which an
explanation has been provided irrespective of whether the 'perspective has been
taken by an in-group or out-group member. However, they are not able to
distinguish effectively between perspectives that are congruent (in-group
perspective) or incongruent (out-group perspective) with the explainer attitude.
There may be no perceivable basis fordistinguishing between these two types
of perspectives as long as they reflect the common knowledge' about how both
sides should explain both target behaviors. In general, the results of Study 4
support the assumption that group perspective taking is at least in part based on
shared social reality, i.e., on being well-informed of out-groups' opinions and
arguments. Interestingly, the participants perceived explanations provided from
own perspective more favorably than the simulated explanations. These results
support the hypothesis that the false polarization effect results from
overestimation of bias in other people. One may speculate that the part icipants ,
expectation of other people's bias in Study 3 resulted in producing lower quality
(perhaps simplified, more extreme, or less reasonable) explanations from the
imagined group perspectives, which in turn, resulted in lower agreement with
these explanations in Study 4.
GENERAL DlSCUSSIO
Main Findings and Contributions of this Research
This thesis aimed to gain a better understanding of what shared reality
means in intergroup perception. The' results of the reported studies illustrate the
complexity of the concept of shared reality and point to a variety of possible
interp retations 0f the, term. The res ul ts show that even with in groups there can
be different ways to define andmeasure shared reality. One interpretation of
shared reality within a group is a purely sociologlcal one. That is, shared reality
can be defined as the similarity between the actual opinions of the group
members. Although in all the reported studies there was certain variability in the
group opinions, for many (although not all) variables the opinions of the
members of the same group were more similar than the opinions of members of
different groups. This is not the sort of shared reality that Festinger (1950,
1954) or Hardin and Higgins (1996) had in mind; in this sense, people who have
never heard about each other can share a social reality. Thus, the reality is
shared in sociological sense, but it is not shared psychologically ..However, such
an interpretation and. measurement of shared reality is of some practical and
theoretical importance. Of practical importance, this offers a baseline estimate
of what the actual opinions are-against which the group members' beliefs about
the opinions can be measured, Of theoretical importance, it reflects the
internalized group norms among individuals belonging to the same group.
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Admittedly, the fact that group members have similar opinions regarding some
topic or object of judgement does [lot say anything about the causal
relationships between social category membership and this similarity .. The
group members may reason in a certain way because of their group membership
(a likely direction of causality in Study I), or they may be in the same group
precisely because they share the same opinions (as in Studies 2-4). In any case,
the mean opinion of the group is the actual manifestation of the group norm as
far as it has any influence on the group members, and thus it serves as a baseline
estimate for comparison when studying the beliefs about the group norm,
Group members' beliefs about what other members of their group think
constitute an alternative way to operationalize shared reality within a group.
Such a definition of shared reality-as group members' beliefs about the beliefs
of other group members-more closely corresponds to the "classical"
interpretation of shared reality as a process of social veri ficat ion. What is
interesting, however, is that the studies reported in this thesis as well as the
previous work on the false polarization effect (Pronin, Puccio, & Ross, 2002)
have documented a discrepancy between the group members' beliefs about the
opinions within a group and the actual mean opinion in the group. The
psychologically shared social reality can actually be (and often is) different
from the social reality in sociological sense. The group members agree in their
view about the average opinion of their group, although most of them
personally do not share this opinion. This situation is very similar to the one
used to define pluralistic Ignorance: "the case in which virtually every member
of'a group privately rejects a belief opinion, or practice, yet believes that
virtually every other member pri vately accepts it" (Prentice & Mi Iler r 1996, p.
161). Of course, in the case offalse polarization, group members do not reject
the prevalent opinion; they just believe theyendorse it (0 a lesser extent than
ethers, Otherwise the two phenomena have muchin common and, as Miller,
Monin, and Prentice (2000) observe', may share a common source: the fact that
panisans' public behavior reflect the sharply defined norms and positions of
their social identity rather than the less extreme positions of their private
attitudes. The false pclarizstioneffect reflects group members' knowledge of
group norms and their estimated support to these nOJTIlS in the group ..That they
significantly overestimate this support may appear "ignorant" from a
sociological perspective, Yet, as long as the knowledge of group norms and the
perceived acceptance of these norms influence public behavior to a larger extent
than the group members' private attitudes (Miller et al., 2000), it is feasible to
consider them a more valid measurement of the shared reality than the mean
meaSuremenl of the actual private opinions. Moreover research has shown that
the perception of support 10 the norm may cause these private opinions to
gravitate towards thai norm Prentice & Miller, 1993), so the "ignorant
misperception" of today may turn out to be a "true estimate" of tomorrow.
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Such a definition of shared reality works well. also in an intergroup
context. As the reported results show, the actual disagreement between groups
on various issues may vary from none to moderate, but on many occasions tbe
groups almost perfectly agree on how much they shoulddisagree on these
issues. The groups demonstrate a very good knowledge of each other's norms,
reflected in stereotypical images about the opinions of these groups. The
reported studies strongly support interpretation of shared reality as shared
stereotypes between groups, i.e., the agreement between groups on their mutual
stereotypes. In both experiments of Study l,groups of judges agreed on the
descriptive attributes of target groups; in Experiment 2, they also agreed that
each group should see its attributes as more favorable than the other group. In
Study 2, both groups agreed on heweach of them should agree or disagree to
various causal explanations of in-group or out-group attitudinal behavior. In
Study 3 both groups produced highly similar explanations when taking the
perspective of the same group, and as Study 4 demonstrated, the explanations
provided from the same perspective were of the same quality even those given
by holders of an opposite attitude. Results reported by Austers (2002b) also
support the interpretation of shared reality as shared stereotypes between
groups. He found that Latvian and Russian students agreed on the value
stereotypes of Latvians (majority group) and contemporary people. Both
stereotypes were- significantly different from individual self-ratings, reported by
both groups, which in tum were very similar to each other. However, both
groups disagreed on the stereotype of Russians. Russian students saw Russian
targets as more similar to themselves, whereas Latvian students saw Russians as
more similar to contemporary people in general. This result can be explained by
the status differences between the groups.
All these findings point to the fact that regardless of how strongly the
stereotypes are actually endorsed by individual group members, they have a
reality oftheir own, and this is the reality that the group members acknowledge.
These stereotypes are true 10 the extent that the groups believe and agreethat
they are true (Oakes & Reynolds, 1997). In this sense, the groups were very
effective in taking each other's perspective just as one would have predicted
from Montgom ery's (I 994) perspec live theory. But the research ra ised another
question: What can be understood with perspective taking in intergroup
context? Do group members really try to imagine themselves in the other
group's position and try to emulate their way of reasoning, or do they simply
recite readily available stereotypes about how the other group is supposed to
reason? The reported research leaves this question without ll- definite answer.
Results of Study 3 and Srudy 4 suggest tnat group members may rely on readily
available stereotypes rather than exerting the cognitlveeffort of imagining
themselves in the position of the other group, at least in the cases where
perspectives of large, diffuse groups are taken. Explanations provided from
group perspectives were simplified and exaggerated; moreovervexplanations
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provided from the perspective of the same group were remarkably similar
regardless of whether the perspective was taken by in-group members or out-
group members. This. in tum, could mean that the polarized ratings and
simplified arguments produced from the imagined group perspectives do not
really reflect assumption of bias in others but rather represent a condensed
version of the group norm. The results of Study 4 cast a doubt on such an
explanation and suggest that the assumption of bias in others at least to some
extent influences the quality of simulated arguments provided from group
perspectives. If the imagined explanations reflected the group norms, the
participants of Study 4 should have perceived these explanations as favorably as
those provided from own perspective (or even more favorably), but the results
reflected an opposite pattern. However, to answer these questions properly,
further research is needed to focus on how exactly individuals come up with
predictions of group opinion.
In general, the present research shows that, at least descriptively. it is
more appropriate, to define shared social real ity (both within and between
groups) as shared beliefs about beliefs of the group members rather than
defining it simply as shared beliefs. Admittedly, such a definition does not offer
a very rational portrait of the social perceiver. Both the present studies and
previous research on the false polarization effect, pluralistic ignorance, and the
third person effect show that such beliefs about the beliefs are often exaggerated
in comparison with the actual beliefs or even opposite to the actual beliefs.
From a normative point of view, itis tempting to label this sort of agreement a
shared "pseudo-reality", something that only seems real and could be proven
wrong at a closer look. However, real-life examples illustrate the power of such,
"pseudo-real" beliefs to become self-fulfilling prophecies. Representatives of
conflicting parties feel pressured by the opinions of their groups when
negotiating (Rubin, Pruitt, & Kim, 1994) and may fail to reach an agreement
simply because they underestimate the extent 10 which the "street opinion"
favors compromise and. an end to the conflict. Investors try to predict how
others will react [Q a piece of news and act on these predictions, which in tum
affects stock prices (Wameryd, 2001).
The admission that the shared social reality upon which individuals and
groups act is vulnerable to psychological biases has implications for both
theoretical reasoning and practical research. From a theoretical point of view, it
underscores the necessity to define very precisely what one understands by
shared reality if such a tern, is used [0 explain social psychological phenomena,
as well as the necessity 10 specify (he mechanisms of shared reality thai
innuence these phenomena. Alternatively, it is worth considering to use the
Lenn'shared reality" only to refer 10 an individuals' perception of the extent to
\~hich their views are shared by others (see Hardin & Higgins, 1996), and to
~Indother terms to describe the actual similarity between the views of different
Individuals and groups.
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From a practical point of view, the most interesting and relevant question
for research is how to reduce the gap between the "perceived" and the "actual"
reality, that is; to reduce the bias in prediction of other people's opinions,
Puccio (2003) presents an example of such research by demonstrating how
simple manipulations In presenting information about the parties' views can
reduce the false polarization effect. It would be interesting to replicate these
results in a real-world situation. Another challenge in this area could be
laboratory research on bias recognition in self One may speculate [hat making
the social perceivers aware of their own susceptibility to cognitive biases could
reduce the perceived gap between one's own opinion and that of Ute group ..
Previous research has shown that introspection is unlikely to bring about such
awareness. Perspective taking could serve as an alternative method of self-
analysis. Given the social perceivers' competence in recognizing cognitive
biases in others, seeing oneself from an outside perspective, i.e., imagining how
another critical person would see the social perceiver, might improve the
recognition of cognitive biases in self.
An interesting result of the reported studies Was that the group-serving
effects ofsocial categorization did not happen on all the measured variables; in
addition, the false polarization effect did not influence. all the variables. In Study
2, we did not fmd any categorization effects or any false polarization for such
attributional variables as globality of causes and causal locus of behavior. On
some other variables, we did not find actual group differences in explanations of
the same target be havior, but nevertheless the panicipantsexpected such
differences in responses of their peers. One possible explanation why the same
pattern did not occur for the globality and locus variables is that these
dimensions do not have either positive or negative connotations. Thus, they did
not provide clear cues for the participants which answer should be seen as
favoring one or the other group_ In other words, there was noinformation about
the group norms regarding these two variables. Consequently, there was no
prescribed direction into which a systematic overestimation of group positions
rnightoccur. Such an explanation is supported by the fact that we did not find
any systematic overestimation of group position in prediction of descriptive
scores in Experiment 2 of Study I. but we found an in-group serving
overestimation for the evaluative scores. Awareness of in-group favoritism
might have prompted the participants to expect that each target would be seen
favorably by its in-group members, but there was DO such normative knowledge
avai Iab Ie regarding the descri pti ve aspects 0 f rat logs. Of course, th is hy pothesis
is a post-hoc explanation and should be tested in a properly designed study. if
this assumption is true', it may have important implications for the studies of the
false polarization effect Some variables could be more polarizing than others
because the social norms predict that groups should strongly disagree on certain
topics, These social categorization effects could be independent of other factors
influencing false polarization such as asymmetric bias perception or biased
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presentation of information. Thus, their 'influence should be distinguished from
the other factors and measured separately if one wants to gain full
understanding of the mechanisms behind the false polarization effect.
All four reported studies demonstrate the robustness of the false
polarization effect across various contexts and measurements. Although
moderate In size, the effect was present when the respondents imagined how
their peers assign positive and negative traits to both gender groups in
Experiment 2 of Stud Y 1. The effect was even stronger in intergroup attributions
as shown in Study 2 and Study 3. The results of Study 3 are especially
illustrative because they show that the effect occurs not only in "placement" of
the average group opinion on a given rating dimension but also in emulating the
group members' way of thinking. The results of Study 4 showed that the
simulated explanations were perceived less favorably by the group members
than the explanations given from participants' own perspective. These
differences in perception point to possibilities of further research that could
provide additional information aboutthe cognitive mechanisms behind the false
polarization effect.
Study 3 confirms that the FEB coding scheme (Malle, 1999,2001) can be
successfu,lly applied to studying intergroup attributions. More specifically, both
dimensions of comparison used in the study-the number of reason vs. causal
history of reason explanations and the use of mental state markers for reason
explanaTions-reflect intergroup bias when explaining in-group and our-group
behavior. Perhaps there are other variables in the coding scheme that can be
used in B. similar manner .. In Study 3, we did not use the contents of the
explanations in data analysis because of a relatively low initial agreement
between judges who conducted the content analysis. However, a repeated
content analysis with experienced/better trained judges might reveal new
dimensi011S in the data that could be used for studying attributional biases in
imergroup contexts and thai could provide additional information about how the
false polarization effect is manifested in free responses.
In a wider theoretical context, the results of Study 2 and Study 3
confirmed that awareness of the causes of one's behavior is seen as a positive.
desirable causal factor. These results are similar La the findings of Pronin, Lin,
and Ross (2002) who found that: the social desirability of various biases largely
overlapped with lhecognitive availability of these biases and. that the
participants did not show asymmetry in perception of cognitivelyavailable
biases. (Examples of cognitively available and socially desirable biases include
rriendenhancement, trust of strangers, trust of borrowers, and upward and
downward comparison.) Our results are also similar to those of Kenworthy and
Miller (2002), who found that rationality was seen as a desirable cause of group
altitudes more often attributed to in-group members than out-group members. It
would be interesting to study how the perception of awareness of causes of
behavior is related to the correspondence bias/fundamental attributionerror, It is
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reasonable to expect some connection between both constructs. An actor who is
reacting loa situarioncould arguably be seen as more aware of the causes of his
behavior than an actor who behaves in line with his dispositional qualities (e.g.,
personality traits). Further studies In this direction could shed more light on the
cognitive mechanisms responsible for correspondence bias.
Shortcomlngs and Limitations
One limitation of the reported studies is that all of them were largely
exploratory. Although predictions were formulated and tested for each study,
none of them were designed with a precise, refutable hypothesis in mind. ntis
was largely because of Iimitations ofthe previous knowledge basis. Despite the
relatively wide use of the shared reality concept in the previous literature,
attempts to operationalize it have been rare. The present studies have illustrated
how difficult it is to define shared reality as a measurable construct and raised a
question of now useful it is to use this term in social psychological studies
despite of its convenience in post boc explanations of various phenomena.
Regarding the proper definition of shared social reality, the research reported in
this thesis has admittedly raised more questions than it has provided answers,
Rather, it points EO necessity of a discussion about the term among social
psychologists that would conventionalizeits use in a more precise way and
allow formulating refutable hypotheses about the nature and effects of shared
reality both within and betweengroups,
The situation is more optimistic regarding various aspects of intergroup
attribution research addressed in this thesis. Studies 2 and 3 were based on
prudent and general predictions because they addressed previously unexplored
aspects of intergroup attribution. Study 2 applied a number of known
atrributional dimensions in a new context, causal explanations of attitudinal
behavior. Most of the previous research had been conducted within the
"ultimate attribution error" paradigm (Pettigrew, 2001) with its division
between positive and negative outcomes, and it could not serve to formulate
refutable hypotheses for Study 2. Study 3 used new variables for measurement
of bias in intergroup attributions based on the FEB coding scheme that had not
been used in intergroup perception before. Now, however, it is possible to build
further studies on these findings by formulating precise, refutable hypotheses.
Another limitation of the reported studies is [he use of a repeated-
measures design. In all four studies, all participants fated both targets. In Study
I (Experiment 2) and Study 2, all participants raced the targets from own
perspective and both imagined group perspectives. The use ofa repeated-
measures design could have had some effect on the research results because ic
made the research hypothesis more transparent to the participants. Moreover,
one may speculate that a repealed-measures design triggers a different cognitive
mechanism in estimating the group opinion by asking the participants to
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juxtapose their own opinion to the group (in contrast to asking only about a
group opinion in a. between-subjects design). It would be interesting to replicate
the reported results with a between-subjects design. Such a replication would
improve the validity of the findings and provide more information about the
cognitive mechanisms involved in predicting group opinions. We conducted a
preliminary study to explore the effects of data-gathering design on the false
polarization effect (Dimdins & Montgomery, 2003). The study included 150
first year psychology students al Stockholm University. ..The study took place
two weeks before the scheduled national referendum on Sweden's membership
in the European Monetary Union (EMU).. The participants rated their attitude
towards EMU and predicted the consequences of EMU membership on Swedish
economy, welfare, and democracy. In the between-subjects condition, the
participants answered the questions either from their own perspective or from
one of the group perspectives (i.e., imagining how either EMU supporters or
opponents in their class answered the same questions). In the within-subjects
condition, each participant answered the questions from atl three perspectives.
The data analysis showed that across all the variables the participants in the
within-subjects condition showed significantly higher false polarization effect
than did the participants in the between-subjects condition. However, the pattern
of results varied between separate variables and between both group
perspectives. Therefore additional research IS needed to document the nature
and magnitude or the differences between both types of data-gathering designs.
The third limitation or the reported studies is the definition of groups
Whose opinions [he participants were asked to predict. Only in one of the
reponed surveys (Experiment 2 of Study I), the question about the imagined
group perspectives was defined precisely about the group whose data we used
for estimation of the group members' own opinions. In Studies 2 and 3, the
group perspectives were defined more broadly, and thus the respondents'
opinions were. technically calculated from a sample that was not representative
of the groups. about whose perspectives the respondents were asked to take.
However in Study 2 we used two different formulations for the Imagined group
perspectives and did not find any systematic differences in results between
them. It should be noted that both formulatioas-c-El.I supporters/opponents in
general vs, EU supporters/opponents among University of Latvia
Sludents--defined the group as more inclusive than the actual respondent group
(who were students of one faculty only). Generally, it is very unlikely that this
incongruity might have accounted for the false polarization effect inthe results.
In a [lumber of other studies, researchers have taken special care of the
fonnulation of group-perspective questions and still found the false polarization
effect (Robinson et al., 1995; Puccio, 2003). Moreover, we found some false
polarization in Experiment 2 of Study I where the sample was representative of
the group whose perspective the respondents were asked to take. We also found
the false polarization effect in the EMU study among psychology students at
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Stockholm University, where the respondents- were asked [0 predict the
responses of their classmates who fined in the same questionnaire (Dimdins &
Montgomery, 2003). At the same time, it makes intuitive sense to assume that
as the number of people in a group decreases, arid the group members'
familiarity with each other increases the accessibility of information about the
group :members'actual opinions should increase as well. Consequently, the
group members' reiiance on stereotypes in predicting others' opinions should
decrease, which should in tum reduce or eliminate the false polarization effect.
This assumption emphasizes the importance of precise formulation of the group
perspective to ensure validity of the study results, and it also points to some
possibilities for future studies to be discussed below.
Directions for Further Research
Mapping the Mechanisms of Group Perspective Taking
Most of the reported research on group perspective taking has focused on
the results of this process. One prospective direct jon for future studies would
include asking the social perceivers to report on the process of perspective
taking; for example, asking them 10 respond using the think-aloud protocols.
Two questions in this regard would be of special interest. First, recording think-
aloud pro-tocols would help 10 identify the source of information. that the social
perceivers use to define group position. Second, this method would help to
uncover the mechanism that accounts for the divergence between a respondent's
own opinion and the imagined group opinion. For example, it would help to
answer the question whether the false polarization effect is indeed a result of
polarizing the imagined group opinion or of moderating or elaborating one's
own opinion in relation to a general group norm. In addition, the two ratings
could be unrelated and result from different cognitive processes such as relying
on one's experience to formulate one s own opinion and relying on general
stereotypes in case of the group opinion.
Future research on false polarization should stress the difference between
the perceptions of what opinion an average group member does have and what
opinion a group member should have in accordance with the group norms.
Mapping the mechanisms of how social perceivers explain others' susceptibility
to group norms could help to understand the role of group norms and social
categorization effects in false polarization. In addition making this difference
salient could reduce the false polarization effect.
Cognltive Representations of Groups
Related to the previous research area is the question of how groups are
represented in the social perceiver's mind when the imagined group opinion is.
formulated. Mullen, Rozell and Johnson (1.996) observe that instructions to
process information about a target group with prototype (Cantor & Mischel.
1979) representations are likely 10 exaggerate such consequences of intergroup
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perception as in-group bias and relative homogeneity ..Alternatively, instructions
to process information about a target group with exemplar representations
(Smith & Zarate, 1992) are likely to mitigate some of these consequences. The
hypothesis would be that if the group opinion is based on prototype
representations, the false polarization should be stronger than if it is based on
exemplar representations. On the other hand, a highly polarized imagined group
opinion could be based on few extreme and salient real cases (exemplars),
confirming the biased social presentation hypothesis.
hifluellce of Group Sire and Previous Contact
Related to the problem of group representation is the question of group
size and the social perceiver's experience in individual contacts with members
of the group ..A number of previous studies have suggested that both of these
factors might influence the extent of false polarization. For example, decision
making research has shown that manipulating the group size and emotional
significance of hypothetical group members can eliminate the framing effects in
the life-death decision dilemma (Wang, 1996). Epley and Dunning (2000) found
that the participants felt superior (in the sense of overestimating the likelihood
of generous and selfless behavior) only in relation to a random peer but no! in
relation to an individualized peer. Kemdal and Montgomery (2000) found that
animal rights activists and animal experimenters could take each other's
perspecHves without showing any false polarization effect. One explanation for
this result is that both groups had been in contact for a long time and they knew
and understood their opponent's opinions. These results seem to suggest that the
false polarization is more likely to occur in relation to large, diffuse groups
rather than 10 small, well-defined groups whose individual opinions are known
to the social observer.
Perception of Simulated Group Opinions
One interesting direction for further research would be to elaborate on the
results in Study 4. The answer to the question of why the simulated explanations
were on average perceived less favorably than own explanations might provide
some variables for systematic evaluation of consequences of the false
po.lariZation effect. Such variables, in tum, could help validate eventual results
acquired from thethink-aloud protocols described above.
ConclUding Remarks
The present thesis illustrates several problem areas within social
psychology. One is the difference between interpersonal perception and
inleraction and individual-group and intergroup perception and interaction,
Because people define themselves in terms of social category memberships and
non-memberships,lhere is a strong motivation for the social perceivers to slay
al the level of group norms and group ideologies in their social judgements. The
false polarization effect seems to be a direct consequence of such ideological,
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nonnative judgements. It offers a measurement of the discrepancy between the
intergroup social reality that is constructed at the level of group norms,
ideologies, and stereotypes, and the reality in sociological sense as reflectedin
people's actual opinions. The mechanisms of interpersonal
perception/interaction are simply insufficient for explaining intergroup
percept ion/interaction.
The false polarization effect also illustrates another problem area-the
complex Interaction between cognitive and social factors in creating a social
reality between groups. Groups as entities are as real for the social perceiver as
are other individuals. Their influence: on the social perceiver can be even
stronger than that of another individual, Unlike individuals, groups cannot
provide the social perceiver with unequivocal feedback about how correct his or
her assumptions about the group beliefs and traits are. Any feedback that an
individual receives from a group is Likely to be much more susceptible to
multiple interpretations than feedback received from an individual. Because the
assumption of bias in others individual motivational factors, and biased social
presentation the individual's exaggerated beliefs about group opinion may
never be corrected. Neither cognitive nor social factors alone can account for
such phenomena as the false polarization effect, pluralistic ignorance, or the
third person effect. It is the interaction of both types of factors that makes
individual judgement primitive and amplifies individual bias into social action,
like herd behavior.
The third problem highlighted in the present thesis is more practical than
theoretical. Although the reponed studies have demonstrated the robustness of
the false polarization effect, the actual process of reasoning that leads 10 these
robust results is still not clear. Of course, the results are interesting on their
own. However, these results are open to diverse theoretical speculations
regarding the prooess that led to them. Finding out how the group opinions are
represented in people's minds and how exactly people come up with predictions
of group opinions could help to identify those parts in the process of individual
reasoning where the discrepancy between one's own and the predicted group
opinion appears. This, in tum, could point 10 possible mechanisms for reducing
this discrepancy. Such mechanisms, especially if applicable outside the
laboratory; might help 10 reduce intergroup misunderstanding and conflict in
various social contexts.
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Abstract
Two basic factors influence mutual ratings of social groups: in-group favoritism
(related to the evaluative aspects of a rating) and the perception of shared reality
(related 10 the descriptive aspects). In two studies, we examine the usefulness of
Peabody's (1968) method 0f separati ngeval uat ive and descri pti ve aspect's 0 f
rating in intergroup judgments. In Study I, Latvian and Russian students made
different evaluations of both groups, but the same groups agreed on the
descriptive ratings. In Study 2, male and female psychology students rated each
other fromown, in-group, and out-group perspectives, The participants did not
show any in-group favoritism in their own ratings, but they expected their
fellow students [0 be in-group biased. The participants agreed 00 me descriptive
~atings of both groups. The results demonstrate that shared reality influences
mrerg.roup ratings, despite differences inevaluations.
Key words: Shared reality.Jn-group favoritism, evaluative ratings, descriptive
ratings. perspect ive tak ing
According to Tajfel (1981 )" an important function of social stereotypes is
that it creates and preserves positively valued differentiation between one's own
and other- social groups, This implies that it is essential in an intergroup context
to view positively one's in-group (any social category that individuals belong to
that is salient at the given moment) more than any out-group (social categories
that individuals do not identify with at that same moment). Empirical studies
support this assumption (Campbell, 1967; Esses, Haddock, & Zanna, 1994~
Esses & Zanna, 1995; Peabody, 1968; Rusternll, Merten, & Ciftci, 2000:
Saenger & Flowerman, 1954; Scaillet & Leyens, 2000;, Smedley & Bayton.
1978).
At the same rime" judging a social group is difficult,especially if based
only on evaluative terms, Most often groups that are stereotyped by the social
perceiver live in the same social space as the perceiver. Hardin and Higgins
( 1996) note that "social interaction is predicated upon and regulated by the
establishment of shared reality" (p.30). Because interacting groups share the
same social reality, they are likely to possess some evaluation-free, descriptive
information about each other. A group's auto-stereotypesand the stereotypes
held about the same group by other groups are often similar (McAndrew et al.,
2000; Peabody, 1985) ..However, this is not the case when one group has little
knowledge about another group-s-that is, when the group being judged and the
judgesthemselves do not share the same reality. In studies during the Cold War
and shortly aFler the end of the cold war, the stereotypes of Russians expressed
by representatives of other nations differed significantly from the stereotypes
Russians expressed ubout themselves, their auto-stereotypes (Peabody &
Shmelyov, 1996; Stephan et al., 1993).. The distinction between evaluative and
descriptive aspects of judgment has also been emphasized In the research on
stereo: y pe accuracy (Judd & Park, 1993), deci s ion-m ak jng (Mon tgom ery,
1994), and the factor structure of personality trai ts (Peabody, 1984;. Peabody &
Goldberg, 1989; Saucier, 1994).
Peabody (1968) describes a method for differentiating between both
aspects of group ratings. He argues that single-trait ratings typicallyconfound
the evaluative and descriptive aspects of judgment A similar problem is present
when a target is judged on a single scale, offering a contrast between two traits.
Fer example, if a typical member of a group is rated as quite thrifty on a bipolar
scale of extravagant-thrifty, it is not dear whether this rating reflecrs the rater's
belief that a typical target group member is prone to control their expenditures:
or whether it reflects the rater's bias for that particular group, resulting in an
adjective with a positiveconnotation (thrifty) instead of an adjective with a
negative connotation (extravagant). Peabody suggests that thjs question could
be answered by racing the target on an additional bipolar scale, maintaining 1M
same descriptive contrast but reversing the evaluativeconnorarions of the
adjectives: stingy-generous, A rating closer to stingy relative to generous would
indicate that the overall rating is more descriptive, whereas the opposite would
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mean that evaluative aspects playa major role in the rater's judgments, When
both scales are arranged in a way that the higher rating corresponds to the
positive adjective, the evaluative aspect of the rating will contribute to the score
on both scales, but the descriptive aspect will do so only on one scale,
decreasing the score- on the other scale,
Peabody (1968) demonstrates that in intergroup ratings (two groups
rating each other) the two aspects could be estimated by conducting a 2 (judge)
by 2 (scale) ANOYA on the ratings of each target, with repealed measures on
the last factor, The main effect of judge corresponds to the evaluative
disagreement between groups about the evaluation of a target (the target's in-
group judges giving higher scale averages than the target's out-group judges),
TIle main effect of scale corresponds to the agreement between groups about the
descriptive characteristics or the target (the difference between the scales being
tn the same direction for both groups of judges).
Peabody (1970, 1985) suggests that [he two aspects of group ratings can
be expressed directlyas indexes, The rating on each of the two scales (0 and b)
can be seen as aeumbination of an evaluative (E) and a descriptive CD)
component: a = E + D, and b = E - D. By solving for the two components, it is
possible to calculate their value from the ratings on both scales: E = (a + b)/2; D
::0 (a - b)/2, We refer to these indexes as evaluative and descriptive scores.
Although this method has been neglected in stereotype and intergroup
perception studies, we believe it offers a simple and elegant possibility to
differentiate between both aspects of group ratings, We intend to investigate the
usefulness of Peabody's approach for studying group perception of shared
reality _ We will also propose possible improvements on Peabody's original
method as well as discuss its lim italians and the possibilities of further
I11flhodological refi nernents,
One aspect of Peabody's method that has been largely unexplored is a
llitect comparison of targets. In previous studies of intergroup perception
(Peabody, t96 8. 1985), judgments about each target were analyzed separate Iy.
In the studies reported below, we include both targets as within-subjects
variables in the same analysis. This approach yields more precise information
about how each group perceives the differences (or similarities) between [he
targets,
Another drawback of Peabody's method is that one faces a
methodological problem when attempting 'to generalize the results across a
number of scale pairs, Whereas the evaluative scores can be averaged across
any number of scales, il is not possible to construct one index. reflecting the
descriptive agreement between groups of judges because the descriptive effects
an different scale pairs can occur in di fferent directions.
To estimate both effects across all scale pairs. we suggest conducting a 3-
\va. (Target by Judge by Scale Pair) ANQYA separately on the descriptive
SCores and evaluative scores as the dependent variables. The analysis of [he
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evaluative scores serves to estimate the effects of in-group favoritism. The
descriptive scores reflect the shared reality of intergroup ratings,
In-group favoritism should result in a tendency that the mean evaluative
score ofan in-group target is higher than toe same mean of an out-group target.
This tendency should hold true for both groups of judges and should result in a
significant Judge by Target interaction (if there are no evaluative differences
among the scale pairs) or a Judge by Target by Scale Pair interaction (if there
are such differences).
Shared realiry should be reflected in a tendency that (on most or all scale
pairs) the mean descriptive score ofthe same target does not differ significantly
between both groups of judges ..This tendency should hold true for both targets,
and should result in a strong Target 'by Scale pair interaction. At the same time,
Target by Scale Pair by Judge interaction should be weak or Insignificant
because it reflects the extent of disagreement between judges on tbe descriptive
ratings of each target
It IS important to note that the size of effects is contingent on how the
descriptive scores are calculated for each scale pair ..Which rating is subtracted
from the other one will affect the sign of the descriptive score. Thus the
direction of subtraction can influence all the ANOYA effects calculated across.
scale pairs. Although these differences in calculations create certain
indeterminacy in the analysis of results, they cannot introduce or eliminate any
effects related to the existence or absence of shared reality because the mean
differences between targets and between judges foreach separate scale pair
remain the same, only their signs change.
We illustrate the use of Peabody's method in two studies of intergroup
perceptio n. J n Study I, Ihe de sign is sim ilar to Pea body's (I 968) ori gina!
research. In Study 2,. we apply the same method in a more complex design of
intergroup percept ion. Judges rate the targets not only from their own
perspective but also from imagined in-groupand out-group perspectives.
Study I
In this study, Latvian and Russian students rated targets representing both
ethnic groups, The relations between Latvians (the titular group) and Russians
(the largest ethnic minority group) in Latvia have a long and complicated
history. On the one hand, there exists a certain tension between both groups on
a political and an everyday level. On the other hand, the groups have shared the
same social universe for decades and thus should have 8. fairly good knowledge
of each other. OnE would expect a fairly strong in-group favoritism. to be
present in the judgments of both groups of one another. However, there should
also be evidence of some "shared reality" in these judgments; that is both
groups should agree to some extent on how they describe each other.
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Method
Trans/a/ion and pre-testing a/the scales. Fourteen scale pairs taken from
Peabody (1985) and eight scale pairs taken from Montgomery and Skaldeman
(200 I) were first translated to Latvian independently by two professional
translators, who afterwards discussed the differences in ttanslarions. Two other
trans lators then provided independent back -translations to Engli sh. A II four met
to identify possible translation problems and finalize the Latvian version of the
scales. The same procedure was used to translate the scales into Russian. Four
bilingual judges (one professional translator, one journalist, and two
psychologists) independently compared the Latvian and Russian versions of the
questionnaire and noted the possible discrepancies between both versions, Their
suggestions were used to revise both versions to make them comparable.
The questionnaire was then pre-tested by asking 16 people (8 Russians
and 8 Latvians) to answer the questions in the presence of an interviewer and to
express any comments regarding their contents. Next, the interviewerexplained
the logic of the evaluative and descriptive contrasts to the respondents and
asked for comments about how well the adjectives of each scale pair
represented these contrasts. The comments were used to further improve the
wording ofthe scales. Finally, all four judges checked and approved the final
versions of the questionnaire in Latvian and Russian.
Nine pairs of scales were excluded from the study at various stages of the
translalionlpreptesting procedure. Although the correspondence to the English
onginal was important, the main criteria were the relationship between the trait
adjectives in each pair and [he comparability between the Latvian and Russian
versions of each scale pair.
Sample. The study induded86 Latvian and 77 Russian respondents (76%
Women). All pa rti eipants were soc ia I sci ences and techni cal sci ence students
from five di fferent Latvian universities (most of them were in thei r second Or
third year of studies). The average age of the respondents was 195 years. Age
and gender proportions were similar in the Latvian and Russian respondent
groups.
Questionnaire, The questionnaire was taken from the middle section of a
larger survey on ethnic identity and values. The participants were asked to rate
the likelihood of presence of the given traits in 2 ethnic groups, Latvians living
III Latvia and Russians living 1/1 Latvia, on 13 pairs of scales. Each scale ranged
from I (0 9. Both extremes (I and 9) indicate a very large possibility of the
presence of the given trait, and 5 indicates an equal possibility of both Of neither
of the traits. The adjectives at both ends of each scale were opposites,
representing a contrast for both evaluative and descriptive aspects (e.g., th,.ijry-
e.Yf'·uvagant). Each scale had a pair that reversed the evaluative aspects but was
sin1ilar regarding the descriptive aspects (e.g., stingy-generonsi , In the sequence
of scales. the evaluative favorable end of the scale altered from the right [0 the
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left (being assigned the anchors I or 9). The order of the scales In the
questionnaire was arranged to separate those of related contents,
Results and Discussion
Before the calculations, the data were recoded so that 9 corresponded IO
the positive adjective on all scales. Appendix A gives all means and standard
deviations. First, an evaluative score was calculated for each scale pair as the
mean of ratings on both scales. Figure 1 gives the means for the evaluative
score. A 2 (judge) by 2 (target) by 13 (scale pair) mixed ANOYA with repeated
measures on the last two factors was carried out on the evaluative scores as
dependent variables,
r
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Figure J. Mean evaluative SCores for Latvian and Russian judges. Higher scores
indicate more positive evaluation.
The ANOYA yielded a Target by Judgeinteraction, PO> 128) = 32.43, P
< ,0 I, and a Target by Judge by Scale Pair interacti on F(l2> 128) = 7.63 P <
.0 l. Figure I shows that the Target by fudge interaction reflects an overall
tendency that each target was evaluated more positively by in-group judges and
less positively by out-group judges. As the three-way irueraction shows, there
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are differences between scale pairs regarding this pattern. However, whereas the
Russian judges displayed a clear in-group favoritism evaluating Russian target
significantly higher than the Latvian target (estimated marginal means 5.91 [SE
= .10] and 4.57 [SE = .11] respectively). the Latvian judges did DOt see both
targets as significantly different (kJ!..ll1 = 5.22 [SE"'" .10] and MRu5 = 5.36 [SE =
,09]). This pattern results in a highly signi ficant main effect of target: F( I ,128)
== 49.06, P < .0 I. A significant Target by Scale Pair interaction, F(12. 128) ='
16.24, P < .01, indicates that' this pattern was not present or equally strong on all
scale pairs. There was also a mai n effect 0f scale pair, F(l2, J 28) = 13.17 J p <
,01, showing that for some scale pairs the evaluative contrast was stronger than
for others. A significant Judge by Scale Pair interaction, F( 12, (28) = 3.52, P <
.0 I. shows that for some scale pairs the evaluative contrast was not equally
Strong for both groups of judges. Perhaps this result reflects some subtle
differences between the Latvian and RUSSian versions of the questionnaire. In
some cases the evaluative contrast in one language Was stronger than in the
Other Ianguage,
The descriptive score for each scale pair was ealculatedas [he difference
of ratings on both scales divided by two. To reduce indeterminacy in the
calCUlations, we chose to follow a common rationale in calculating the
difference scores for all scale parts. For each scale pair, we subtracted the rating
On[he scale where the positive adjective represented unassertiveness or impulse
comral (e.g .., cautious in rash-cautious) from the rating on the scale where the
positive adjective represented assertiveness or impulse expression (e.g .. bold in
11m id- b old) , A larger descriptive score thus corresponds to
assertiveness/impulse expression, and a lower score to unassertiveness/ impulse
Control. The terms assertiveness/ unassertiveness and impulse expression/
vnpulse control are taken from Peabody and Goldberg's (1989) structure of
personality traits, where they denote two separate factors. lr makes intuitive
sense, though, to use both dimensions alongside, because together they
represent a cornrast between more dynamic traits on the one side, and more
passive traits on the ather. It is important to note that this arrangement of scales
represents only one of many possible ways of calculating the difference scores.
However, such a calculation makes the size and direction of descriptive scores
interpretable. .
A 2. (judge) by 2 target) by 13 (scale pair) mixed ANOVA with repeated
me.asures on the last two factors was carried out on the descriptive scores as
dependent variables. The analysis yielded two strong main effects: target, F( I,
132) "" /30.72, p < .0 I, and scale pair, F( 12 '132) "" 15.93, p < .0 I.. There were
also stI'ong Target by Scale Pair, F(l2, 132) = 39.28, p < .01, and Target by
JUdge, F( 1, 132) "" 10.89, P < .01 ,interactions. There were also two weaker
ItHeractions, Target by Scale Pair by Judge, F02,128) = 5.87. P <. .01, and
Scale Pair by Judge, F( 12. 128) "" 2.81, P < .05. Figure 2 shows that both targets
Were seen as descriptively different by both groups of judges; at the same time,
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there was a very good (although Dot perfect as reflected in the interactions
involving judge) agreement between judges on the descriptive attributes of each
target. The strong main effect of target reflects the tendency that Russians were
rated as more assertive/prone to impulse expression than Latvians by both
groups of judges.
The Target by Judge interaction reflects a tendency that Latvian judges
saw bothtargets as more descriptively different than Russian judges did- This
effect occurs because Russian judges displayed stronger in-group favoritism in
their ratings as could be seen from the analysis of the evaluative scores.
2.5
2.
___ Lat,,1 a " ludgelLa IVla n la'9.1
-+- - tal.lan ludge/Russian ta rgel
__ RUSSIan jud.galLaMan largol
~ ••..• Russian j1JdgeJRLISSIan, t. 'gel1,5
·\.5
Figure 2 Mean descriptive scores fOT latvian and Russian judges. Higher scores
indicate that a target is rated as assertive/prone to impulse expression. When
calculating the descriptive scores. rating bwas subtracted from raring Q.
Taken together, the results of Study I support our predictions that both
groups agree on the descriptive aspects and disagree on the evaluative aspects of
mutual ratings. One finding stands out from the predicted pattern .. Although
Stronger in-group favoritism b)' Russian participants (as ethnic minority group)
could be expected (Brewer & Gardner, 1996; Hewsione, Rubin, & Willis, 1002:
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Mullen, Brown, & Smith, 1992), the lack of in-group favoritism demonstrated
by the Latvian participants was somewhat of a surprise. One explanation might
be the influence of social desirability on the responses of Latvian judges. As
Fiske (2000) points out, modern racism theories hypothesize a self-esteem-
based motive not to appear racist, and: a similar hypothesis can also be made
about the motivation to hide one's ethnocentrism. Maass, Castelli and Arcuri
12000) quote a number (If studies that show H tendency for majority group
members to avoid actions that might be seen as discriminating against minority
group members.
This result also illustrates the usefulness of direct comparisons between
targets in the analysis. If we had followed Peabody's (1968) original approach
and ran the analysis separately on each target, we might have (erroneously)
concluded that both groups displayed similar levels of in-group favoritism
because each target received higher evaluations from its in-group judges than
from out-group judges.
Study 2
Related to shared reality is the concept of perspective, Decision-making
Sludies demonstrate that the same object attributes can be seen as positive or
negalive depending on the perspective taken by the perceiver (Montgomery,
1994). In addition, the members of opposing groups can successfully take the
perspective of their opponent (Kerndal & Montgomery 2001). This can reduce
in-group bias and stereotyping of an out-group (Galinsky & Moskowitz, 2000).
At the same time, taking a group's perspective may lead to an
exaggeration of the group's position (Robinson, Keltner Ward, & Ross, 1995)
and overestimation of differences between various groups (Diekman, Eagly, &
KUlesa, 1002; Keltner & Robinson, 1997; Robinson & Friedman 1995;
Rouhana, O'Dwyer, & Morrison Vase, '1997). Overestimation of a group score
on a certain attribute in comparison with the actual group score on that attribute
is known as theIalse polarization effect (Pronin Puccio, & Ross, 2002).
Study 2 was designed 10 examine the effects of perspective taking on the
inlergroup perception. In addition \0 rating both targets from their own
perspective both groups were asked to make their ratings from the perspective
of their in-group and out-group, As in Study I,we predicted that both groups of
jUdges would show in-group favoritism. disagreeing on the evaluative aspects of
ratings of each target. but would agree on the descriptive aspects, In line with
the perspective theory (Montgomery, 1994), we expected the false polarization
effect to occur primarily in evaluations of targets in positive-negative terms bur
not in the descriptive ratings of the targets. We predicted that the judges would
indicate stronger in-group favoritism when rating the targets from the imagined
group perspectives than their own perspective. We also expected no perspective
effects in the analysis of the descriptive scores.
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Method
Selection ofscales, Because the participants would be asked to make all
the ratings six times (2 targets X 3 perspectives), it was necessary to reduce the
number of scales used In the questionnaire. Thus only eight scale pairs already
available in Swedish (taken from Montgomery and Skaldernan, 2001) were
used. The Swedish scales were initially developed according to a similar pre-
testing procedure as the scales in Study 1. The only difference was that QuI of
the eight scale pairs three were not taken from Peabody but developed by the
researchers (directly in Swedish). Montgomery and Skaldeman ran a
rnultidirnensional scaling on their data (with 206 participants). For each scale
pair, they found clear descriptive and evaluative contrasts in tine with Peabody's
model.
Sample. Seventy-one students (44 women) at the Department of
Psychology, Stockholm University, participated in the study. An participants
were first year students and received points for course requirements for taking
part in the study.
Questionnaire. W~ asked the participants to rate two targets: (<I.) a malt!
psychology student at Stockholm University and (b) a female psychology student
at Stockholm University on 8 pairs of scales. The participants were asked 10
indicate the usual presence of the given traits in each target. The scale ranged
from I to 9, standing forexeremely, with the scale midpoint 5 for neither. Each
participant rated both targets from his or her own perspective, as well as from
the perspective of (a) male psychology student at Stockholm University and (b)
female psychology student at Stockholm University.
Results and Discussion
Appendix B givesthe means and standard deviations for all scales. A 1
(judge) by 2 (target) by 3 (perspective) by 8 (scale pair) mixed ANOYA with
repeated measures on the last three factors was carried out on the evaluative
scores of all 8 scale pairs (calculated as the average rating, on both scales). The
analysis yielded a significant main effect 0 f target, F( l , 57) = 4.40, P < .0 -,
main effect of scale pair, F(7, 57) = 4.18, P < .Ol, and a Target by Scale Pair
interacti on, F( 7, 57) '" 13.48, P < .0 L On average, the female target received
higher evaluation than the male target. The estimated marginal means and
standard errors were 5.73 (0.09) and 5.62 (0.08). As can be seen in Figure J, the
difference between targets varied depending on the scale pair, resulting lnme
Target by Scale Pair interaction.
III. contrast to Study I, the participants did not show signi flcant in-group
bias in evaluation of both targets. There are two possible explanations of this.
First, although male and female psychology students represent distinct social
categories, a salient common category (psychology student) maycontribute to
seeing both targets as equally positive. Second. there is no history of conflict or
competition between groups that reduces the need for self-enhancement. [II.
ro
other words, the social categorization in the present context was probably not
strong enough to induce in-group favoritism.
Target: male psyehelogy students
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Figure J. Mean evaluative scores for male and female targets from 0\ n. male. and
remale perspectives across both groups of judges. Higher scores ind icate more
positive eval uati on.
The analysis also yielded a significant Target by Perspective interaction,
F(2, 57) = 4.20, P < .05. Figure 3 sho ..•s a clear pattern: the participants gave the
highest evaluation to each target from the target's in-group perspective. That is,
they judged the male target most positively from a male perspective and female
larget most positively from a female perspective. Although participants did not
display significant in-group favoritism, the pattern of means indicates that they
expected the ratings of'fellow participants to be biased towards in-group,
1 I
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Figure 4. Mean descriptive SCores for male and female targets from own" male, and
female perspectivesacross both groups or judges. Higher scores indicate that a
targe: is rated as assertive/prone 10 impulse expression. When calculating the
descriptive scores, rating b was subtracted from rating a.
A 2 (judge) by 2 (target) by 3 (perspective) by 8 (scale pair) mixed
ANDV A with repeated measures on the last three factors was carried out on the
desc riprive scores 0fall 8 seal e pa irs, ca1cu Ialed as the difference between
ratings on both scales divided by two. As in Study 1, a higher descriptive score
corresponds to assertiveness/ impulse expression. The analysis yielded a
significant main effect of scale pair, F(7 57) = 15.69, P < .01 ,and a significant
Target by Scale Pair interaction, F[7, 57) -= 19.41. P < .01. There was also a
weak but significant Perspective. by Scale Pair, F(14, 57) -= 2.73, P < .05.
interaction. Figure 4 shows theralthough both targets were seen as fairly
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different and the means occasionally differed for the three perspectives, the
overall pattern across all scale pa irs shows a good agreement among the judges
about the descriptive attributes of each target. There seem to be no systematic
differences between the ratings provided from own perspective and the
imagined group perspectives.
General Discussion
The present resu Its demonstrate the usefu lness of Peabody's ( 1968, I985)
model of separating evaluativeand descriptive components in mutual ratings of
social grQups. In both studies, evaluative and descriptive scores could be used
as convenient and efficient tools for estimating the effects of in-group
favoritism and shared reality. In a broader theoretical context, the resu lis of
Study I showed that intergroup ratings reflect agreement on the contents of the
shared social reality despite the bias introduced by in-group favoritism. Study 2
demonstrated that this agreement is largely independent of whether these ratings
eremade fro Ill, one's own perspective or from imagined group perspectives.
The results of STUdy 2 point [0 a promising direction for further research.
Wedid not findeny systematic disagreement between judges on the evaluations
of largets (i.e., no in-group favoritism). However, when rating the targets from
the imagined group perspectives, both groups of judges expected in-group
ravoritism to influence the scores. The perspective effects were moderate in
size. but the expected bias was dearly in the predicted direction. Jt would be
interesting to repeat this study in a more competitive social context as in Study
1. Some perspective effects were found also in the analysis of descriptive
scores, but the mean differences were not systematic and cannot be attributed to
the false polarization effect However, given the robust nature of this effect
lProninet al., 2002), we may find that it affects both the evaluative and
descriptive aspects of ratings made from imagined group perspectives.
The results supported our suggested improvements to Peabody's method.
We believe that directlyccrnparing the targets in the same analysis is
particularly useful both in studies of in-group favoritism and the contents of
shared reality. Our other suggestion - inclusion of all scale pairs in the same
ana.lysis - also proved useful, Although the data analysis is based on
campi icated three-way and four-way ANOVAs,. the results are easy to grasp
because the number of effects corresponding to the in-group favoritism and
shared reality is limited in each analysis. In addition, our approach allows
conducting two analyses across all scale pairs instead of conducting separate
analyses for each pair.
In both studies, ''v'e found differences between scale pairs both for
evaluative and descriptive scores. One possible way of further refining
Peabody's method would be to look at (or control for) the influence or social
rontext and relevance of rating criteria on the intergroup judgments. It has been
shown that dlmensionsof'cornparison between groups and the social context tin
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which the comparison is made) can significantly influence the patterns of
displaying in-group favoritism and social discrimination (Mumrnendey, 1995;
Reynolds, Turner & Haslam, 2000) as well as out-group stereotyping (Haslam,
Turner Oakes, Mcfiarty, & Hayes, 1992). Taking these factors into account
might help to understand the differences in results between the scale pairs and
develop more reliable sets of scales for use in specific socialcontexts. Reducing
the difference between the seale pairs would allow constructing reliable
indexes for eval uat ive and descri pri ve com ponents across all pai rs.
We believe that the method outlinedabove can be applied to studies of
stereotype accuracy (cf. Judd & Park, 1993; Oakes & Reynolds, 1997) and
consensus (cf. Has lam, 1997). These are issues of great social relevance thai
continue to attract the interest of psychologists. We hope that our research will
encourage other researchers [0 re-visit the work of Peabody and to further
contribute to the development of his method and its integration into modern
social psychology.
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Appendix A. Mean ratings and standard deviations on all scales for Latvian and
Russian judges
Scale
a lnhibited (~) - Spontaneous (+)
b Impulsi ve (-) - Se If~corUrolled(+)
a Doesn't care about others (-) ~
Cares about others (+)
b Interferes in others affairs (-) -
Leaves others in peace (+)
a Stingy (~) - Generous (+)
b Extravagant (-) - Thrifty (+)
a Timid (-) - Bold (+)
bRash (-) - Cautious (+)
a Devious (-) - Frank (+)
b Tactles.s 0- Tactful ( )
a Se lf-desrructi ve (-) - Sel f affirmati ve (+)
b Egoistic (-) ~ Altruistic (+)
a Passive (-) ~ Active (+)
b Agitated (~) - Calm (+)
a Cold (-) ~ Warm (+)
b Disorganized (- ) - Organized (+)
a Conforming (-) ~ Independent (+)
b Uncooperative (-) - Cooperative (-iF)
aGrim (-)-Gay (+)
b F'rivolous (-) - Serious (+)
a Boring (-) - Charming (+)
b Unreliable (-) - Reliable (+)
a Opportunistic (.) - Ideal istic (+)
b Impractical (-) ~ Practical (+)
a Vacillating (-) - Persistent (+)
b InUex.ible (-) - Flexihle (-+)
Target: Latvian
Latvian judges Russian judges
Mean SD Mean SD
3.27 1.64 4.67 2.69
6.04 1.85 5.60 2.70
4.95 1.91 356 1.67
5,01 2.49 4..55 2.39
4.23 1.91 3.04 1.84
6.76 1.67 6.42 l,96
4.23 2.02 3..66 2.05
5.90 1.95 6.17 2.35
4.79 2.04 3.03 1,77
5.74 1.80 5.17 2.41
5.26 1.48 4.97 2.14
3.95 1.57 2.87 1.55
4.82 1..86 4.05 2.13
5.60 1.99 5.70 VII
5.65 1.99 3.40 2.01
5.25 1.89 4.67 2.07
4.39 2.12 4.54 2.40
4.94 1.73 4.12 2.03
5.6\ 5.71 4.40 2.28
6.72 1.59 5.36 1.27
5.45 1.90 4.79 2.10
5.70 J.6\ 4.09 2.43
5.04 1.57 6.01 2.14
6.51 1.99 5.41 2.34
5.14 2 ..11 4.32 2.04
4.75 1.80 3.99 1.83
i8
Scale Target: Russian
a.Inhibi red (-) - Spontaneous (+)
b lrnpulsive ( -) - Se.1[-controlled (+)
a Doesn "1 care abou t others (-) -
Cares about others (+)
bInterferes in others affairs (-) -
Leaves olhers in peace (+)
a Stingy (-) ~ Generous (+) 5.61 1.83 6.58 1.95
b Extravagant (-) - Thrifty (+) 4.40 1.80 4,30 2.35
a Timid (-) ~ Bold (+) 7.34 1.67 6.78 1.78
bRash (-l-Cautious(+) 5.05 1.99 5.36 2.12
a.Devious (-)-Frank (+) 5.37 2.13 6.15 1.93
b Tactless H- Tactful (+) 4.24 1.73 5.59 1.85
a Self-destructive H~Selfaffinnative (+) 6.59 LSS 6.20 1.95
b EgOistic (-) - Altruistic (+) 4.43 1.77 5.17 2.11
a Passive (-) - Active (+) 6.42 1.95 6.91 1.99
,EAgitated(-)-Calm(+) 3.45 \.55 4.71 1.94
a Cold (-) - Warm (+) 5.68 2.03 7,12 1.74
bDisorganized(-)~Organized(+) . 5.20 2.07 5.38 2.10
a Conforming (-) - lndependent (+) 6.24 1.95 5.86 2.09
.!Uncooperative (-) ~ Cooperative (+) 5.67 1.97 6.64 2.00
aGrim(·)~Gay(+) 6.50 1.76 6.86 1.89
j Frivolous (-)-Seriolls (+) 4.82 1.77 5.39 2.16
a BOring «-) - Charming (+) 5.08 I. 73 6.54 I. 76
1Unreliable (.) - Reliable (t) 4.77 1.88 6.26 1.80
a Opportunistic (-) -ldeal.istic (.,I.) 4,90 1.60 4,82 2"II
J Impractical H- Praclical (+) 5..63 1.79 6.30 1.90
a Vacillating (.) - Persistent (+) 6.78 1.91 6.74 1.87
~lnflc)(ible (-) - Flexible (+). 6.23 .. 2.02. 5.64. 1.98
Niue. For all scales I stands for the negative end of the continuum lind 9 for the
POsilive end. Adjacent scales are from the same pair. Rating b was subtracted from
rating Gl when calculatlng the descriptive scores.
Latv ian j udges
Mean SD
6.65 1.74
2.96 1.67
Russian judges
Mean SD
5.83 2.26
4.46 2.26
5.29 5.58 6.21 2.03
4.04 2.27 4.97 1.88
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Appendix B. Mean ratings and standard deviations on all scales for male and
fernal e judges from own, male and female perspecri yes
Scale Target: "Male psychology student"Male judges Female judges
Own Male Female Own Male Female
a Inhibited - 5.59 5058 5.64 5,48 6.29 5.63
Spontaneous (I.J I) ( 1.33) (1.38) ( 1.23) (1.45) ( 1.42)
b ImpuJsive- 6.30 6.54 6.19 6.07 6.62 6.26
Self-com ro lled ( 1.30) (1.07) ( 1.13) ( 1.61) (1.61) ( 1.85)
a Doesn't care about 4.70 4.96 5.19 5.35 6.55 5.93
others - Cares about o. (1.59) (1.56) (1.42) (L88) ( 1.58) (1.78)
b Interferes in o, affairs 5.41 5.58 5.50 5.47 5.57 5.58
~ Leaves others in peace ( I.87) ( 1.42) ( 1.48) ( I.4S) ( 1.60) (1.37)
a Stingy - Generous 5.41 5.62 5.58 5.26 6.17 5.55
(J .01) ( 1.02) (1.03) (.1.18) (1.45) (1.27)
b Extravagant.- Thrifty 5.56 5.3$ 5.15 5.1& 5049 5.30
( 1.3]) (1.26) ( L 19) ( 1.24) (l.58) ( 1.44)
a Timid - Bold 5.48 5.85 5.54 5.33 6.17 5.51
(L19) ( 1.32) (1.53) (1.29) ( 1.58) ( 1.52)
b Rash - Cautious 5.37 5.23 4.54 5.37 5.62 5.67
( 1.21) (l.18) (1.36) (1.38) ( 1.34) ( 1.60)
a Devious - Frank 5.37 5..69 5.54 5.49 5.60 6.19
( 1.62) (1. 72) (1.53) (1.62) ( 1.81) (1.64)
b Tactless - Tactful 5.67 5.62 5.27 6.12 6.3& 6.33
( 1.44) (1.33) (1.34) (1.37) ( 1.50) (L59)
a Self-desrructive > 6.44 6.27 6.31 5.91 5.95 6.16
Se If afflrmat ive ( 1.28) (0.87) ( l.OS) (1.54) (1.56) (1.48 )
b Egoistic - Altruistic 4.63 4.35 4.73 4.93 5.64 5.35
(1.25) (1.20) ( \.08) (l.22) ( 1.69) ( 1.53)
a Passive - Ac ti ve 5.82 5.77 5..89 5.98 6.36 5.61
( 1.36) ( 1.42) ( l.SI) (1.46) (1.83) (1.72)
b Agitated - Calm 5.&9 5.96 6.24 6.26 6.36 6.16
( 1.70) (LSI ) (1.39) (1.65) (1.62) ( I.75)
a Cold>- Warm 5048 550 5.62 5.74 6.07 6.14
(1.22) (1.14) (1.39) ( l.63) (t .50) ( 1.66)
b Disorganized- 5.29 5.00 4.80 4.72 5.60 5.05
Organized ( 1.20) ( 1.50) (1.92) (1.47) ( 1.88) ( 1.75)
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cale
Target: "Female psychology student"
Male judges, Female judges
Own Male Female Own Male Female
4.56 4.85 5.27 5.56 4.83 5.61
(t.4o) (1.46) (1.64) (1.30) (1.41) (1.4.5)
6.15 5.93 5.96 6.72 6.02 6.19
(1.63) (1.66) (1.89) (1.33) (2.09) (1.82)
5.85 6..15 5.89 6.26 6.69 6.81
(1.56) (1.54) (2.01) (2 ..00) (l.8o) (1.76)
4.74 4.44 4.62 5.05 4.41 4.77
([,23) (1.48) (1.88) (1.70) (1.77) (1.1.16)
5.41 5.82 5.73 5.79 6.00 5.88
(1.22) (0.92) (1.37) (1.37) (1.41) (1.35)
b Extravagant - Thrifty 5.44 5..56 5.69 5.21 5.45 5.67
(1.16) (1.31) (1.49) 0.39) (1.78) (1.44)
5.00 4.78 5.46 5.42 4.81 5.]4
(1.41) (L50) (1.53) (1.18) (1.07) (1.13)
5.96 6.15 6.19 5.67 6.10 6.35
(1.16) (1.46) (1.23) (1.49) ( 1.76) (l.4.S)
4.85 4.74 5.23 5.63 5.64 5.91
(1.61) (1.61) (1.99) (l.7)} (1.64) (1.80)
5.93 6.59 6.04 6.07 6.91 6..79
(1.66) (1.34) (1.~I) (1.98) (1.34) (1.52)
6.26 5.85 6.19 6.05 6.10 6.09
(1.43) (1.32) (1.47) (1.69) (1.62) (1.65)
4.96 5.30 5.31 5.65 5.76 5.70
( I .32) (1.27) ( 1.69) (1.46) (1.46) (.1.26)
5.96 5..52 6.08 5.91 5.02. 5.93
(1.72) (1.89) (1.38) (1.43) l1.75) (1.75)
5.04 4.82 5.19 5.91 5.52 5.54
(1.51) l1.42) (L74) (1.78). (1.95) (1.93)
5.82 5.82 5.96 6.33 6.43 6.61
(1.47) (1.50) (1.56) (1.39) (I.S8) (1.61)
b Disorganized - 6.37 6.44 6.46 6.12 6.29 6.33
-.9rganized ( I. 57) (1.31) ( 1.45) ( l.79) (2.02) ( 1.86)
Note. Standard deviations are indicated in parentheses. For all scales, I stands for the
negative end of the continuum and 9 for the positive end. Adjacent scales are from the
same pair. Rating bwas subtracted from rating a when calculating the descriptive
Scores
B Inhibited-
Spontaneous
b Impulsive-
Self-controlled
3 Doesn't care about
others - Cares about o.
b Interferes in o.affairs
- Leaves others in peace
a Stingy - Generous
a Timid - Bold
bRash - Cautious
-
a Devious - Frank
b Tact less - Tact ful
a Sel f-destructi ve ~
Self affirmative
bEgoistic - Altruistic
a.Passive - Active
b Agitated - Calm
IICold - Warm
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EXPLANATIONS OF ATTITUDINAL BERA VIOR
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ABSTRACT
Supporters andopponents of Latvia's EU membership rated attitudinal behavior
of Ellsupporters and opponents on a number of causal explanation scales from
their own perspective and simulated perspectives of both groups. From a target's
in-group perspective, both groups rated the causes of behavior as more stable,
(om-rallable and rational, and less subjective: and less influenced by others than
the respective group did from their own perspective. Although the results were
not consistent for all rating scales and all perspectives, the study demonstrates
thai a false polarizationeffect occurs in explanationsof attitudinal behavior.
Directions for future research are discussed.
Key words: ln tergrou p attribu tion, group attri burien, false po Iarizatl on effec t,
perspective taking
HIEORETICAL BACKGROUND
Lee Ross (t 977) notes that "Individuals must, for the most part, share a common
understanding of the socialactions and outcomes that affect them, for without
such. consensus, social interaction would be chaotic, unpredictable, and beyond
the control of the part iclpants' (p. 179). For the past several decades
psychologists and other researchers have focused on the construal of social
reality (see Hewstone, 1989 for a review) ..A signJficant portion of these studies
deals with causa! attribution in an intergroup context (Hews tone, 1990;
~eschamps, 1983). These studies consistently ha ve found that indiv id uals prefer
mogroup-servi ngatrributi ens relative to out-group- serving auri buttons
(Hews-tone, 1990).
The de fin iHan of" group-serving" has vari ed from study to study, depend ing on
Which attributes are used. The oldest classification of intergroup attributions,
based on Heider's (1958) model of interpersonal attributions, distinguishes
between internal (dispositional) and external (situational) attributions. The basic
hypothesis is that more internal attributions would be made for in-group
members' socially desirable behavior and more external attributions for socially
undesirable behavior. The opposite should hold true for out-group members'
behaviors. Several classic studies using this classification (Taylor & Jaggl,
1974; Duncan, 1976; Rosenberg & Wolfsfeld, 1977; Hewstone & Ward,. 1985)
have provided mixed. support for this hypothesis. The elaaslfication Irself has
been criticized for several methodological drawbacks (see Miller, Smith, &
Uleman, ]981).
An improved model was proposed by Islam and Hewstone (1993), who suggest
measuring attri butions along the continuums of causal locus, stabi Iity,
controllability (Weiner, 1986), and globality (Abramson, Seligman, & Teasdale,
1978). The hypothesis for this model is that positive in-group behavior and
negative out-group behavior would be attributed to internal, stable, controllable
(by the actor), and global causes; negative. in-group and positive om-group
behavior should be attributed to mereexternal, unstable, uncontrollable, and
specific causes. A number of successful attribution studies have used this
classlfication (Islam & Hewstene, 1993; Wilder, Simon & Faith, 1996" Lee &
Robinson, 2000; Austers, 2002) ..Again, ihe support for the hypothesis has been
mixed.
Malle (1999, 200 I) suggests another alternative to the internal/external
classification. Central to the model of folk explanations of behavior (FEB) is
the folk concept of intentionality (Malle & Knobe, 1997). Within the model,
explanations thar interpret all agent's behavior as unintentional are considered
cause explanations. Explanations that interpret an agent's behavior as intentional
are divided into three major groups ..Causal htstory of reasons contains [actors
from an agent's personal history that cause the intentional behavior without the
agent being aware ofthem, Reasons are factors that the agent considered when
forming the intention to act, and enabling/actors are factors that clarify how it
was possible that the agent completed the intended action. Reasons are further
divided into desires. beliefs, and valuing. Whereas the FEB model has been
used mostly inexplanations of individual behavior (Malle, Knobe, O'Langhlin.
Pearce &. Nelson. 2000), it can also be successfully applied in analyzing the
explanations of group behavior (O'Laughlin & Malle, 2002 ..
A number of studies of group attributions have been carried out that ask the
participants (0 take the perspective of their in-group or Out-group members.
Kerndal and Montgomery (2001) found. that anlmalexperirnenrers and animal
rights activists could take each other's perspective, resulting in a reversed actor-
observer effect. Austers (2001) and Austen and Montgomery f200!) found.
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similar results. Robinson. Keltner. Ward, and Ross (1995) tested some aspects
of group attribution when they asked their participants to rate the basis of their
own political. judgments and that of their in-group and out-group members. The
respondents indicated that they personally had been less influenced by ideology
or politicalorientation than either their peers or opponents. These findings
suggest a presence of the false polarizationeffect in the context of intergroup
attribut ions.
The false polarizationeffect (see Pronin, Puccio, & Ross [2002J for a review of
this phenomenon) is better known from the studies of group attitudes.
Generally, the effect can be defined as an everest irnati on 0f the expected group
score on a certain attribute in comparison with the actual group score, on that
attribute, which has been found across a. number of different contexts
(Robinson, Keltner. Ward, & Ross, 1995; Keltner & Robinson, 1997; Robinson
& Friedm an, [995; Rouhana, O'Dwyer, & Man'! son Vaso, J 997; 0 iekrn an,
Eagly, & Kulesa, 2002). These findings show that the false po larizati on effect is
a very robust phenomenon, influencing various types of ratings. There is no
reason why the same effect should not appear in attribution studies, but very
few published papers address this issue. Austers (2002) asked ethnic Latvian
and Russian schoolteachers to rate positive and negative behaviors from their
own and out-group perspective on a number of artriburional dimensions. The
resuHsindicated some false polarization effect in predicting out-group's
responses but not consistently, To our knowledge, the paper of Robinson et al.
[]995) provides the most convincing evidence of the false polarization effect in
the context of group attributions ..However, in their study the effect Is reponed
On a small number of context-specific dimensions. We designed this study to
explore the presence of the false polarization effect on more general
attribut:ional dimensions, including "traditional" dimensions familiar from the
previol'lS research.
This study tests whether the false polarization effect would be present ill
explanations of causes of attitudinal behavior when these explanations are given
from in-group and out-group perspectives. By altitudinal behavior we
understand general, non-specific behavior that expresses the actor's attitude
towards a certain issue, in other words-acting in line with one's attitudes. We
chose attitudinal behavior instead of more specific group behaviors because lt
allowed us toconstruct simplevcontext-independent and unambiguous stimuli
for our study.
l~ Our study we tried to use all the attributional dimensions reported in earlier
literature. In addition to the four variables of causal locus, controllability,
stability, and globality, we included a number of explanatory dimensions taken
from Malle's FEB model. The items constructed on the basis of the FEB model
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represented factors differentiating among the major groups of explanations
within the model, as well as various types of explanations within each group,
The differentiating factors were intentionality (d isti ngu ish ing cause
explanations from all other explanations) and awareness (distinguishing causal
history of reasons from reason explanations). The specific explanations included
in the questionnaire were various types of causal history of reasons and reason
expl ana t ions. (Inan earlier unpu bli shed study, whe reowe asked part iclpants to
give free-response explanations of attitudinal behavior, more than 95% of the
explanations fell into these two categories.)
We included two items measuring the evaluation of the target behavior in
positive-negative terms, to control whether the group serving bias occurs in the
expected direction (i.e., each target behavior is seen as more positive from its
in-group perspective than out-group perspective). Finally, we also included all
item asking the participants to estimate the distribution of people sharing their
opinions and those with opposite opinions in the society. This was another
control question because Stronger in-group favoritism can be expected among
the members or minority groups (Hewstone, Rubin, & Willis, 2002; Mullen,
Brown, &. Smith, 1992).
We predicted that when irnagrrnng how specific causes' for a given target
behavior are rated from the target's in-group and out-group perspectives,
participants would give significantly higher (or lower) ratings than the
respective in-group and out-group members themselves. Theoretically, the mean
differences should occur in the group-serving direction. However, because we
were using general descriptions of two groups' altitudinal behavior rather than
descriptions of positive and negative behavior, it was difficult to make specific
predictions about the direction of mean differences. Although one would expect
that each target behavior should be seen more favorably from the target's in-
group perspective than the out-group perspective, it does not necessarily mean
that in-group behavior is seen as explicitly positive, and out-group behavior as
negative. In other words, from the previously published group attribution
studies we could not predict with eertalnry how in-group favoritism should
manifest itself on each of the attributional variables. Our general prediction was
that the mean differences from opposing perspectives should be in opposite
directions for the same behavior. For example, if the causes for supporter
behavior are rated as highly stable from the supporter perspective (implying that
stability is seen as a favorable attribute) -they should be rated as relatively
unstable from the opponent perspective, and vice versa,
After a pilot srudy of several topics eliciting political attitudes among Latvian
students, we decided that Latvia's membership in the European Union is a
controversial political issue worthy of study, The topic provides an excellent
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context for examining perspective taking inexplanations of group behavior.
Over the last two years. the debate on the issue has grown with the opinions of
both supporters and opponents highly salient and well represented in mass
media. Although traditionally EU membership supporters have been in a slight
majority in Latvia the opinion polls predict a dose race in the referendum
planned for autumn 2003.
METHOD
Sample One hundred forty-one students (lID women) at the University of
Latvia participated in the study. The participants were undergraduate students of
education. The mean age of the participants was 19 years. Majority of
respondents (82%) were ethnic Latvians.
Questionnaire. First, we asked the participants to indicate their age, gender.
ethnicity, and general attitude towards joining the European Union (pro vs.
against). We also asked whether they believed (a) that EU supporters were in
the considerable rnajoriry in Latvia, (b) that there was approximatelyequal
number of opponents and supporters, or (c) rhar the opponents were in the
majority.
III the second part of the questionnaire, we provided descriptions of two
opposite behaviors and asked paniclpants to rate various explanations of these
behaviors from their own perspective as well as from the perspective of both
EU supporters and EU opponents. The opposite behaviors were described with
the following sratemerus: (a) "There are many people in Latvia 1,vJlO actively
support Latvia entering the European Union"; (b) "There: are many people in
Latvia who actively protest against Latvia entering TheEuropean Union". Each
description was wri tten on top of a separate sheet.
We asked the participants to rate the causes of both target behaviors from their
Own perspective, EU opponent, and EU supporter perspective by answering a
number of questions. All but the last two questions offered various explanations
for the behavior. and they were constructed to cover both "traditional"
anribution dimensions and the FEB coding scheme. The survey items are shov n
in Appendix A. The participants rated to what extent in their Opinion each
explanation accounted for the target behavior. The last two questions asked the
parcicipanls to evaluate the target behavior in positive-negative terms. All
ralings were made on a five-point Likert scale.
Correspondingly. for group perspectives. half ofthe participants were asked the
follOWing: "How would people who support (oppose) Latvia entering the
European Union answer the question ... ", For the other hair, the following
queslion was asked: "How would University of Latvia students who support
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(oppose) Latvia entering the European Union answer the question ... ", The
two different wordings were used to control for the possible effects of how the
group perspectives were defined.
The order of items and target behaviors was counterbalanced across the
questionnaires. The participants first rated each target behavior from their own
perspective. Then they rated each target from both group perspectives in
random order. To reiterate, each participant made ratings of two target
behaviors frorn rhree perspectives, answering the same set of questions six
times.
In the third pan of the questionnaire, we asked the participants to indicate their
agreement/disagreement with seven items measuring their support to EU
membership (see Appendix A). Afterwards, the participants rated the same
items from both group perspectives.
RESULTS
First, we checked for the effects of questionnaire type (wording for the group
perspective: supporters/oppenents in general vs ..LU students) and the effects of
perceived balance (supporters in majority vs.opponents in majority vs, both
groups equal). We included each of these variables as a between-subjects. factor
in a 4-way ANDV A with participant attitude (supporter 'Is. opponent) as
another between-subjects variable and target behavior (supporter \IS. opponentl
and perspective (self vs. supporter \IS. opponent) as within-subjects variables.
We ran the ANOVA on all variablesin our study both on raw data and the
Indexes reported below, We found some significant effects involving both
variables, but the directions of mean differences varied from analysis 10
analysis. Because the effects of both variables did not seem to be systematic, we
do not report them.
We based our data analysis on planned pairwise comparisons between the raling
means from own perspective and thecorresponding means from both group
perspectives. We used a one-tailed t-test where we had clear predictions about
the directions of mean differences (i.e., attitude ratings) and a 2-tailed t-test for
the other comparisons (i.e., causal explanation ratings). Such a direct test of the
false polarization effect increased the power of the analysis in comparison wuh
a full ANOVA. For each comparison, we computed effect size (Cohen's d) 10
provide an estimate of the magnitude of mean differences. According to
conventional estimates suggested by Cohen (1988). an effect size of about 0,:
can be seen as small, an effect size of about 05 as medium, and an effect size of
D.Sor higher as large.
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Ninety-two participants (65%) identified themselves as supporters of Latvia's
EU membership, and forty-nine (35%) identified themselves as opponents. The
lOp row of Table 1 shows the means of strength of support [0 EU membership
from own and both imagined group perspectives. The index was calculated as
the average of the seven items in the third part of the questionnaire. The index
values can vary from 1 to 5, higher score corresponding to stronger support to
Latvia's EU membership. The false polarizationeffect is dearly visible in the
results. Both groups overestimated the support displayed by EU supporters and
ihe opposition displayed by EU opponents.
Table 1
,\ileanattitude ratings from own perspective and the imagined grOllp
perspec t ives
Ratings from own Ratings from the Ratings from the
perspective supporter opponent
perspecti ve perseecti ve
By By By By By By
support oppone support oppone support oppone
ers nts ers nts ers nts
Support to EU
(11 = 92) (n= 49)
3.88 232 4.30*** 4.29*** 1.91*+ 1.94*'"
member-ship (0.55) (0. 56} (0.61) (0.65) (0.85) (0.74)
Effec[ size 0.72 0.68 0.56 0.57
Evaluation of
target behavior:
Supporter 3.53 2.77 4, l3*** 3.96*'*· [.96*** 2.36**
behavior (0.67) (0.76) (0.73) (0.81) (0,82) (0.91)
Effect size 0.85 0.55 1.02 0.54
Opponent 2.63 3.52 1.99*** 2.13*'" 3 .85* 3 .80
behavior (0.81) (0.82) (0.86) (0.81) (l.06) (0.97)
-.Effect size 0.76 0.62 0.34 0.31
Note. Standard deviations are given in parentheses. Asterisks indicate that rating
from the imagined group perspective is significantly different (l-tailed r-test) from
the corresponding rating (rom own perspective. Means in columns 3 and 4 are
compared to means in column I· means in columns 5 and 6 are compared to means
in column 2. TIle effect size (Cohen's d) for each comparison is given below the
respeCI ive mean in columns 3-6 ..• P < .05. • '"P < .01. '""'..,p < .001.
We calculated an index measuring the evaluation of target behavior as the
average of two items: liking/disliking the behavior, and the belief that the
behavior benefits the interests of the Latvian society. Cronbach's Alphas for
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both items were calculated separately for each perspective and target behavior
(because each of target/perspective combinations represents a separate repeated
measurement using the same two items). All but one (0.54) were above 0.6.
Table l. shows the means of the evaluative index. The index value can range
from 1 (unfavorable evaluation) to 5 (favorable evaluation). Again, both groups
showed a strong false polarization effect when evaluating supporter behavior
from both perspectives and opponent behavior from the supporter perspective.
The mean difference was not significant when opponent behavior was evaluated
from the opponent perspective, but the means were in the expected direction.
Our study replicated the previous findings showing a false polarization effect
when estimating group attitudes. Our main interest, however, was whether the
Same pattern of results would be found in estimating group ratings of causal
explanations. Table 2 shows the mean ratings of stability of causes and ratings
of actors' control over the causes of their behavior. All ratings were made on a J
to 5 Likert type scale; larger values correspond to higher stability and control.
For two dimensions-vcauses in situation vs. actor and the globality of the causes
of target behavior--we found no significant mean differences. Therefore the
means of these two variables are not shown in Table 2 (but the means ace
reported in Table 83 and Table "66 io Appendix B). The false polarizationeffee
appears in estimations of stability of causes of behavior. The strongest
overestimation occurs in predicting supporters' ratings of supporter behavior
where both groups rated the causes as significantly more stable than the
supporters did from their own perspective. In other cases, the significant mean
differences are in the same direction, (From the in-group perspective, the causes
are seen as more stable.) lnt.erestingly, the responses of supporter and opponent
participants themselves do not differ for supporter behavior (1(1381 = 0.12 P 0=
.90) or opponent (t[lJ6] """-1.83, P = .07) behavior. Nevertheless, both groups
expected other supporters and opponents to be biased towards their in-groups,
We found similar results also for ratings of the actors' control overthe causes 0 f
their behavior. Again, the strongest overestimation of group position occurs
when rating the supporter behavior from supporter perspective. For supporter
behavior, both groups did not differ in their ratings from own perspective
(I[ I18] = -0.03, p = .98). For opponent behavior, opponents gave highercomrol
ratings than supporters did (t[ 139} = -2.51, P < .05). Ne ertheless, the
overestimation of group position was stronger and more frequent for lhe
supporter behavior than the opponent behavior.
To summarize, of the four traditional attribution dimensions, [he false
polarization effect appears in the stability of causes and the actors' control ofrhe
causes of attitudinal behavior. For both ratings. the effect was stronger for
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supporter behavior than for opponent behavior, and the effect was stronger from
the imagined supporter perspective, than the opponent. perspective.
Table 2
Alean ratings for the traditional dimensions of causal attri but ion from own
perspective and the imagin.ed group perspectives
Ratings from own Ratings from the
perspective supporter
perspective
By By
support oppone
ers nts
Causes Me stable
Supporter behavior
Effect size
Opponent behavior
Effect Size
Actors control the
causes of (heir
behavior
Supporter behavior
EffeCI size
By
support
ers
(n =92)
Ratings from
the opponent
perspective.
By By
supper oppon
ters enrs
By
oppone
nts
(11 = 49)
2.96 2.94 3.76*** 3.84*"'''' 2.49* 3.02
(0.91 ) (0.84) (0.97) (0.99) ( 1.04) (0.88)
0.85 0.92 0.47 0.09
2.87 ),17 2.59 2.86 3.59'" 3.61'"
(0.90) (0.96) ( 1.00) ( 1.04) (1.16) (0,86)
0.29 0.01 0.39 0.48
3.12
(0.94)
3.82"''' 3.86"** 2.53'1"1' 2.94
(1.00) ( 1.02) ( l.08) (0,94)
0.72 0.75 0.58 0.20
3.13
( 1.(0)
Opponent behavior 2.82 3.29 2.46'" 2.84 3.64 3.59
(1.06) (\.06) (0.95) (1.12) (1.09) (1.22)
~ffect size 036 0.02 0.33 0.26
Note, Standard deviations are given in parentheses. Asterisks indicate mat rating
from the imagined group perspective is significantly different (2-taiJed r-test) from
the corresponding rating from o•••.rn perspective. Means in columns 3 and 4 are
compared 10 means in co'lumn l : means in columns 5 and 6 are compared to means
in column 2. The effect size (Cohen's d) for each comparison is given below the
respective. mean in columns )·6 .•• P < .05. "'•.P < ,0I.'·p < .001.
To reduce me number of variables, we ran a factor analysis on the items based
on the FEB coding scheme. Sums of ratings for each item from all three
perspectives tor both target behaviors were entered into the analysis. A principal
component analysis with Varimax rotation yielded two factors, accounting for
50% of the total variance. The resul ts of the factor anal ys is are shown in Tabl e3.
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Table 3
Results of Principal Components Analysis
.580
.589
.392
.533
.615
.538
.471
.344
.597
.252
Component
1 2
.303 .713
-.077 .758
.030
.610
.728
.631
.709
.680
.572
.537
.432
.767
.145
-.051
.466
.187
.090
.130
.556
-.256
1.69
15.38
Reliability analysis was then conducted for sets of variables with high loading
on the same factor. Cronbach's alpha for these sets of variables was calculated
separately for ratings of each target from each perspective (because each of
these ratings is a separate repeated measurement using the same set of items).
Both factors were transformable into reliable indexes. Tbe first index was
ca Icul ated as an averageo f three varia b Ies: intentione liry 0f the target behavior,
actors' awareness of causes of their behavior, and the extent to what behavior is
caused by actors' careabout the country's future. We labeled this the Rationality
index because all items are related to rational causes of behavior. All but one
(0.58) Alphas for this index were above 0.60. The index values can vary from I
to 5, higher scores corresponding to higher rationality. The second index was
calculated as anaverage of 7 items. all of which seem to be related to actors'
Hem
Target behavior is intentional [a]
Actors are aware of the causes of their
behavior [a]
Target behavior is determined by care for the
country's future [a]
Target behavior is determined by actors' own
interests [b]
Target behavior is determined by actors'
emotions [b]
Target behavior is determined by actors'
desires fbJ
Target behavior is determined by actors'
valuations ofEU [b]
Target behavior is determined by actors'
personality traits {bJ
Target behavior is determined by the actors'
group memberships [b]
Target behavior is determined by actors'
beliefs [b]
Target behavior is determined by accepting
others' opinions
Eigenvalues for unrotated solution 3.82
Variance explained before rotation (%) 34.73
Note. fa] These items were used to calculate the Rationality index.
[b] These items were used 10 ealeulaie the Subjectrviry index.
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inner stales and psychological characteristics. Therefore, we labeled i.t the
Subjectivi'ry index. (The belle! item, which had similar loading on both factors,
was included in Subjectivity index because it increased its reliability, and it
decreased the reliability of the Rationality index.) Again, all but one (0.57)
Alphas for this index were above 0.60. The index values can vary from 1 to 5,
higher scores corresponding to higher subjectivity. One item (extent to which
the behavior is caused by accepting otbers'opinions) that could not be included
in any of the indexes was analyzed separately. It was measured on a five-point.
Likert scale; where higher score indicate more influence from accepting others'
opinions. Table 4 shows the corresponding means.
The pattern of means for the Rationality index resembles those discussed above.
For supporter behavior, means of supporter and opponent groups did net differ
significantly, t( 136) = 1.17, p = .25. However, both groups displayed a false
polarization effect when rating the behavior from the imagined supporter
perspective, and supporter participants showed the same tendency when
estimating the position of opponents. For opponent behavior, both groups
differed in their ratings, r((39) = ~3.60, P < .001. Three of the four group
perspective means showed a false polarization effect. The results suggest that
the participants saw rationality as a favorable cause of attitudinal behavior.
The pattern is less clear for the Subjectivity index. The means of supporter and
opponent participants from own perspective did not differ for supporter (t[ 134}
'" -1.38, P = .17) Of opponent (([139} = 0.09, P = .93) behavior.upporterand
opponent participants saw the causes of both target behaviors as Jess subjective
from both targets' in-group perspectives (supporter behavior from supporter
perspec6ve and opponent behavior from opponent perspective). However, no
false polarization effect in the opposite direction occurred when the causes were
rated from targets' out-group perspecti es,
Finally, regarding acceptance of others' opinions as the cause of attitudinal
behaVior, there was some evidence of a false polarization effect, but the mean
differences were relatively small. From own perspective, the means differed
significantly for the supporter behavior (1[1361 = -2.38, p < .05), but not
opponent behavior (1[1361 = 0.94, P = .35). With one exception, all of the mean
differences between own and group perspectives were consistently in the same
direction, assigning less influence by albers from in-group perspective and more
from out-group perspective.
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Table 4
Mean ratingsfor explanations derived from the .FEB coding scheme/rom own
perspective and the imagined group perspectives
Ratings from own Ratings from the
perspective supporter
perspective
By By
support oppone
ers fits
By
support
ers
(11= 92)
Ratings from the
opponent
perspective
By By
support oppone
ers ms
By
oppone
nts
(n= 49)
"Rational! ty"
index
Supporter
behavior
Effect size
Opponent
behavior
Effect size
"SUbjectivity"
index
Supporter
behavior
Effect size
Opponent
behavior
Effect size
Accepting others'
opmrons
Supporter 3,]3 3.55 2.75* 2.98 3.33 3.22
behavior (1.04) (0.88) (1.02) (LIS) (1.21) (1.I2)
Effect size 0.37 0,t4 0.21 0.33
Opponent 3.20 3.02 3.52* 3._9 2.64* 3.06
behavior ( 1.11) (0.92) (1.05) (Ll4) (:1,13) ( 1.03)
Effect. size 0.30 0.08 0.39 0,04
No te , Standard deviations are given in parentheses. Asterisks indicate that foaling
from we imagined group perspective is significantly different (2~taHed r-test) from
the corresponding rating from own perspective. Means in columns 3 and 4 are
compared 10 means in column I : means in columns 5 and 6 are compared to means
in column 2. The effect size (Cohen's d) for each comparison is given below th
respective mean in cal urnns 3~6.•• P < .05. "'. p < .0 J . "' ••.• p < ,00 I.
3.29 3.13 3.99*** 3.86*''''* 2.67"'* 2.96
(0.78) (0.70) (0,83 ) (0,85) (0.9 t) (0 ..82)
0.87 0,70 0.57 0.22
2,94 3.45 2.68* 2.83 3.79'" 3.84'"
(0.78) (0.,83) (0.93) (0.83) (0.94) (0.S3)
0.30 0.14 0.38 0.47
3.68 }.81 3.46** 3.38"'* 3.54* 3.67
(0.52) (0.51) (0.54) (O.59) (0.62) (0,68)
0.42 0.54 0.48 0.23
3.80 3.79 3.68 3.80 3,36"'** 3.54'"
(0.53) (0.53) (0.61) (0.57) (0.,64) (0.59)
0.21 0,00 0,73 0.45
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DfSCUSSION
On a number of rating dimensions for explanations of attitudinal behavior, we
found significant differences between the actual ratings of the participants and
their estimations of others' ratings on the same dimension. Our studyconfirms
(hat the false polarization effect is a robust phenomenon, which can. affect not
only estimation of group ani tudes but also exp lanations of ani tud inal beha viol'.
On average the magnitude of the false- polarization effect was moderate-vfor
most of the reported significant mean differences, the effect size was around
medium, according to Cohen's (1988) estimates. However, it should be noted
that we found such differences on most of the variables in our study, and that
most or the time these differences were in [he expected direction. This leads us
to believe that, although moderate in effect size, our results are indicators of a
robust psychological tendency.
At the same rime, the effect was not present on all attributional dimensions. We
did not find the false polarization effect in ratings of globality of causes and the
person-situation attributions. Moreover, there were no group-serving effects for
these two scores at all. One explanation for chis finding is that in our study we
did not compare positive and negative behaviors by both groups. Although all
four dimensions have been shown to yield group-serving biases for comparisons
of positive and negative in-group and out-group behaviors (c.f, Islam &
Hewstons, 1993) the same effects may be less pronounced when explaining
non-specific attitudinal behavior. At the same lime, the participants showed
clear false polarization effect in group-serving direction on other dimensions
where group-serving biases in ratings from own perspective were not
pronQunced. This fact suggests another possible explanation: whereas stability
and control as concepts have positive connotations. globality of causes and the
person-situation disfirtc tion per se have neither positive nor nega ti ve
connotations. One may speculate that it is the evaluative connotation of a rating
dimension, which triggers the false polarization effects in estimating in-group
lind out-group ratingsvand this perhaps contributes to group-serving biases in
genera 1. Asking the part ic iparus 10 eval uare anribu t ion al di mension s in posit ive-
negative terms in the future studies could provide more information about the
~ature of the false polarization bias and about the group-serving effects in
lruergroup attributions in general.
From the practical point of view, our findings illestrate how the false
polarization effect can result in overestirnetion of group differences. On il
number of variables we found very small or insignificant differences between
(he acma] ratings of supporter and opponent participants; however both groups
expected much stronger differences when laking the perspective of their in-
group and out-group members. If the parties in a controversial issue assume
more grounds for disagreement or conflict than is actually the case, it rna.
impede rational discussions between the groups and cause ungrounded
pessimism about the possibility of negotiations. Moreover, the false polarization
effect may put additional pressure on group leaders/representatives, who may be
reluctant to make concessions in negotiations, fearing discontent of their in-
group members. Awareness of the false polarization effect may contribute 10
conflict prevention and resolution in various intergroup contexts.
In the wider context of attribution research, the results of our study provided
some additional information about causalexplanations of attitudinal behavior.
Stability, control, and rationality were seen as more positive causes of
attitudinal behavior (more often ascribed to an in-group target). Subjectivity and
influence by other people were seen as less positive, These findings are similar
to the results reported by Kenworthy and Miller (2002); they found that more
rationality and less externality and emotionality were attributed to in-group
attitudes in comparison with out-group attitudes.
Another possible direction for the future research might be using similar
perspective-taking studies with specific positive and negative in-group and OUI-
group behaviors, Such designs would allow formulating more precise
hypotheses about the expected directions 'of mean differences and acquire
clearer resulrs,
We did not find systematic and interpretable effects of how the groups. were
defined in our study (supporters/opponents in general vs, student
supporters/opponents). However both definitions were relatively general,
relating toa large group whose members' individual opinions were unknown to
the participants ..The question remains if one wou ld f nd false polarization e ffect
if the groups were relatively small, and their individual members familiar 10 the
respondents. A study by KemdaJ and Montgomery (2000) suggests that under
such conditions the false polarization effect may disappear. The effect of group
characteristics on the false porarizaticneffect is another prospective direction
for future research.
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APPENDIX A. THE SURVEY lNSTRU1v1ENT
First Part of theQuestionnaire (Cover Page)
By answering the questions in this survey you are taking part in a study of political
attitudes carried out by Stockholm University and University of Latvia reserachers.
Your responses are confidential and will be used for research purposes only.
Tbe aim a flbestudy is 10 explore how people evaluate the behavior of supporters and
opponents of the European Union from their own and imagined point or vie .•s.
Therefore we ask you to answer a number of similar questions several limes. It is very
important Ihm you answer all the questions.
Please, lick me appropriate response or fill in the information!
Your age ~[pari ic ipan: ins tructed to indicate the age]
Sex: M F [pa,./icipanf instructed to check one]
Ethnicity: [participan! instructed to indicate the ethnicity)
Generally you:
support. Latvia's membership of the European Union
oppose Latvia's membership ofthe European Union
[participant instructed to check one]
In your opinion:
EU supporters in Latvia are in a significant majority: EU opponents are in a minority
there are approximately equal number (DfEU supporters and opponents in Latvia
EU opponents in Latvia are in a significant. majority: ED supporters are in a minority
[participant instructed to check one J
In the rest of the questionnaire. please, answer the questions bycircling the response
that corresponds to your opinion!
lelld of cover page)
Second Part of the Questionnaire:
Descriptio" of supporter behavior:
There are many people in Latvia who actively support Latvia entering the European
Union
Description of opponent behavior:
There are many people in Latvia who actively protest against "Latvia entering the
European 'Union
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NO/e. In the second par' ofthe questionnaire, each of/he target behaviors was rated
on J 7 items, provided below. Each larger behavior appeared three times in the
questionnaire, and correspondingly \lias rated from three perspectives: from own
perspective, and from two imagined group perspectives-supporter perspective and
opponent perspective.
Items for rating causal explanations and evaluating targe« behavior from oW/1
perspective:
In your opinion, to what extent do the causes of the supporters'(opponents' behavior
originate in the situation rather then within themselves?
[participant instructed 10 Indicate the response Oil a 5-poi11l scale where I = not in the
least and 5 = to [he highest extent]
[n your opinion, \0 what extent are the causes of the supporters'(opponents' behavior
stable (invariable)?
II "= not in the [east; 5 == to the highest extent]
In your opinion, to what extent do the supporters/opponents control their behavior?
[I == not in the least: 5 == io the highest extent]
In your opinion, to what exrent do the causes of the supporters'zopponents' behavior
influence their behavior in all situations (also in those not related to Latvia's EU
membership)?
[I '" nOI in the least; 5. '" 10 the highest extent]
In your opinion. (0 what extent is the supporters'zopponents' behavior intentional?
[I. '" OQl in the least; S.== to 'the highest extent]
ln your opinion, to what extent are the supporters/opponents aware of the causes of
their behavior?
[I " not in the least; 5= to the highest extent]
In YOUT opinion, to what extent are the causes of the supporters'ropponents' behavior
determined by their personality traits?
[l = not in the least; 5 '" to the highest extent]
ln YOur opinion, to whatextent are the causes or the supporters'zopponerns' behavior
de~ermined by their own interests'!
II ""not in the least; 5 == to the highest extent]
In your opinion. to what extent are the causes of the supporters'(opponerns' behavior
determined b. their membership in vadous social groups?
!1~ not in the least; 5'" 10 the highest extent]
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In your opinion. to what extent are the causes of the supportersvopponents' behavior
determined by their care about the country's future?
[I = no! in the least 5 = to the highest extent]
In your opinion, ro what 'extent are the causes of the supportersvopponenrs' behavior
determined by accepting other people's opinions?
[I = nol in the least; 5 = to the highest extent]
In your opinion, to what extent are the causes of the supportersvopponents' behavior
determined by their beliefs?
[1 = not in the least; 5 = to the highest extent]
In your opinion. to what extent are the causes of the suppcrters'zopponeuts' behavior
determined by their desires (aspiration for a specific result)?
(1 '" not in the-least; 5 = to the highest extent]
In your opinion, 10 what extent are the causes of the supporters'zopponerus' behavior
detenn ined by their subjective lik ing or disl iking for various a~pel;:ts 0 f the EU'?
II = not ill the least; 5 = to the highest extern]
In your opinion ..10 what extent are tbe causes of the supponers'zcpponents' behavior
determined by their emotions?
[I = not in the least; 5 = to tlie highest extent}
ln your opinion, to what extent does the supporters'zopponents' behavior correspond to
the interests of the Latvian society?
iparticipan: instructed to indicate the response on a j~poil1/ scale where
-2 '" dues not correspond at all;
-I = does not correspond rather than corresponds:
0'" is neutral:
-I- 1= corresponds rather than does not correspond;
+'2 = fully corresponds]
To what extent do you like or disl ike the sup po rters'/opp on en ts' behav ior?
[participan: tnstructed 10 indicate the response on a 5-point scale where
-2 = dislike very much;
-I = dislike rather than like;
o = neither like nor dislike;
+ i '"like rather Inan dislike'
+2 = like very much]
Note: These items appeared twice jn the questionnaire: once for the suuoorter
behavior ana once for the opponent behavior.
10
hems for ratlng causal explanations and evaluating larger behavior from the group
perspectives:
How would people who support/oppose Latvia entering the European Union answer
the question to wha! extent the causes of the supportersvopponerus' behavior originate
in the situation rather than within themselves?
[I e; nOI in the least; 5 ee to the highesi extent]
How would people who support/oppose Latvia entering the European Union answer
the Question 10 what extent the causes of the supportersvopponents' behavior are stable
Iinvariable)?
[I '"'not in the least; 5 = to the highest extent]
How wou ld peop Ie who su ppon/oppose Lar via entering the European Union answer
Ihe question to what extent. the supporters/opponents control their behavior?
[1= not in theleast; 5= to the highestexteru]
How would people who support/oppose Latvia entering the European Union answer
the Question to ••vhatextent the causes of the supporters'(opponents' behavior influence
(heir behavior in all situations (also in those not related La Latvia's EU membership)?
[t .• not in the least; 5 = 10 the highest extent] .
How would people who support/oppose Latvia entering the European Union answer
the question to what extent the supporters'(opponents' behavior is intentional?
!1= not in the least; 5 = to the highest extent]
I-Iow would people who support/oppose Latvia entering the European Union answer
the question to whatextent the supporters/opponents are aware of the causes of their
behavior?
r 1 '"'not in the least; 5 = to the highestextent]
How would people who support/oppose Latvia entering the European Union answer
the question to what extent the causes or the supporters'(opponents' behavior are
determined by their personality traits?
I! = not in the least; 5 = to the highest extent]
Howwoutd people who support/oppose Latviaentering the European Union answer
the question to what extent the causes of the supporters'ropporrents' behavior are
determined b) their own interests?
t 1 '= nm in the least; 5 == tothe highest extent)
110'\0\' would people \••..ho support/oppose Latvia entering [he European Union answer
the question to \ hat extent thecauses of the supporters'ropponents' behavior are
determined by their membership in various social groups?
[l ~ not ill the least; 5 == to the higbes: extent]
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How would people who support/oppose Latvia entering the European Union answer
the question to what extent thecauses or the supporters'zcppcnents' behavior are
determined by their care about thecountry's future?
[1 "" not in the least; 5 "" to the highest extent}
How would people who support/oppose Latvia entering the European Union answer
the question to what extent the causes of the supporters'zopponenrs' behavior are
determined by accepting other people's opinions?
[I = not in the least; 5 = to the highest extent]
How would people who support/oppose Latvia entering the European Union answer
rhe question [0 what extent the causes of the supporiers'zopponents' behavior are
determined by their beliefs?
{I =oot in the least: 5 =10 the highestextenr]
How would people who support/oppose Latvia entering the European Union answer
the question to what extent the causes of the supporters'ropponents' behavior are
determined by their desires (aspiration for a specific result)?
[I "" not in the least; 5 <tothe hi gbest extent]
Howwould people who support/oppose Latvia entering the European Uniun answer
the question to whatextent the causes of the supporters'(opponenrs' behavior are
determined by their subjective liking or disliking for various aspects of the EU?
[1 "" nOI in the least; 5 = 10 the highest extent] .
How would people who support/oppose Latvia enteringthe European Union answer
the quesuon to what extent the causes of the supponers'ropponems' behavior are
determined by their emotions?
[I = not in the least; 5 = 10 the highest extent]
How would people \••'ho support/oppose Larvia entering the European Union answer
the question to what extent the supporters'sopponents' behavior corresponds to the
interests of the Latvian society?
[-2 = does noi correspond at all;
-\ = does mot correspond rather than corresponds;
o := is neutral:
+ I "" corresponds rather than does nOI correspond:
+2. = fully corresponds]
How would people who support/oppose Latviaentering the European Union answer
the question 10 what extent they like or dislike the supporters'ropponents' behax ior?
[-2 = dislike very much;
-I := dislike rather than like;
o := neither like nor disllke;
+ I = like rather than dislike;
+2"" like very much]
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Note: These items appeared four limes in the questionnoire-sonce for each possible
combination of target behavior (supporter or opponent) and group perspective
(supporter or opponent). For half of rhe participants, the wording in all items was
"University of Latvia students" instead of"peopfe".
Third Part of the Questionnaire
Instruction for the ·own perspective:
Please indicate to what extent you agree or disagree with the following statements.
Indicate YOUT response by circling the appropriate number next to each statement!
Instruction for the group perspectives:
How wou Id people who su pport/oppose Larv iaentering til e European Union agree or
disagree with the following statements.? Indicate your response by circling the
appropriate number next to each staternent!
lrems for measuring the strength ofsuppon 10 Latvia's £U membership:
Latvia should enter the European Union.
Iparlicipant instructed to indicate the response on (1 j·pOb7f scale where
I == strongly disagree;
2 == disagree rather than agree;
3 == neither agree nor disagree;
" == agree rather than disagree;
5 = strongly agree]
TIle European Union membership will do more harm than good to Latvia.
[I = suongly disagree:
2'" disagree rather than agree:
] == neither agree nor disagree;
<l == agree rather than disagree:
5 '" strongly agree J
Latvia will only gain by remaining outside the European Union. •
[1 '" strongly disagree;
2 == disagree rather than agree;
J == neither agree nor disagree;
4 == agree rather than disagree;
.s '" strongly agree1
1 am personallyagainst Latvia's membership Into the European Union, ~
[I == strongly disagree;
2.'" disagree rather than agree;
3 == neither agree nor disagree;
" '" agree rather than disagree;
5 == strongly agree]
23
It would be better for majority of Latvians if Latvia became a member of the.
European Union.
[I '" strongly disagree;
2 = disagree rather than agree;
3 = neitheragree nor disagree;
<1= agree rather than disagree;
S == stronglyagree 1
European Union membership threatens the sovereignty of Latvia ..•
[I = strongly disagree;
2 = disagree rarhcr Uumagree;
3 = neither agree nor disagree:
4 = agree rather than disagree;
5 = strongly agree]
I personally support Latvia's membership into the European Union.
[1 = strongly disagree;
2 = disagree rather than agree;
3 = neitheregree nor disagree;
4 = agree rather than disagree;
5 = strongly agree]
Note: These items appeared three times in the questionnaire, and correspondingly
were rated from three perspectives: own, supporter, and opponent. Asterisked items
are reverse-scored. Reliability measures [Cronbach's Alpha): for ratings from OWll
perspect ive, Alpha = .90, for ratings/rom the supporter perspective, Alpha = .ts.]«
rat fngsfrom the opponent perspective, Alpha = .82.
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APPENDIX B. CORRELA TJON MA TRlXES WITH MEANS AND
STANDARD DEVIATIONS FOR ALL VARIABLES
Table HI
Au ir tide towards. EU membe rslJip
Supporter participants
I J I Own perspective
m Supporter perspective
131Opponeru perspeclive
Opponent participants
11)Own perspecti ve
!~)Supporter perspective
J]\ Opponenl perspective
~ p < 0.05. h P < O.ot.
n
90
85
87
n
46
47
49
M SD
3.88 0.55
4.30 0.6:1
1.91 0.85.
M SD
2.3"2 0.56
4.29 0.65
1.94 0.74
(1) (2)
.39$010
.DJ -.48**
(1) (2)
~.34*
.33* ~_71**
Table B2
_Evaillation of/he target behavior
Supporter participants
/I M SD (I) (2) (]) (4) (5)
I J ISB, own perspective 92 3,53 0.67
12.1SB. supporter persp. 91 4.13 0.73 .14
(1,) SR, opponent persp, 91 1.96 0.82 .08 -.33**
(4) DB, OWII perspective 92 2.63 0.81 -.07 -,13 .19
IS) OB, supporter persp, 91 1.99 O.M .03 -.32 .43** .30*'"
19) OB, opponem persp. 91 3.85 1.06 -.27'4< .30"'* -.41 * .06 ,35'"'"
Opponem participants
II M SD (I) (2) (3) (4) (5)
r I} S8, own perspective 48 2.77 0.76
(2) SB, supporter persp, 49 3.96 0.87 -.06
131SB. opponent persp. 49 2.36 0.91 .23 -.2'2
(4) DB, Own perspective 48 3.52 0.82 -.01 .09 _23
IS) DB. supporter persp, 49 2.13 0.81 .18 ~.4J*" .30" .17
J.Q.J 08, opponent persp. 48 3.~0 0.97 .02 .68"'''' .OJ .37 -.::!8
S8 = supporter behavior; 08 = opponent behavior
p < 0.05, '" p < 0.01.
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Table B3
Shuation liS. actor ratings
Supporter participants
n M SD (I) (2) (3) (4) (5)
(I) S8, own perspective 92 3.42 0.97
(2) SB supporter persp. 92 3.48 0.95 .29"''''
(3) SB. opponent persp, 9J 3.11 1.09 .31** .00
(4) OB, own perspective 92 3.46 1.02 .06 .08 .33n
(5) DB, supporter persp. 92 3.14 1.13 .08 ~.04 .42"'* .23'"
(6) OB. opponent persp. 91 3.57 l.05 -.04 .12 ·,06 -.03 .01
Opponentparticipants
n M SD (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
(l) S8, own perspective 48 3.46 0.92
(2) S8, supporter persp. 49 3.63 Ul .34*
(3) SB,oprnnent persp. 49 3.55 0.89 ,46*· .29*
(4) OB. own perspective 49 3.39 1.00 .28 .47*'i< .60"'*
(5) DB, supporter persp, 49 3.43 1.12 .05 -,09 -.10 -.10
(6) DB. opponent persp. 49 3.47 0.98 .36* .54*· .41** .5'*· -..07
sa:= supporter behavior: OB:::: opponent behavior
•.p < 0.05 .•• * P < 0.01.
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Table B4
Stability ratings
Supporter participants
I:l M SD (1) (2)
tl) SB, own perspecti ve 92 2.96 0.91
12) SB. supporter persp, 91 1.76- 0.97 .29**
f 3) sn, opponent persp. 92 2.49 1.04 .30*'" .12
\4) OB, own perspective 91 2.87 0.90 .01 -.04
15) 08, supporter persp, 91 2,59 1.00 .19 ".10
!6}OB, opponem persp. 91 3.59 1.16 ~.O3 .09
Opponent participants
(3) (4) (5)
.19
.48""" .32"''''
.16 .19 .06
/I M SD (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
11) S8, own perspective 48 2.94 0.84
(2) S8, supporter persp, 49 3.84 0.99 .15
13)sa, oppcuent persp, 49 3.02 0.88.26 ,05
(4) DB, own perspective 47 3.t7 0.96 -.09 .37* .32*
15)DB, supporter persp, 49 2.86 ],04 .14 -.19 .09 -.08
(6) oB, opponent persp. 49 3.61 O.8?_ .24 .34. .12 ,42**.10
SB ::::supporter behavior; 08:::: opponent behavior " p < 0.05, up < 0.01.
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Table B5
Control ratings
Supporter participants
n M SD (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
(L) SB, own perspective 92 3.12 0.94
(2) S8, supporter persp. 92 3.81 1.00 .33**
(3) S8, opponent persp. 91 2.53 1.08 .09 .05
(4) OB, own perspective 92 2.82 1.06 .19 .21* ·.08
(5) oB, supporter persp, 92 2.46 0.95 ~.16 -.23'" .27H .26*
(6) OB, opponent persE. 92 3.64 1.09 .11 .34"'* -.03 .12 -.11
Opponent participants
II M SD (1) (2) (3) (4) (5l
(I) SB, own perspective 48 3.13 1.00
(2) S8. supporter persp. 49 3.86 1.02 .03
(3) sa, opponent persp. 49 2.94 0.94 .32* -.10
(4) 08, own perspective 49 3.29 1.06 .17 .21 .27
(5) DB. supporter persp. 49 2.84 1.12 ,02 -.16 .23 .08
(6) OB. opponent persp. 49 3.59 1.22 .23 .40** .12 .41** -.16
SB = supporter behavior; 08 = opponent behavior
*" p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01.
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Table B6
GlobaUl)' ratings
Supporter participants
fl M SD (lJ (2) (3) (4) (5)
r I ) SB, own perspecti ve 92 3.28 0..82
(2) SB, supporter persp, 92 1.33 0.88 .25'"
!3 S8. opponent persp, 92 3.13 0,92 ,01 .10
14) DB, own perspective 9] 3.lO 0.96 .18 .05 .09
IS) OB supporter persp. 92 3.41 0,92 .03 -.02 .11 .42""
16l OB. opponent persp. 92 3,16 0.76 .21 * .22'1l .19 _07 .08
Opponent participants
11 M sD (I) (2) (3) (4) t5)
t l) SB, own perspective 48 3.25 0.91
12) SB, supporter persp, 49 3.06 1.05 .23
[3) S8, opponent persp. 49 3.35 0,97 .n- .14
(4) DB. own perspective 49 3.14 0.89 .16 .24 .04
\5\ OB. supporter persp, 49 3.31 0.94 .25 ~.04 .20 .12
\6) OB, opponent persp. 48 3.19 0.94 .11 .44"'* .00 .35* ·.14·
-- -- ---
sa:::: supporter behavior: 08 = opponent behavior
'" p < 0.05, ** P < 0.01.
Table 87
Rationality index
Supporter participants
11 M SD (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
(I) S8, own perspective 92 3.29 0.78
(2) SB, supporter persp, 91 J.99 0.83 ,34**
(3) SB, opponent persp .. 91 2.67 0.91 ..06 -,14
(4) OB, own perspective 92 2.94 0.78 .22* .23* .08
(5) 08. supporter persp, 91 2.68 0.93 .04 -.25i!< .J6*'" .30**
(6) OB, opponenl persp. 90 3.79 0.94 -.06 .46*'!\ -.05 .09 -.04
Opponent participants
n M SD (I) (2) (3) (4) (5)
(I) SB, own perspective 46 3, l3 0,70
(2) S8, supporter persp. 49 3.86 0.85 .37*
(3) SB, opponent persp, 47 2.96 0.82 .2J -.08
(4) DB, own perspective 49 3.45 0.83 .41** .34* .30*
(5) DB, supporter persp. 49 2.8] 083 .14 -.06 .OR -.07
(6) OB, opponent persp __ 48 3.84 0.84 .40** .47* .16 .60"* -.04
S8 = supporter behavior; OB = opponent behavior
* p < 0.05, ** P < 0.01.
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Table B8
Subjectivity index
Supporter participants
n M SD (I) (2) (3) (4) (5)
II)58, own perspecti ve 91 3.68 0.52
12) 5B, supporter persp. 90 3.46 0.54 .39**
13) SB, opponent persp. 89 3.54 0.62 .43** .40**
14) OB, own perspective 92 3.80 0..53 .48"'* .21* .44**
IS) 013, supporter persp. 89 3.68 0.61 .50"'* .26" .48*~ .57**
(6) OB. opponent persp. 89 3.36 0.64 .35"'* .41*'" .22* .40** .06
Opponent participants
11 M SD (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
11) SB, own perspective 45 3.81 0.51
12) S8, supporter persp. 47 3.38 0.59 .31'"
(3) SU, opponent persp. 49 3.67 0.68 .48** .4]"'"
(4) OB, OWl) perspective 49 3.79 0.53 .56** .32* .56H
IS) DB. .';upPQr1er persp, 49 3.80 0.57 .48** .17 .'fin"'" _78"'*
(6) OB, opponent persp. 48 3.54 0.59 ,44** .36* .41** .60"''10 .44**-
SB == supporter behavior: 08.: opponent behavior
~p < 0.05, ** P < 0.0'1.
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Table 89
. Accepting others' opinions racings
Supporter participants
/1 M SD (I) (2) (3) (4) (S)
(I) S8,own perspective 91 3.13 1.04
(2) SB. supporter persp, n 2.75 L02 ..14
(3) SB. opponent persp. 92 3.33 1.21 .25"- .04
(4) DB. own perspective 91 3.20 1.11 .18 -.01 .06
(5) DB. supporter persp, 92 3.52 1.05 .25* ..02 .11 .38**
(6) DB, opponent persp. 92 2.64 Ll3 ·.02 .45** -.16 .II .13
Opponent participants
n M SD (I) (2) (3) (4) (5)
(I) S8. own perspective 47 3.55 0.88
(2) sa. supporter persp. 49 2.98 1.IS .14
(3) SB, opponent persp. 49 3.22 1.12 .42** .02
(4) 08. O\Vn perspective 47 3.02 0.92 .20 -.19 .20
(5) 08, supporter persp, 49 3.29 1.l4 .27 ~.32* .23 .27
(6) DB. opponent persp. 49 3.06 103 .09 .30* -.12 .25 .16
58 :::supporter behavior: DB :::opponent behavior
>i< p« 0.05 ..** P < 0.01.
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Abstract
Supporters and opponents of Latvia's EU membership explained atrirudlnal
behav iour of both groups from their own perspeci j veand from an irnagined in-
group or out-group perspective. Content analysis ofdata show thstexplanations
given from the imagined group perspectives differed more between opposing
altitudinal behaviours (particularly in terms of reason versus causal history of
reason explanations) than those given from participants' own perspective. The
results indicate that the false polarisation effect influences nOI only quantitative
ratings, but also the qualitative contents of free-response explanations. This
study demonstrates the applicabi lity of Malle's (1999) Folk Explanations of
Behaviour coding scheme to the analysis of intergroup anributicns.
Key words: Intergroup attribution, group attribution false polarisation effect,
perspective taking
Theoretical Background
Hardin and Higgins (1996) note that even basic cognitive processes are
defined by the social activities in which they are manifested. Peopleconstruct
the reality they live in through social verification. and nowhere else is this
phenomenon more vivid than in the context of intergroup relations. When
reality is constructed through the process of social verification, it is subject to
various interpretations by the groups involved in the process. The same
"objective" and physical facts can be interpreted very differently depending on
the perspective from which they are seen (Montgomery, 1994). When the
interests of social groups clash, these interests determine their perspectives. If
one or all of these groups fail to acknowledge that the other side sees the world
differently than they do, this may lead to erroneous attributions,
misunderstandings, and conflicts between the parties (Griffin & Ross, 1991).
Ichheiser (1949) notes that people are aware of differences between
opinions of di fferent social groups,explaining these differences byattriburing
psychological biases to others. Pronin, Puccio . and Ross (2002) conclude that
the real source of misunderstanding arises from people's failure to recognise the
operation of the same biases in their own judgements and decisions. This
represents the so-called "naive realism" view of the social perceiver (Ross &
Ward, 1996). According to rhis view. social perceivers assume they have access
to unbiased and objective reality which others should perceive the same way as
long as their view is not biased by Ideology or self-interest, This assumption
often results in an overestimation of psychological biases in other people
(Kruger & Gilovich, 1999; Pronin, Gilovich, & Ross, in press; Pronln, Lin, &
Ross, 2002).
One of the consequences of the "naive realism" of the social perceiver is
the 50-called false polarisation effect (Pronin et al., 2002)--anoverestimationof
a group score on a certain attribute in comparison with the actual group score on
that attribute. Robinson; Keltner, Ward, and Ross (1995) found that both
liberals andconservatives lend to overestimate the differences in both groups!
interpretations of a controversial incident. Respondents of both groups lend to
see both in-group and out-group members as more extreme in their attitudes
than themselves. Similar findings in a study of book preferences among
trad itiona list and revisi OJ] isr Eng [ish professors by Kel tner and Robinso n ( 1997)
lead them to conclude that representatives of opposing parties tend. to rely on a
polarisation heuristic when judging their conflicts, accentuating the differences
between both sides' positions and underestimating the common ground. [0 some
studies, the false polarisation effect has been found in estimating out-group
attitudes (Robinson & Friedman, 1995; Rouhana, O'Dwyer, & Morrison Vasa,
1997). Other studies report similar overestimation of both out-group and in-
group attitudes (Diekman, Eagly & Kulesa, 2002; Keltner & Robinson, 1997;
Puccio, 2003; Robinson er al., 1995).
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Studies of intergroup atrri bution constitute one area of soei al
psychological research that highlights di fferences between groups In construi ng
the same observable events. Hewstone (1989, 1990) reports a number of
findings showing that individuals prefer in-group-serving attributions relative to
out-group-serving attributions. Perspective-taking studies of intergroup
attribution have found evidence of the false polarisation effect in explanations
of group attitudes and behaviour. Robinson et a1. (1995) tested some aspects of
group attribution by asking their participants to rate the basis of their own
judgements and that of their in-group and out-group members. The respondents
indicated that they had been less influenced by ideology or pofitical orientation
than either their peers or opponents. Dimdins, Montgomery, and Austers (2003)
asked European Union supporters and opponents in Latvia to rate various causal
explanations of supporters' and opponents' attitudinal behaviour. From a target's
in-group perspective, they found that both groups rated the causes of behaviour
as more stable, controllable, and rational, and less subjective and less influenced
by others than the respective group did from their own perspective. Austers
(1002) asked ethnic Latvian and Russian schoolteachers to rate positive and
negative behaviours from their own and out-group perspective on a number of
attributional dimensions. The results indicated some false polarisationeffect in
predicting out-group's responses, although the results were not consistent. The
cited studies measured attribution on various quantitative dimensions. This
paper explores whether the false polarisation effect would appear in free
response explanations of attitudinal behaviour.
Traditionally, intergroup attribution studies have been based on two
c1assi fications of causal factors. The older classification, based on Heider's
11958) model of interpersonal attributions, distinguishes between internal
(dispositional) and external (situational) attributions. Because of several
limitarions of this classification (Miller, Smith, & Uleman, 1981)., an alternative
four-dimensional model was proposed by Islam and Hewsrone (1993),
measuring attributions along the continuums of causal locus, stability,
controllabiliry (Weiner, 1986), andglobaliry (Abramson, Seligman, & Teasdale,
1978). A numbe r of successful intergrou p attribution stud ies have been carri ed
out using this model withtne four dimensions serving as the basis for
quantitative rating scales (Austers, 2002; [slam & Hewstone, 1993), coding
categories of free responses (Austers & Montgomery, ZOOI, Lee & Robinson,
2000), and stimulus material in different experimental conditions (Wilder,
Simon & Faith, 1996).
Bertram Malle and his colleagues (Malle, 1999; Malle & Knabe, 1997;
Malle Knabe, O'Laughlin, Pearce, & Nelson, 2000; O'Laughlin & Malle, 2002)
have recently proposed a different alternative to the person/situation
classification. The main idea behind their model -- Folk Explanations of
Behaviour (FEB) -- is that rather than concentrating on the explicit contents of
causal attributions people's behaviour explanations must instead be considered
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in terms of their conceptual structure, the network of concepts and assumptions
on which these explanations are based.
Central 10 this structure is the folk-concept of intentionality (Malle &
Knabe, 1997). According to the classification suggested by Malle (1999),
explanations that interpret an agent's behaviour as unintentional are considered
cause explanations, Explanations. that interpret the behaviour as intentional are
divided into three major groups: (a) causal history of reasons (factors from
agent's personal history that cause the intentional behaviour without the agent
being aware of them); (b) reasons (factors that the agent considered when
forming the intention to act); and (c) enabling factors (factors that clarify how it
was possible that the agent completed the intended action). Reasons are further
divided into three types: desires, beliefs, and valuings, A distinction is made
between reasons marked wilh a mental state description and those unmarked. In
addition, the coding scheme developed by Malle (2000) uses a number of
secondary codes to reflect the contents of each explanation. Some examples of
coding categoriescan be found in Appendix A.
Perhaps the most appealing aspect of using the folk explanations of
behaviour model in coding of attributions is that it uses categories that take into
account both linguistic and conceptual features of the explanations, Such
categories are not as sensitive to subtle linguistic differences as those
traditionally used to person/situation classification. At the same time, thecoding
scheme provides strict rules based on a consistent inner logic to avoid
speculative interpretations during analysis.
Of special interest to the studies of intergroup attributions is the
distinction between causal history of reasons (CHR) and reasons. Both
categoriesexplain intentional action; however, using CHR (such as an actor's
personality traits, social category membership, and the state of being deprived
of relevant information) shows, in the explainer's opinion, that the actor is not
aware of what factors have. caused his or her behaviour. Locke and Pennington
(1982, p, 213) make a philosophical distinction between explaining and
justifying behaviour. The same reasoning can be applied to the distinction
between reason and CHR explanations. CHR explanations can explain the
action but cannot JUS! ify it. Reasons, on the contrary, both explain theact ion and
justify it. (In the observer's opinion, actors themselves could explain why they
acted ina certain way if asked.) According to Locke and Pennington,
"Behaviour that is so justified can be said to be rational in Simon's (1957) sense
of 'bounded rationaliry' .... If behaviour cannot be justified this way, then we
have to look for other explanations, for example; psychopathologies" p. 21 J l.
In other words, awareness of one's causes of behaviour implies more rationality
than lack of suehawareness.
Previous studies have shown that people perceive rationality as a positive
factor in imergroupatrrtburions (Dirndins eial., 2003; Kenworthy & Miller,
2002). Consequently, one may expect to find systematic differences in people's
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lise of reason and CI-lR explanations when explaining positive and negative
behaviour or in-group and out-group behaviour . .It is reasonable to expect that if
the observer finds an actor's behaviour personally acceptable, positive, and
congruent with one's own attitudes, he or she will tend to use more reason
explanations relative to eRR explanations; the opposite should be true for
negatively evaluated behaviour.
Our study has two aims. First, we examine if the false polarisation effect
would appear in the free responseexplanations of attitudinal behaviour. (By
attitudinal behaviour, we understand general, non-specific behaviour that
expresses the actors attitude towards a certain issue, acting in line with one's
attitudes. We chose attitudinal behaviour instead of more specific g-roup
behaviours because it allowed us to construct simple, context-independent, and
unambiguous stimuli for our study.) Second, we explore the possibilities of
using FEB scheme in studies of intergroup attributions.
We made two predictions regarding the false polarisation effect. First,
following our reasoning described above, we expected that the ratio between the
number of reasons and the CHR explanations could elicit false polarisation.
More reasonexplanations relative to Cl-lR explanations can be expected when
members of a target's in-groupexplain its behaviour than jf members of the
target's out-groupexplain the same behaviour. (We understand in-group as the
participants who share the attitude expressed in the target behaviour, and we
understand out-group as the participants who hold the' opposite auitude.) Thus,
if the participants' responses. are influenced by the false polarisation,
participants should provide more reason (relative to CHR) explanations when
taking the (imagined) in-group perspective of the target. than the target's in-
group members have provided from their own perspective. In addition.
simulated explanations given from a target's out-group perspective should
contain more CAR (relative to reason) explanations compared to the
explanations given by that target's out-group members.
Our second prediction concerns the linguistic aspects of the FEB coding
scheme, the interpretation of mental slate markers in reason explanations. Malle
(1999, p. 4\) notes that mental slate markers are likely to be used by observers
10 distance themselves from the agent's subjective reasons. By extending. this
assertion 10 an intergroup context, one should expect more marked (relative (0
unmarked) reason explanations when a target's out-group members explain the
target's behaviour than if the same behaviour is explained by the target's in-
group members. In this way, explainers would try to distance themselves from
reasons they might find personally less acceptable. We wanted 10 test if this
pattern would indeed appear in an intergroup context If so, we wanted to test if
the use of mental state markers would be affected by false polarisation. We.
predicted that participants should use more mental state markers when laking
the (imagined) out-group perspective of the target than the target's out-group
have used from their own perspective; the opposite should be true regarding the
target's in-group perspective.
After a pilot study of political attitudes among Latvian students, We
decided that Latvia's planned membership in the European Union was the most
appropriate issue for our study because it elicited the strongest and most
polarised attitudes. Defining the group membership in terms of attitudes is a
valid practice in studies of controversial political issues (Kenworthy & Miller,
2002).
Method
Sample
Eighty-four students (75 women) at the University of Latvia participated
in the study. Participants were flrst, second, and third year students of
psychology, education, and languages. The mean age ofthe participants was 20
years.
Questionnaire
The participants Were flrst asked co indicate their age, gender, ethnicity,
and their general attitude towards Latvia's membership into the European Union
(for va.against).
The second part of the questionnaire consisted of descriptions of two
opposite attitudinal behaviours, whichthe participants were asked to explain
from their own perspective and from the perspective of either ED supporters or
EU opponents. The opposite behaviours were described with the following
statements: fa) "There are many people in Latvia who actively support Latvia
entering the European Union"; and (b "There are many people in Latvia who
activelyprotest against Latvia entering the European Union". Each statement
was on top of a separate sheet. AU respondents explained both behaviours. The
order of both target behaviours was counterbalanced across the questionnaires ..
After reading each of the two statements, the respondents were asked to
explain the respective behaviour from two perspectives. The first question was
the same in all questionnaires: "Why do you believe people who support Latvia
entering the European Union/people who oppose Latvia entering the European
Union act the way they do? Please, write the answer in (he space below." The
second question varied depending on which group perspective was assigned to
the respective questionnaire. Hal f ofthe respondents were asked to explain both
behaviours from the perspective of EU supporters, whereas the other half were
asked to explain both behaviours from the perspective of EU opponents. For
example, for supporter behaviour to be explained from the EU opponent
perspective, the question reads: "How would people wno oppose Latvia entering
the European Union answer this question: "Why do supporters of European
Union act this way?" The wording was developed through several rounds of
pre-testing to ensure that the participants understood the perspective-taking
questions correctly.
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In the third part of the questionnaire, the participants were asked to
indicate their agreement/disagreement with seven items using a 5-pornt Likert
scale. This was designed to measure the strength of support of Latvia's
membership into the European Union. The list of items can be found in
Appendix B. The partici pants were al so asked io iod icare to what exten t in their
opinion people who support (or, depending on the group perspective, oppose)
Latvia entering the European Union would agree or disagree with the 7 items.
The group perspective indicated in this question was consistent with that
indicated in the previous questions.
To reiterate, the group perspective was manipulated between subjects.
Each respondent was asked to explain both attitudinal behaviours (supporter and
opponent in random order) from their perspective and from the perspective of
one of the groups -- either EU supporters or EU opponents. This design was
chosen to minimise tbe possibility that participants might guess the research
hypotheses.
Content Analysis of Data
Two independent judges first divided all responses into codeable units. A
codeable unit was defined asa unit of text that alone would be sufficient to
explain the beha viour in quest ion. The in it ial agreem ent between the judge s on
the division into units was 87.7%. After discussing {be differences, both judges
reached al 00% agreement on the units that had to be coded.
A fterwards, the same judges independently coded all the un its in
accordance with the F .EX Coding Scheme for Folk Explanations of Behaviour
(Malle 2000). The explanation type (cause explanations, causal history of
reason [CHRJexpJanations, reason explanations [marked and unmarked], and
enabling factor explanations) served. as the primary code. The contents of each
explanation were coded using a number of secondary codes (more than 20
different codes for each explanation type). Examples of the codes used are
given in Appendix A.
The initial agreement between judges for the primary codes was 88.3%.
After discussing the differences, the judges reached an agreement on 99.4% of
tbe units. The units that the coders could not agree upon were dropped from the
analysis. For secondary codes (i.e., how the contents of the explanations were
classified), the agreement was relatively low (65,7%), and these categories were
not used in the data analysis.
None of the explanations were coded as enabling factor explanations, and
only two of the 796 units were coded as cause explanations. These two types of
explanations will not appear in the results and discussion sections below.
Results
On average, the participants provided 2.35 explanations per behaviour
(SD = 1.29). There was a tendency that slightly more explanations were
provided from own perspective (for opponent behaviour M = 2.79, SD = 1.41:
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for supporter behaviour M = 2.54, SD = 1.35) than from group perspective (for
opponent behaviour M = 2.11, SD = 1.18; for supporter behaviour M = 2.05~ SD
= 1.21). Sixty-one participants (73%) identified themselves as supporters of
Latvia's ED membership, and twenty-three (27%) identified themselves as
opponents.
An index measuring the support of Latvia's rnernbershlp into the
European Union was calculated for each participant by summing the responses
to the seven items displayed in Appendix B. An index for predicted strength of
support from the imagined group perspective was calculated in the same way.
As we predicted, the numbers of reason and CHR explanations were
negatively correlated for each target behaviour (for supporter behaviour, own
perspective r(84) = -.33, P < .01, group perspective r(84) = -.47, P < .00l.; for
opponent behaviour own perspective r(84) = -.46, p < .00l, group perspective
r(84) = -.49, P <.00 I). This all owed us to calculate a Reason -CHR index for
each participant by subtracting the number of CHR explanations from the
number of Reason explanations and dividing the difference by the total Dumber
of explanations given. An index value of -1.00 means that only CHR
explanations were given, and + 1.00 indicates that only Reason explanations
were given. An index value of zero results from an equal number of both types
of explanat Ions.
Simi lady, the numbers of marked and unmarked explanations were
negatively correlated for each target behaviour (for supporter behaviour, own
perspective r(78) = -.23, P < .05, group perspective r(65) = ~.54, P < .001; for
opponent behaviour, own perspective r(76) = -.32, P < .01, group perspective
r(62) = -.59, p < ..001). We calculated an Unmarked-Marked index for each
participant by subtracting the number of marked reason explanations from the
number of unmarked reason explanations and dividing the difference by the
total number of reason explanations given. A more positive index thus indicates
a prevalence of unmarked reason explanations over marked explanations.
We based our data analysis on planned pairwise comparisons (one-tailed
r-tests) between the rating means from own perspective and [he corresponding
means from both group perspectives. Such a direct lest of the false polarisation
effect increased the power of the analysis in comparison with a full ANOY A.
For each comparison, we computed effect size (Cohen's d) to provide an
estimate of the magnitude of mean differences.
The top row of Table 1 shows the strength of support index means. The
means for supporter and opponent participants from their own perspective
differed significantly. t(79) = 11.42, P < .05. When answering the same
questions from the imagined supporter perspective, both supporter and opponent
participants showed a strong false polarisation effect. When taking the
opponents' perspective only the opponent participants showed moderate false
polarlsati on. Supporters, however ,.ac-eurate ly predicted the opponents'
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responses .. The means for either of the imagined group perspectives did not
differ significantly between supporter and opponent participants.
Table I
Mean ratings from awnperspective andthe imagined group-perspectives
Support to EU
membership
Effed size
ReasonlCHR
index:
Supporter
behaviour
Effectsize
Ratings from own
perspective
By
support
ers
(n = 61)
26.19
(4.00)
0.84
(0 ..46)
By
opponent
5
(n = 23)
15.14
(3 ..51 )
0.68
(0.63)
Ratings from (he
supporter
perspective
By By
supporter opponent
s 5
(n= 33)
30.73**·
(3.76)
1.17
1.00*
(0.00)
0049
(n = 10)
29.70*'"
(2.71)
l.03
1.00
(0.00)
0.49
Ratings from the
opponent
perspective
By By
supporter oppone
s nts
(11=28) (n=13)
14.22 12.25'"
(4.72) (5.49)
0.22 0.63
-0.06'"
(0.89)
0.96
0.36
(0.92)
0.40
0.85
(0.55)
0.10
Opponent
behaviour
Effect size
Unmarked/mark
ed index:
Supporter 0.06 -0.02 0..60***' 0.43 ~O.6S" ~O.7S·
behaviour 0.71) (0.81) (0.72) (0.83) (0.60) (0.46)
Effect size 0,76 0.48 0.88· i.1 J
Opponent -0.40 0.08 -0.17 -0.17 0.45 0.17
behaviour (0.69) (0.79) (0.88) (1.00) (0.80) (1.03)
-Effect size -0.29 -0.27 0.47 0 ..10
Note. Standard devietionsare gi en in parentheses. Asterisks indicate thai rating from
the imagined group perspective is significanrly different (J-tailed r-test) from the
corresponding raring from OWn perspecti ve. Means in columns 3 and 4 are compared
LO means in column I; means in columns 5 and 6 are compared 10 means in column 2.
Theeffect size (Cohen's d) for each comparison is given below the respective mean in
columns 3~6.•. P < .05 .••.. P < .01. "'•• P < .00 I.
0.46
(0.71)
0.80
0.39)
0.08*
(0.84)
0.49
·0.33"'·
(0.94)
0.95
0.92
(0.39)
0.31
Regarding the eRR-Reason index, fot' the supporter behaviour both
groups. of partieipants did not differ significantly - I{80) = • t .26, P == .21 --
When giving explanations from own perspective. The predicted pattern of means
emerges in explanations from the imagined group perspectives. From the
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supporter perspective, both groups used only reason explanations (note that the
same mean difference is significant for supporter participants, but it is not
significant for the opponent participants because of a different number of
degrees of freedom), A stronger false polarisation effect occurred when
explanations were provided from the opponent perspective, especially for the
supporter participants. The mean pattern for the opponent behaviour is similar.
Here, the means for both groups from own perspective differed significantly,
1(80) = 2.17,. P -c .05. The false polarisation effect can be seen in explanations
provided by both groups from the imagined supporter perspective but not from
the opponent perspective. For both behaviours, the means for either of the group
perspectives did not differ significantly between supporter ·andopponent
participants. To summarise, a target's in-group members showed the strongest
false polarisation (in terms of using more CHR explanations relative to reason
explanations) when explaining the target behaviour from its out-group
perspective.
Regarding the Unmarked-Marked index, the means in Table I show that
for own perspective, the expected pattern of means appears in explanations for
the opponent behaviour; supporter participants used more mental state markers
than the opponent participants, t(73) = 2.64~ P < .05. When explaining the
supporter behaviour, both groups. used approximately equal number of marked
and unmarked explanations, 1(76) = ~0..43, P = 0..67. The expected pattern of
means appears in explanations. provided from the imagined group perspectives.
When explaining supporter behaviour from the supporter perspective, both
groups used fewer mental state markers than supporters did from their own
perspective; from the opponent perspective, both groups used more mental stale
markers than opponents themselves used. For opponent behaviour, the
respective mean differences are small and insigniflcant. For supporter
perspective, the mean differences were not in the expected direction. Again, for
both behaviours the means for either of the group perspectives did not differ
si gni fi cant ly between supporter and opponent patti ci pants. We concl.u de that
there is some evidence of false polarisation regarding the use of menial state
markers when explaining attitudinal behaviour from the imagined group
perspectives, but this evidence is not conclusive.
Discussion
Evidence confirms both of our predictions. Prediction l (regarding [he
use of CHR and reason explanations) rece ived stronger suppott from the results
Although not aU mean differences were significant, they were always in the
expected direction for both supporter and opponent behaviour. Support for
Prediction 2 (regarding the use of mental slate markers) was less consistent,
because we found the expected mean pattern only for explanations to supporter
behaviour but not opponent behaviour. However, generally our results show that
tbe false polarisation effect is a robust phenomenon that influences the
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qual itative ton ten ts of free-response exp lanat ions. In th is study, we replicated
the results of Dimdins et al, (2003 ),. using a different method of data gathering
and analysis.
An interesting pattern emerging from the results was that both groups of
judges similarly overestimated the predicted responses from the group
perspectives. Supporters and opponents agreed on how both groups should see
the attitudes and explain the behaviour of their in-group and out-group
members. The results reflect a sort or«shared pseudo-reality" as opposed to the
"actual reality" in which both groups were significantly less extreme in their
ratings and explanations. As Robinson et al, (199.5) note, one possi ble
explanation fur this phenomenon deals with the salience of social debate and
availability of information about both groups' positions. Most information about
the European Union membership in Latvia comes from mass media, where most
of thedebate on the topic takes place. People expressing their opinions In such
debate are typically politicians or socially active members ofnon-governmenral
organisations. Thus their opinions are more extreme than that of an "average
person", and regular exposure to such extreme opinions may lead to
development of stereotypes about both groups. (n other words, people are
relying on the availabilityheuristic (Taylor, 1982; Tversky & Kahnetnan, 1973)
when trying to predict a person's responses. As the analysis of free responses
indicates, this explanation is supported by the fact that both groups tended to
use similar rhetoric when explaining both target behaviours from the same
perspect ive,
Puccio (2003) goes a step further and argues that because of the
correspondence bias (Gilbert & Malone 1995;. Jones & Davis 1965) people
tend to assume that the salient behaviour of the biased sample represents an
accurate reflection of the views of the particular group. This assumption may
lead to pluralistic ignorance (Miller Manin, & Prentice, 2000) ~- a widespread
misperception of group norm that leads to a situation where a majority of group
members privately disagree with the norm, but erroneously assume that
majority of other group members support it. It is possible that the "shared
pseudo-reality" that we found in our data reflects a sort of pluralistic ignorance
about the mutual perceptions of EU supporters and Etlopponents in Latvian
society.
Findings by Van Boven, Kamada, and Gilovich (1999) point ar another
possible link between the correspondence bias and the false polarisation effect.
They found that actors overestimated the magnitude of correspondence bias
displayed by observers. In several experiments with highly salient situational
constraints an actors' behaviour, the observers indeed displayed [he
correspondence bias" However, the actors predicted that the observers would
make more favourable (or unfa ourable, depending on the experimental
condition) dispositional inferences than the observers actually did. One may
speculate that the same "biased perception of bias" could explain the
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exaggerated attri but ions from group pers pectives that we found in our study.
We believe that the cognitive mechanisms behind the false polarisation effect,
and in particular the relation between the correspondence bias and the false
polarisation effect, still produce possibilities for further research, especially in
the area of intergroup attri bution.
Our study proved that the FEB scheme is an efficient and convenient 1001
for studies of group attributions. In line with our expectations, we found that the
explainers tended to use more reason explanations for attitude-congruent (in-
group) behaviour, and more causal history of reason explanations for attitude-
incongruent (out-group) behaviour. We think that the ratio between both types
of explanations is worth adding to the set of methods for estimating group-
serving biases in intergroup attribution studies.
From a.methodologicaJ respect, the application of the FEB scheme in om
study was also successful. The initial agreement between the coders on the
primary codes (i.e., the four basic explanationtypes) was high despite the fact
that both judges used the coding scheme for the first time. This suggests that
these coding categories are stable, valid, and relatively easy [0 recognise, The
ca tegori es provedapplicable to all intergroup contex r, and the resu Its yielded
significanteffects, The application of secondary codes (mostly those related to
the explanation context) was more problematic, Because of the relatively low
initial agreement between judges, none of the data based on secondary codes
were included in the analysis. The low agreement perhaps can be partially
explained by the lack of experience ofthe coders; however, it may also indicate
that the secondary coding categories as they are might be less applicable in ali
intergroup context than they are in an interpersonal context where [he scheme
has been developed. The large number of secondary categories also poses a
problem of how to reduce the number of variables in the analysis, Perhaps after
accumulating a larger amount of data,a factor analysis might yield some
insights in this respect. We are convinced. however, Ihat the FEB scheme can
provide unexplored possibilities for intergroup attribution research.
In our study, a novel aspect of applying the FEB scheme was that it was
used in respect to explanations provided in Latvian. To our knowledge, this was
the first attempt to use this coding scheme in a language other than English.
Latvian belongs to the Baltic branch of tbe Indo-European language tree, and it
is very different from English in both vocabulary and grammar. The fact that the
sa.me coding categories could be successfully applied in a completely different
linguistic context offers strong support to the validity of these categories and
points to possibilities of using the FEB scheme in cross-cultural research in the
future. In general, our findings suggest that the most interesting results in the
future studies of intergroup attribution can be expected from the use of free-
response formatsand qualitative methods of data analysis.
1'2
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Coding examples
Cod lngcategory
Caussl History of
Reason
Agent stable
propositional state
Agent category
membership
Agent trait
Agent passive
Situation
Reason
De~ite
Agent content
(marked)
Situation content
(marked)
Agent + situation
lnteraction (marked)
Agent content
(unmarked)
Situation content
(unmarked)
Bel~ef
Agent content
(marked)
Situation content
(marked)
Agent + situation
interaction (marked)
Agent content
(unmarked)
Situation content
(unmarked)
Agent + situation
interaction
(unmarked)
Appendix A
Example
They do that because oftheir overwhelming
patriotism.
Those are mostly middle-aged and old people.
Unable to act independently.
They do not receive enough information about
the EU
There is notenough information available
about EU.
They want security for themselves.
They do not want the country to become a
member in any unions.
They want to enjoy the country's independence.
(They support the EU membership) to achieve
a better life quality for themselves.
(They support the EU membership) to improve
the living standard in the country
They think. they are not going to lose anything.
They think it will be safer for Latvia.
They think they are going to Jive like in
Westem countries.
(They support the EU membership) because it
will be Sa fer for them.
(They protest against the EU membership)
because it will harm the agriculture.
EU membership will increase their chances to
work in other countries.
16
Valuing
Agent content
(marked)
Situation content
(marked)
Agent + situation
interaction (marked)
They are afraid of changes.
They dislike globalisation,
They are afraid to be subdued by foreign
powers.
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Appendix B
[terns that measure the strength of support for Latvia's EU membership
I, Latvia, should enter the European Union.
2. The European Union membership will do more harm than good to Latvia
(R).
3. Latvia will only gain by remaining outside the European Union (R).
4. I am personally against Latvia's membership into the European Union (R).
5. It would be better for majority of Latvians if Latvia became a member of the
European Union.
6. European Union membership threatens the sovereignty of latvia (R).
7. r personally support Latvia's membership into the European Union.
Note. Items 2, 3, 4, and 6 are reverse-scored, Cronbach's Alpha = 0.91
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Abstract
We examined whether participants could differentiate between explanations of
attitude-consistent behavior related to EU membership given from two
perspectives (EU supporter and EU opponent) by means of three perspective
taking modes (the explainer's own perspective, imaginedin-group members'
perspective, and imagined out-group members' perspective). Participants were
presented with explanations provided from different perspectives and
perspective taking modes, and they were asked to judge the extent to which they
agreed with each explanation, 10 guess theanitude of the provider of eac,h
explanation, and to rate the quality of each explanation in various respects.
Participants could not differentiate between explanations given by in-group
members and out-group members who imagined the 'same perspective. They
responded more favorably to explanations given from own perspective than
from the imagined perspectives. The results suggest that there exists a shared
understanding about how both sides shouJd explain attitude-consistent behavior,
but this understanding is measurably different from the actual explanations.
Key words: Shared reality, perspective taking, causal explanation, false
polarization
A substantial part of intergroup research in social psychology bas dealt
with how people explain the behaviors of their in-group and Qui-group
members. In his review of research of intergroup attribution, Hewstone (198.9,
1990) reports a number of findings, which indicate robust effects of social
categorization on explanations of behavior. Research designs and patterns of
results have varied from study to study, but in most cases the underlying general
findi ng has been ·a preference for in-grou p-serving attributions relati ve to out-
group serving attributions (Hewstone, 1990). Perhaps this can be seen as a
natural consequence of sodalcategorization, where a favorable comparison of
one's in-group to other groups serves as a powerful instrument of self-
enhancement (Ta] tel, 1978).
The robust nature of group differences in explaining social behavior has
prompted a number of attribution studies where participants are asked to
provide explanations from perspectives of other groups or individuals. A
number of these studies have found that when making attributions from the
imagined out-group perspective, participants simulate the out-group's
motivation to have a positive and benevolent self-image, and accordingly bias
their responses in favor Q f the out-group (Austers, 2002; Austers&
Mon tgom ery, 200 I; Dimdins I Montgomery, & Austers, 2003a).
Other studies have looked at the similarities between the contents of
attributions provided by members of various groups taking each other'S
perspectives. Using the number of internal and external causes as the criteria for
comparison, Kemdal and Montgomery (2001) found that animal rights
supporters and animal experimenters could fairly accurately take the other
party's perspective in attributing causes to behavior of both groups. Dimdins,
Montgomery and Austers (2003b) asked EU supporters and opponents to
explain the behavior of people supporting and opposing Latvia's EU
membership (i.e., behavior expressing a positive Dr negative attitude) from their
own perspectives and the perspectives of both groups. Explanations provided by
supporters and opponents from the same group perspective were remarkably
similar (the criterion for comparison was the ratio between two types of
explanations, taken from the coding scheme suggested by Malle [1999,2000]:
reason explanations and causal history of reason explanations),
In the quoted studies, the effectiveness of the perspective taking has been
explained as a resultof a shared reality (Hardin & Higgins, 1996). According to
this theoretical perspective, it is not surprising to find such a consensus
regarding a topic of public debate. When two groups share the same social
universe, both have access [0 lacrge1y the same information about the debated
issues and each ether, and through direct or indirect communication they
exchange opinions on a regular basis. This is especially true in regard 10
attitudes about controversi al issues. As Bill ig (1991 ) has pointed out, to have an
attitude and to follow it in behavior means placing oneself in a public debale,.
where attitude-consistent behavior has (0 be justified and defended against
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holders of other attitudes. In this context, taking an opponent's perspective helps
the groups to find persuasive arguments against (he opponent's position by
predicting possible assaults on their own position and formulating arguments 10
defend their positions.
However, one aspect of the cited studies needs to be addressed. In all
these papers the researchers measured the accuracy of perspective Laking. This
was done either on the basis of simi larities in quantitative ratings provided from
different perspectives (Austers, 2002, Dimdins el aI., 2003a),. or similarities in
frequency with which certain categories of content analysis occurred in
responses provided from different perspectives (Austers & Montgomery, 2001;
Kemdal & Montgomery, 200 I, Dirndinset al., 200%). It is likely that the broad
theoretical and/or linguistic categories used as the measurement dimensions in
these studies have failed. to take into account subtler differences in the contents
of behavioral explanations provided from different perspectives ..For example,
when explaining a certain out-group's behavior from that out-group's
perspective, respondents might have used predominantly internal attributions,
just like the members of the respective group itself. However, in regard to the
spec ific contents, both groups could prov ide total] y different exp lanati ons (e..g.,
"they are smart" and "they are not very smart"), yet these differences would not
be caprured. in the content analysis using tile broad internal versus external
categories (both explanations would be coded as internal). This is an
exaggerated example unlikely to occur in real life. but it serves to illustrate Ole
shortcomings of the content analysis approach. Moreover, social and cognitive
psychologists are far from being in agreement about what would be the
appropriate dimensions for measuring attributions (e.g., Sabini, Sieprnann, &
Stein, 200 I, GiJovich & Eibach, 200 I; Ross, 200 I; see also Malle, Knobe,
O'Laughlin, Pearce, & Nelson, .2000).
An interesting and so far little explored aspect of group perspective
laking is the question of what the group members themselves think about the
explanations given by out-group representatives trying to take their group's
perspective. To our knowledge, no published research addresses this question.
But an early study of altitudes by Dawes, Singer, and Lemons (1972) showed
that partisans in a political controversy were less successful in taking an out-
group's perspective than in-group's perspective. Dawes et aJ asked supporters
and opponents of the Vietnam War to write statements that would be endorsed
by members of one or the other group ...When these statements where presented
to the corresponding groups, both supporters and opponents rejected more
statements written by their out-group members than by in-group members. This
finding is not surprising, given that the previous research has documented a
number of psychological mechanisms that may work against accurately taking
an out-group perspective .. Such mechanisms include adversary's extremity bias
(Rouhana, O'Dwyer, & Morrison Vasa. ·199'7), influence of in-group norms
(Turner, 1991;. Abrams Wetherell, Cochrane, Hogg, & Turner, 200 I), and
motivational biases in seeking and evaluating information (Kunda, 1990),
The above arguments point to the importance of replicating the previous
findings (that interpret the effectiveness of perspective taking as a consequence
of shared reality) by using a design where the accuracy of perspective taking is
not assessed by researchers but by the group members themselves. If the shared
reality hypothesis is true, the simulated. opinions produced by out-group
members should be highly similar to the ones provided by in-group members
themselves, reflecting the fact that both originate in the same shared reality,
Consequently, members ofa particular group should see no difference between
arguments provided by their in-group members and those provided by out-group
members from the perspective of the particular group. If, however, the group
members would see such a difference (e ..g., by favoring opinions expressed by
in-group members over those expressed by out-group members taking the
particular group's perspective), it would indicate that the out-group members are
missing some subtle characteristics when simulating the opinions of the
particular group. Such a. result would challenge the shared reality hypothesis
and the results of many studies demonstrating theefficiency of perspective
taking (as estimated by the researchers).
Apart from validating the previous findings regarding the causal role or
shared reality, such a design will also allow a test of a recently formulated
explanation of the false polarization effect (overestimation of group differences
on a certain attribute in comparison with the actual differences) ..Dirndinset OIL
(200301, 2003b found that both supporters and opponents of EU membership
expected their in-group andout-group members to he more extreme in their
explanations than the actual results showed. This was a replication of a well-
documented phenomenon previously known from studies of beliefs and
attitudes (see Pronin, Puccio, & Ross, 2002, for a review). Pronin et al, (2002)
argue that the cognitive mechanism behind the false polarization effect is the
"naive realism" of the social perceiver (Ross & Ward, 1996). The social
perceiver assumes that he or she has unbiased access to the objective reality.
Others should perceive the reality the same way as th.e social perceiver does as
long as their view is not biased by ideology or self-interest. Because the
perceptions of others often differ from those of the social perceiver, this
assumption results in an overestimation of psychological biases in other people
(Pronin, Gilovich, & Ross, in press; Pronin, Lin, & Ross, 2002; Kruger &
Gilovich, 1999). Consequently, when asked to provide enestlrnate of other
people's opinions/attitudes. the social perceiver tends to come up with
simplified, stereotypical, and exaggerated responses. .
If the false polarization indeed is a result of assuming bias in others (in-
group and out-group members alike), people should be able to see some
differences between the opinions provided by their in-group and mit-group
members from their own perspective, and the simulated opinions provided from
4
the imagined group perspectives. Because the simulated opinions should reflect
the expected bias, they should sound less rational and reasonable than the
opinions from own perspective ..Consequently, people shouldagree more to the
opinions provided from owe perspective than to the simulated opinions
provided from the imagined group perspectives. If, however, there were no
differences in agreement between the opinions expressed from own and
imagined perspectives,it would indicate that people do not see the quality of the
simulated arguments as inferior to that of the real arguments provided from own
perspective (even though researchers may find signs of bias through content
analysis or using quantitative rating scales). Such a result would challenge the
assumption that the false polarization effect isa result of expectation of bias in
other people .. In that case, one might wish 10 test an alternative hypothesis that
the false polarization effect is a result of moderating respondents' own opinions
(e.g .• because of social desirability) rather than exaggerating the group's
position.
This article examines these assumptions in two studies regarding a
controversial political issue (Latvia's membership in the European Union). The
topic provides anexcellent context for examining perspective taking in an
intergroup context. Over the last two years, the debate on the issue has grown in
force, with the opinions of both supporters and opponents well represented in
mass media and highly salient.
In Study L we explored to what extent supporters and opponents of
Latvia's EU membership agreed or disagreed with explanations of both groups'
atrhude-consistent behavior provided by other supporters and opponents from
their own perspective, their in-group perspective. and their out-group
perspectives. By altitude-consistent behavior we understand general, non-
specific behavior that expresses the actor's attitude towards a certain issue. In
other words, actors behaving in line with one's attitude rather than simply
having a certain attitude ..We chose attitude-consistent behavior instead of more
specific group behaviors or attitudes in general because it allowed us to
construe! simple, context-independent, and unambiguous stimuli for our study.
In Study 2, we examined in more detail what differences the participants could
discern between the various explanations.
Study 1
Method
Sample. In this study, 137 students at the University of Latvia (107
women [78%1) participated. The participants were students of psychology,
education, and languages. The mean age of participants was 21 years, and 118
participants (86%) were Latviarrs,
Ques tion naire. The partie ipants fi IIedin a three-part questionna ire. Firs t,
the participants were asked to indicate their age, gender,ethnicity, as well as
their general attitude towards Latvia's membership into the European Union
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(pro vs, against). In the second part of the questionnaire, the participants were
presented. with descriptions of two opposite attitude-consistent behaviors and a
number of explanations to these behaviors. The participants were then asked to
indicate how much they agreed or disagreed with each explanation.
The descriptions of target behavior were as follows: (a) "There are many
people in Latvia who actively protest against Latvia entering the European
Union" and (b) "There are many people ill Latvia who actively support Latvia
entering the European Union". Each description was provided on top of a
separate sheet In half of the questionnaires, the description of supporter
behavior was described first, followed by opponent behavior, and in the other
half the order was reversed. After each description of behavior, 12 different
explanations to this behavior were provided. All of these explanations were
taken from the results of the earlier study by Dirndins, Montgomery, and
Austers (2003b). In this study, EU opponents and supporters were asked to
provide explanations (in a free response format) to the same fWO target
behaviors from their 'Own, imagined in-group, and imagined out- group
perspectives. A number of these explanations were selected as stimuli for the
present study.
The 12 explanations came from the six possib.lecombinalions of
perspective (supporter or opponent) and mode of perspective taking (own
perspective, imagined in-group perspective, and imagined out-group
perspective), Thus for each behavior there were 2 explanations provided from
each combination of perspective and mode of perspective taking. The origin of
each explanation (i.e., the perspective, from which the explanation had been
provided and the mode of perspective taking) was not indicated in the
questionnaire, and the order of explanations was arranged 1.0 separate those
given from the same perspective.
The explanations included in the questionnaire had been selected
according to the following scheme. All the participants In the study by Dimdins
et al. (200Jb) were ranked in the order of their strength of support for EU
membership. Only explanations provided by self-labeled opponents ranking
below the 25th. percentile and self-labeled supporters above the 75th percentile
of the resulting distribution were used. In this way it was ensured thai the
explanations came from participants with a distinct (strongerthan average)
attitude towards the issue. Explanations to the same behavior provided from the
same perspective were then pooled together and randomly assigned to one of
three different versions of the questionnaire. The assignment of items was not
controlled regarding the contents of the explanations or the coding of their
contents known from the previous content analysis of the items in order 10 avoid
introducing method bias. All together, 72 different explanations were used, l2
from each combination of perspective and mode of perspective taking. Some
examples of explanarions used are provided in Table I.
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Table 1
Examples of explanations .lJsedas stimuli in the presented studies
Perspective and mode of Explanation
perspective taking
Supporter perspective
Own (i.e .• supporter from
own perspective)
Imagined in-group (i.e.,
supporter taking supporter
perspective)
Imagined out-group (i.e.,
opponent taking supporter
perspecti ve)
Opponent perspective
Own (i.e., opponent from
own perspective)
Imagined in-group (i.e .•
opponent taking opponent
perspective)
Imagined out-group (I.e,
supporter laking opponent
perspecti ve)
Supporter perspective
Dvm
Target: supporter behavior
"They see perspectives for development of the
country, through cooperati ngwi th other
European states,"
"Possibly theywill feel safer from the threats of
Russia, feel protected. ,-
"They believe in the EU."
"They think: 'wewant a better life, we want
Latvia to be noticed'."
"May be material values are more important to
them than the moral ones."
"They want to submit. to someone, or cannot act
independeruly of others,"
"They do not want 10 work. [They act]
according to the principle: 'EU will come and
present it to us'."
"Those •••"ho will profit, support [the EU
membership], forgening about those who will
be destroyed by the [European] Union,
"May be they don't can: what will happen to
Latvia."
"They do not have enough information about
the negative [aspects all EU."
"The EU \ ill support us botheconornlcelly and
militarily."
"They want a hying standard like that in the
Western European countries."
Target opponent behavior
"May be these people are afraid of changes,
afraid of financial loss,"
"There is notenough information about the EU
model in general, a lack of general information
in mass media, "
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Table 1 (continued)
Imagined in-group
Imagined out-group
Opponent perspective
Own
Imagined in-group
trnagined out-group
"They are not convinced that the ED will bring
only good [things]. Afraid to lose something
important. "
"They don't understand the risk factor of Lal' v ia
not joining the EU Latvia do not have
resources like the Norwegians [do] to exist
successfully outside the EU,"
"They don't want Latvia to fall under someone's
rille again."
"They think Latvia should be independent, we
need no masters."
"They think we will lose our identity and
culture. From one union we will faHinto
another."
"People want to take no risks, are afraid (hat the
changes will harm (hem."
"They think: 'It isanother Soviet Union'."
"They actlike this because they want to
maintain Latvian identity -- [they] are patriots."
"They are incompetent,"
"Conservative- people. Don't warn to develop
their country."
Tahle2
Items for measurfng the strength 0/ supporllo Latvia's BU membership
I. Latvia should enter the European Union.
2. rile European Union membership will do more harm than good to Latvia (R).
3. Latvia will only gain by remaining outside the European Union (R) ..
4. I am personally against Latvia's membership Into the European Union (R).
5. It would be better for majority of Latvians ifLarvia became a member of the
European Union.
6. European Union membership threatens the sovereignty of latvia (R).
7. .1 personally support LaIv ia's membership imo tbe European Union ..
Note. hems 2, 3, 4, and 6 are reverse-scored,
Reliabili[)l measures (Cronbach's Alpha): ClS1udy I = .92, o.Slucly 2 == .88.
The participants were asked to indicate their agreement or disagreement
with eachexplanation ona 7-point Likert scale, with ''I'' labeled "Strongly
disagree" and "7" labeled "Strongly agree".
In the third part of the questionnaire, the participants were asked to
indicate their agreernent/disagreernent with seven items (provided in Table 2) 10
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measure the strength of support to Latvia's membership into the European
Union OJI a 5-point Likert scale.
Results and Discussion
An average agreement score was calculated for each perspective as the
mean of the agreement scores with explanations provided from the same
perspective for both target behaviors. Six agreement scores corresponding to the
six perspectives described above were acquired for each participant. Figure I
shows the means.
An index measuring the strength of support to Latvia's membership of tile
European Union was calculated for each participant by summing the responses
to the seven items displayed in Table 2. The index values could thus vary
between 5 and 35. higher scores indicating stronger support
Seventy -eight parti ci pants (57%) identified themsel yes as su pporters 0f
Latvia's EU membership, and 57 (42%) identified themselves as opponents.
Both groups differed significantly in their support for EU membership as
measured by the mean support index (fur supporter participants M - 27.88, SD
= 3.49, and for opponents M= 16.16. SD = 4.35,. t(126) = 16.93,p < .00 I).
A 2 (participant altitude: supporter vs, opponent) X 2 (perspective:
supporter vs .. opponent) X 3 (mode of perspective taking: own perspective vs.
imagined in-group vs. imagined out-group) mixed ANOVA with repeated
measures on the last two factors was carried out on the agreement index. scores.
We define perspective as the view from which the explanation had been
provided. We define mode as the way the particular perspective had been taken.
For the supporter perspective, the mode of perspective taking corresponds to
own perspective when a supporter has given an explanation from his or her own
perspective, to imagined in-group when a supporter has given an explanation
from the supporter perspective (i.e., imagining how other supporters would
explain the behavior), and to tmagtned out-group when anopponeru has given
an explanation from the supporter perspective (i.e .., imagining how supporters
would explain the behavior). Correspondingly, for the opponent perspective the
mode of perspective taking corresponds to own perspective when an opponent
has given an explanation from. his or her own perspective, to imagined in-group
when an opponent has given an explanation from the opponent perspective (i.e.,
imagining how other opponents would explain the behavior), and to imagined
our-group when a supporter has given an explanation from the opponent
perspective (i.e, imagining how opponents would explain the behavior).
Our first prediction was thai the agreement with explanations would be
determined to a much larger extent by the perspective from which the
explanation had been provided (supporter or opponent perspective) than by the
attitude of the explainer (as reflected in Participant Attitude X Mode of
Perspective Taking interaction). As expected there was a highly significant
Participant Altitude X Perspective interaction, PO; 125) = 91.29. p < .00 I,
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partial 112 = .42, accounting for the pattern that the participants agreed more with
explanations provided from an in-group perspective than from an out-group
perspective. The Participant Attitude X Mode of Perspective Taking interaction
was not significant, F(2, 125) = 2 ..69, P > ,05. partial 112 = ,02, and neither was
the Attitude X Mode X Perspective interaction, F(2, l25) = 1.45, p> .05, partial,,2.= .Ot.
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Figure J. Mean agreement wilh explanations provided from EU supporter and
EU opponent perspectives taken as oWO, imagined in-group, and imagined out-
group perspectives, Higher score indicates higher agreement.
In line with our second prediction, there was a significant main effect of
mode of perspective taking, F(Z; 125)= 17.98. P < .00 I, partial 11;1 = .13, caused
by the tendency that the. participants agreed more with the explanations
provided by explainers expressing their own opinion rather than the
explanations given from the imagined group perspectives. Pairwise comparisons
(Tukey LSD) showed that the estimated marginal mean for own explanations, M
= 4.82 (SE = 0.06), was significantly higher than the mean for simulated in-
group explanations, M = 4.41 (SE = .06), and the mean for simulated out-group
explanations, M"" 4.55 (SE = .07). Both group perspective means, in turn, did
not differ significantly from each other. As Figure 1 shows, the agreement was
higher when both perspectives were taken as O"\,'1n perspectives rather than as
imagined in-group or out-group perspectives. The only exception to this pattern
is that the opponent participants agreed equaJly strongly to the explanations
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provided by opponents from their own perspective and to the simulated
explanations by supporters taking the opponents' perspective.
Srudy 2
The aim of Study 2 was to expand the focus of Study 1 beyond simple
agreement or disagreement with explanations. For example, it can be argued
that a person may agree with a behavioral explanation even when knowing that
the explanation has been provided by an out-group member (for example, if the
person finds the explanation well substantiated at reasonable). In Study 2, we
wanted to check if the participants would be able to guess the attitude behind
each explanation when informed. that the explanations might not reflect [he true
opinions of the explainers. Our prediction was that the participants would be
able to determine only the perspective from which the explanation has been
provided, but not the explainer attitude when that perspective had been taken as
an our-group perspective. (Note that the explainer attitude and perspective
coincide when a perspective is taken as an in-group perspective ..)
Another aim of Study 2, related to the false polarization effect, was to
examine in more detail what differences the participants would discern between
the explanations provided from both perspectives when these perspectives are
taken as own perspective, imagined in-group perspectives, or imagined OU(-
group perspectives. Previous studies have shown that rationality is seen as a
favorable cause of attitudes and attitude consistent behavior, more often
attributed to in-group members than to out-group members (Kenworthy &
Miller, 2002; Dimdins et al. 2003a). Dimdins etal, (2003a) found that attitude-
consistent behavior was evaluated more positively from the actors' in-group
perspective than from our-group perspective, In line with these findings, we
predicted that rational ity and posi ti vi ty 0f the depicted behavior mi gh [ influence
the perception of differences between explanations. We also hypothesized that
if an explanation has its origins in (he shared reality, it shonto be Seen as rypical
rather than idiosyncratic. Finally, we deemed it plausible to include a control
variable of how substantiated the participants thought the explanations were,
because it could arguably influence their agreement. However, these
measurements were of exploratory nature, and no specific predictions were
formulated regarding them.
Method
Sample. In this study, 89 students at University of Latvia (72 women
f81%]) participated. A II participants were students of education and languages.
The mean age of participants was 19.5 years, and 77 participants (87%) were
Latvians.
Que s I(on nai re. The part icipants fi ned in a quest ionnaire, consisting of
four parts. First. as in Study 'I, the participants were asked to indicate their age
I]
gender,ethnicity, as well as their general attitude towards Latvia's membership
into the European Union (for versus against).
In the second pan of the questionnaire, the participants were presented
with descriptions of two opposite behaviors and a number of explanations of
these behaviors. The descriptions of target behaviors and the presented
explanations were the same as in Study 1, The only difference was that for each
target behavior there were only six explanations, one from each of the six
combinations of perspective and mode of perspective taking .. Six different
versions of the questionnaire were created. The explanations came from the
same pool of 72 explanations as in Study 11 but they were shuffled among the
versions in such a way [hat those explanations, which appeared together in
Study I, were in different versions of questionnaires in Study 2.
After each explanation, the participants were asked five questions. First,
the participants were asked to indicate their agreement/disagreement with each
explanation (the same as in Study I), Second, the participants were asked to rate
how positive/negative the explanation was towards the target group (people
whose behavior was being explained). The third question was to rate to what
extent the target behavior was depicted as rational/irrational in [be explanation,
Fourth, tne participants were asked how typical (common in atvian society)
theexplanation was. Finally, the participants were asked to rate how well
substantiated the explanation was.
All ratings were given on a 7-point Likert type scale. The sequence of
explanations, questions, and target behaviors was counterbalanced across the
quest ionnaires,
In the third part, the participants were informed that the explanations they
had just rated had been provided by supporters and opponents of EU
membership from their own perspective and imagined group perspectives. The
participanes were then asked to determine if the explanation had been initially
provided by an EU supporter Or an opponent. The explanations for each target
behavior were presented again, and the participants were asked toindicate their
opinion on a 7-point Likert scale: ] was defined as "[am sure that the
explanation has been provided by an EU opponent"; 7 was defined as "1 am
sure that theexpkmation has been provided by an EU supporter"; 4 was defined
as "I cannot say".
In the fourth part of the questionnaire the participants were asked to
indicate [heir agreement/disagreement with the seven items (provided in Table
2) that were designed to measure the strength of support for Latvia's
membership into the European Union on a 5-poinl Likert scale,
Results and Discussion
All index measuring the strength of support for Latvia's membership of
the European Union wascaleulared for each participant by summing the
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responses to the seven items displayed in Table 2. As in Study I,. the index
values could vary between Sand 35; higher scores indicated stronger support,
Sixty participants (67%) identified themselves as supporters of Latvia's
EU membership, and 28 (32%) identified themselves as opponents. Both groups
differed significantly in their support 10 EU membership as measured by the
mean support index (for supporter participants M = 27.47. SD = 3.72, and for
opponents M= 17.21. SD = 3.28,. 1(85) = 12.47,p <.001).
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Figure 2. Mean agreement with explanations provided from EU supporter and
EU opponent perspectives taken as own, imagined in-group, and irnaglned out-
group perspectives. Higher score indicates higher agreement.
The general pattern of means for agreement. scores largely resembled
Study I (Figure 2). A 2 (participant attitude: supporter \IS. opponent) X 2
(perspective: supporter vs, opponent) X 3 (mode of perspective taking: own
perspective vs, imagined in-group vs, imagined out-group) mixed ANOYA with
repeated measures on the last two factors was carried out on the agreement
scores. The significant effects replicated those of Study J, albeit with a smaller
magnitude. There was a strong Perspective X Participant Atritude irueraction,
£(1; 83) = 27.14, P < _001, partialTl2 = .25, and a main effect of mode of
perspective tasing, F(2' 83) = 9.05, p < .001, partial 112 = . .1O. The estimated
marginal means were in the same direction as in Study l: M = 4.68 (SE = 0.10)
for own explanations, M = 4.18 (SE = .11). for simulated in-group explanations,
and M ::= 4.25 (SE = .12) for simulated out-group explanations. The mean for
own explanations was significantly higher than both means of simulated group
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perspectives, which, in tum, did not differ significantly from each other. Again
the results were similar to the results in Study I, and none of the Participant
Attitude X Mode of Perspective Taking interactions were significant.
TIle similar pattern of results in Studies land 2 supports the reliability of
the findings. It was repeatedly found that agreement with explanations was
determined primarily by the perspective from which the explanations had been
provided and not by the explainer attitude. Furthermore, in both studies we
found that the participants tended to agree more with the explanations provided
from own perspective than to the simulated explanations from the imagined
group perspectives.
Of greater interest in the results of Study 2 are the participants'
estimations of the attitude of providers of explanations. A 2 (participant attitude:
supporter vs. opponent) X 2 (perspective: supporter vs, opponent) X 3 (mode of
perspective laking: own perspective vs, imagined in-group vs, imagined out-
group) mixed ANOVA with repealed measures on the last two factors was
carried out on the attitude-guessing scores. There was a highly significant main
effect of perspective, F(l;8J) = 132.18,p < .001, partialni = .61. As can be
seen in Figure 3, this effect corresponds to the tendency that the estimated
explanation-provider attitude corresponded to the perspective from which the
explanation bad been provided, and it was independent of the actual provider
attitude (involved in mode of perspective Laking) when the explanations had
been provided from an out-group perspective. In other words, the participants
were able to "guess" the perspective of the explanation but not the explainer
ani tude when this attitude was no! congruent with the perspective. These results
are consistent with the initial predictions.
A result that breaks the overall pattern in Figure 3 is that the explanations
provided by opponents from their own perspective in fact received an average
score of M = 4.15 (SE = .17) - very close to the scale midpoint - from the
supporter judges. This indicates that the supporter participants had difficulties
determlning theattirude of the explanation provider, and at least in some cases
they ascribed the explanations to a supporter. The pattern results in significant
Participant Altitude X Perspective X Mode of Perspective Taking, F(2.; 83) =
3.28 P < .05, partial. T]2 = .04 and Perspective X Mode of Perspective Taking,
F(2; 83) = 5.56, p < .01 partial Tl2 = .06, interactions, as well as in a main effect
of mode of perspective taking, F(2; 83) = 4.94, P < .0 I, partial 112 = .06, and a
main effect of participant attitude. F( 1; 83) = 6.58·, p < .0S, partial 112 = .07.
Perhaps something in the contents of (a number of) these explanations made
them more- appealing to the supporter participants and disguised the fact that
they had been provided by an out-group member.
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ANOVAs were run also on the results of the four other questions asked
about each explanation. The results were highly similar for all four scores, and
they are summarized below according to the most often found effects. It should
be noted that we did not predict any relations between these variables.
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Therefore we carried out separate ANOVAs for each of the questions rather
than including all ofthem in one analysis.
Main effect of mode of perspective taking. A main effect of mode of
perspective taking was found in all four analyses, and in all cases the means
were in the same direction. For positivity ratings, F(2; 85) = 7.57, P < ..01,
partial 112= .08, own explanations were rated as more positive towards the target
group than the simulated in-group explanations (explanations given from the
imagined in-group perspective), or the simulated out-group explanations
(explanations given from the imagined out-group perspective). The
corresponding estimated marginal means were M = 4.58 (SE = 0.10) for own
explanations, M = 4..14 (SE = .J J) for simulated in-group explanations, and M=
4.22 (SE = .11) for simulated out-group explanations.
For rationality ratings, F(2.; 82) = 8.08, P < .001, partial n' = .09, own
expl-anations (M = 4.36, SE = 0.08) were rated as depicting the target behavior
as more rational than the simulated in-group explanations (M = 3.94, SE = .10)
or simulated out-group explanations (M = 4.05, SE =,10).
The same result was found for argumentation ratings, F(2; 82) = 4.68, P
< .05, pertial n' = .05, own explanations (M = 4.46, SE = 0..10) being rated as
better substantiated than the simulated in-group (M = 4.1 2, SE = .11) or out-
group (M = 4. 18, SE = .12)expl anations.
For t.he ratings of typicality. F(2; 80) = 4.30, P < .05, partial n2 = .0S, the
mean differences were smaller, although in the same direction. Own
explanations (M = 4.98, SE = 0.10) were rated as more typical than the
simulated out-group explanations (M = 4.63, SE =.11), but not significantly
different from the sim.ulated in-group explanations (M= 4.75 SE =.11),
Although the effect sizes are relatively small, it should be noted that the
same significant effect was found for all dependent variables, and the means
were always in the predicted direction. This is a clear indication that the
participants could see diffe-rences between the explanations provided from own
perspective and the imagined group perspectives.
Main effect of perspective. The main effect of perspective was the second
most common effect found. Again, in all cases the means were in the same
direction. Regarding he positivity rarlngs, F( I.; 85) = 23.61, P < .00 I, partial n'
= .22, the explanations provided from supporter perspective (M= 4.54, S£ =
.08) were rated as more positive than the explanations provided from opponent
perspective (M = 4.09, SE = .10). The same effect, although of smaller
magnitude, was present for ratings of rationality, Fe1; 82) = 7.91, P < .01,
partiall1! = .09, M,wp = 4.23 (SE = ,08), Mopp = 4~OO(SE = .08), and typicality.
F( 1; 80) = 4.89, p < .05, partial 112= .06, M.up = 4.90 tSE = .09), Mapp = 4.68 lSE
= .10).
In general, Study 2 confirmed our initial predictions. When asked to
guess the attitude of the explanation providers, the participants could correctly
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infer the perspective from which the explanation had been provided but not the
explainer attitude (in 'those cases when the attitude was opposite to the
perspecri ve), Regarding the ra ti ngs a f pas itivity, ratl anal ity, argum enta tion, and
typicality, the participants were able to see some quality in the explanations
provided from the explainers' own perspective, which differentiated them from
the simulated explanations given from the imagined in-group and out-group
perspectives. One may speculate that the same quality prompted the participants
of this study, as well as those of Study I, to agree more with explanations
provided from the explainers' own perspective.
General Discussion
The studies reported in this paper tested whether group perspective taking
is based on a shared reality thai Interacting social groups inhibit and construe.
According to the shared reality hypothesis, most of the time the groups should
be highly accurate when taking their opponent's perspective because the
opinions of the parties involved in the debate are exchanged regularly and are
freely accessible. We hypothesized Ihat the behavioral explanations produced as
a result of such perspective taking should be highly similar to the ones provided
by the members of the particular group themselves. Furthermore, we
hypothesized. that when presented with these explanations, they should detect no
difference between explanations provided by their in-group members, and those
provided by out-group members from tbe perspective oftheir group.
Both studies supported the hypothesis. Our conclusion is that in general
group members can recognize the perspective from which an explanation has
been provided irrespecti ve of whether the perspective has been taken by an in-
group or out-group member. However, they are not able 10 distinguish
effectively between perspectives that are congruent (in-group perspective) or
incongruent (out-group perspective) with theexplainer attitude. This leads LIS 10
speculate that there may be no perceivable basis for distinguishing between
these two types of perspectives as long as they reflect the common knowledge
about how both sides should explain both target behaviors. In general, our
results agree with previous findings that concluded that group members were
accurate in taking their opponents' perspective in various social contexts.
From a theoretical point of view, the most interesrlngfindlng in both the
reported studies is the stability of mode of perspective taking effect. Regardless
of the explainer attitude, the participants agreed more with the explanations
provided from the explainers' own perspective than with those given from
imagined in-group or out-group perspectives. Moreover/ explanations provided
from the explainers' own perspective, regardless of their attitude, were rated as
more positive, typical, better substantiated. In addition, interpreting the target
behavior was rated as more rational than the explanations provided from either
of the imagined group perspectives. The general tendency 'Is that the participants
perceived own explanations more favorably than the simulated explanations.
17
We think that these results support the hypothesis that the false polarization
effect results from. overestimation of bias in other people. One may speculate
that the participants' expectationof other people's bias in the Dirndins et al,
(20mb) study resulted in producing lower quality (perhaps simplified, more
extreme, or less reasonable) explanations from the imagined group perspectives,
which, in turn, resulted in lower agreement with these explanations in the
studies reported here.
On the one hand the presented results can be seen as illustrating the
efficiency of social debate in communicating theopinions between opposing
parties. The explanations provided from an our-group perspective turned out to
be of the same quality as those given from the in-group perspective. Explainers
on both sides of the debate knew very well bow the other side is supposed to
explain a certain target behavior, On the a-ther hand, the same results
demonstrate the inferior quality of the simulated explanations if compared with
the actual explanations from own perspective. It seems that people agree about
what is the social norm in. the case ofexplaining attitude-consistent behavior of
EU supporters and opponents: however, they do not 'themselves completely
agree with rhis norm. One may speculate that the false polarizatlon in the
explanations reflects a sort of pluralistic ignorance (Prentice & Miller, 1996;
Miller, Manin, & Prentice, 2000). By definition, pluralistic ignorance is a
widespread misperception of a group norm that leads toa situation where a
majority of the group members privately disagree with the norm, but
(erroneously) they assume that majority ofother group members support it. Our
results agree with such interpretation of the false polarization. effect.
The results are especially strong because we found significant differences
between how theexplanations given from own perspective and the imagined in-
group perspective were rated. In line with the findings on social influence and
the in-group role in forming people's opinions (Turner, 1991; Abrams et al.,
200 I), ilwould have been reasonable toexpect the explanations generated fron)
own and in-group perspective to he highJy similar. Our findings, however,
suggest that the participants were distancing themselves (in terms of lower
agreement) from the simulated explanations given from the in-group
perspective as strongly as from those given from the out-group perspective. It
seems that rather than representing a genuine shared social reality, the simulated
explanations reflect a "shared pseudo-reality" - an agreement beth between and
within two opposing groups about how both groups are supposed to explain
certain attitudes and attitude-consistent behaviors. However, this "reality" is
measurably different from how the group members in fact explain such
behaviors. Our results, along with other findings related to (he false polarization
effect illustrate the complexity of the question of how shared reality should be
defined and measured in the context ofintergroup perception.
One result deserving a comment is that in Study 2 theexplanations given
from the supporter perspective were seen as more typical than those given from
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the opponent perspective. For many years, all the major political forces in
Latvia (including opposition parties) have been promoting EU membership as
the main goal of Latvia's foreign policy, and for most of the 1990s pro-EU
arguments dominated the mass media. Only during the last couple of years, the
opinions of both sides have become more or less equally represented in the
public debate. It is possible that this fact was :reflected in the contents of the
explanations. Moreover, because the pro-Elf stance has represented the
mainstream opinion for so many years, EU opponents might arguably be seen as
partisans trying to change the status quo, Previous studies of partisanship and
status quo (e.g., Kray & Robinson, 2001, Keltner &. Robinson, 1997) have
Found that parties which are seen as trying to change the status quo, are
perceived as more extremist and evaluated less positively than parties
advocating the status quo. This could also have been reflected in the contents of
the explanations making the explanations from the opponent perspective sound
more extreme and from the supporter perspective sound more reasonable and
moderate. These are of course post hoc speculations not related to the main
pred ictions 0f the current study. However, these find ings poi nt to one pass ibIe
area of further research.
Two other interesting directions emerge for the future research, First. the
characteristics that makeown explanations more "attractive" than the simulated
group explanations seem to be context-free and independent ofthe perspectives
from which they had been provided. Denning these characteristics and
exploring their effects would improve our understanding of how biases are
mani fested and perceived in everyday discourse.
Another interesting question is whether the quality of arguments or
behavioral explanations provided from a group perspective would increase with
the individual's level of familiarity with the members of that group. In relatively
small social groups, people should be familiar with the actual opinions of most,
if not all, individual group members. This should. reduce ungrounded
assumptions of bias in others at least regarding topics that the group members
have sufflcienrly discussed among themselves. It IS feasible to speculate that in
such a case the simulated arguments Or explanations provided from the
imagined group perspectives would become truly indistinguishable from those
provided from the explainer's own perspective. Some initial findings suggest
that this speculation may be true (Kerndal & Montgomery, 2000). Further
research in this direction might help finding ways to reduce (he false
polarization effect and thus improve the quality of intergroup communication
and facilitate conflict resolution.
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Abstract
False polarization is an overestimarlcn of II gap between the views of two sides that occurs
because social perceivers expect their peers 10 be more susceptible to grou p norms than
themselves, Shared reality is a generic term denoting social verification. of information by
individuals and groups. This thesis explores the relation between shared social reallt)' and
falsc polarl2lltion In situations where lWO groups lake the perspett1ves elf each other. A
specie I emphasis i0 the thesis is put on irnergroup attributions, 1:0 Study I, two experl rnents
exerni ned the d] fferences between evaluative and descriptive ~Spe<:ISof Intergroup
perception, In Experiment I, Latvian and Russian students agreed on the descri ptive scores of
mutual ratings, but they disagreed oil the evaluanve ones. In Experiment 2, male and female
psychology students did nOI show anydlsagreernent either for evaluative or descriptive
scores, but theyexpected their peers to be in-group biased in eva! uation of both groups. In
Study 2, supporters and opponents or Latvia's EU membership exhibited a false polarization
effect when rnti:og various causal explanations of artiLudinnl behavior of both groups, Study 3
replicated this result with free responsecausal explanations. Contenranaiysis of the data
showed lhal simulated expianatlons of a Illrgel behavior given from the opposire group
perspectives differed more \in terms of perceiving the actors' awareness of causes of behavior
and in terms of using mental state markers) than those given from the partisans' own
perspective. til Stud)' 4,1,,",,0 eXpetilw::IIlSdemonsuated Ihal. EU supporters and opponents
could not differentiate betweenexplanauens given by in-group members and out-group
members who imagined the same perspective and responded more Iavorably to explanaiions
given from the explainers' own perspecuve than from the imagined perspectives, In general,
the results demonstrate the robustness of the false polarization effect ac ross various eomex IS ,
The Iindings also illustrate the cornplexitj- of tile term "shared social reali ty," Furthermore. in
the context of intergroup perception, these findings suggest that the most appropriate
operationalization of this concept should be shared stereotypes between groups.
Key "'ordJ: Shared reality, soei~1 reali t)', fa lse polarization effect. social pereepti on,
perception of bias, social categorizatiun, in-group fa\'orilisnL intergroup perception,
intergroup attribution, causal explanation.
